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The Review of Metaphysics

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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Concerning Non-Existence

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Summaries and Comments

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ARTICLES

ART, SUBSTANCES, AND REALITY *

PAUL WEISS

PHILOSOPHIES of art are rarely written by artists. Consequently, they tend to deal with art from the position of a spectator rather than from that of a creator. And quite soon they turn away from the very objects they were intending to study to discourse about the nature of judgment, the principles of evaluation, the use of aesthetic terms, and similar matters. Since theories of judgment, knowledge, and discourse have for the most part been developed in order to do justice either to the claims of commonsense or science, it is almost inevitable that they will fail to provide the categories and distinctions needed for an understanding of art. Most students of art who have made an effort to deal with it from the standpoint of its creators or, at the very least, in terms which are primarily appropriate to art, have therefore had to ignore the philosophic studies, with their bias towards commonsense and science. Unfortunately they allowed these studies to claim that they alone yielded unvarnished truth. Consequently students of art have been forced to speak of art as incapable of providing knowledge, and as offering instead only illusions, or inchoate expressions of feelings or emotions. Even ardent defenders of the arts have spoken of them as loci of paradoxes, as tissues of symbols and forms, and as exercises in self-deception. These traps can be avoided if one turns away from the discourses, not only of philosophers but of students of the arts, and makes an effort to see just what is in fact experienced, what its analytic components are, what these reveal, how they point to a reality beyond them all, and how this reality can be grasped through art.

What we experience is somewhat of a *mélange*, something at once *perceptual*, mediated by the sense organs; *scientific*, reflecting

* A part of this paper was read as the third of five Gates' lectures which I delivered at Grinnell College last November. An earlier version was read to the University of Chicago Philosophy Club in October.

our use of mathematical and other formal devices to make clear and systematic the causes of what is now taking place, and pointing us towards what might be expected; *eventful*, stretches of vital movement in which beginning and ending are, though separate, inescapably interlocked; and *important*, reflecting both our sense of value and the presence of an objective standard outside us and unaffected by our interests. Initially these strands are inchoately together, constituting commonsense objects, artifactual or natural, the occupants of the world of which we unreflectively take account. On some occasions one of these facets may be to the fore, on other occasions it may be so recessive that its presence is overlooked.

With shifts in interest, under the pressure of tradition, of language and technological needs, as a consequence of new discoveries, and the importation of prejudice and superstition, there is an alteration in the content of our commonsense world. What we now take to be commonsense is not altogether identifiable with what Aristotle, for example, accepted. It is hard for us to look at the stars without seeing them as having tremendous magnitudes, and as being at great distances in space and in time; it is hard for us to see the ethereal, regularly moving, not too distant perfections which Aristotle acknowledged. To know what is true in his or our commonsense view it is necessary for us to know the essential components of commonsense objects. This will enable us not only to free those objects from the assumptions and conditions read into them in a given historic period, but to free ourselves at the same time from confusion and distortion.

The problem of knowledge is not the problem of how a man, living in radical privacy, can go out into or be reached from an outside independent world; it is the problem of how he and objects, each somewhat inchoate and involved with one another across space and time, can become better focused, better organized. This is to be done by his stressing some one particular way of apprehending things, thereby analyzing out of the commonsense object some one strand which he can purify and master. He will not have adequate knowledge, however, until he purifies and masters other strands as well, and then finally sees how they all can be together. The unity of the different purified strands one

can isolate out of a commonsense object is a substance¹ more real than any of those strands, or the commonsense object from which they were abstracted.

The inchoate commonsense object of unanalyzed experience is the counterpart of men, unfocused, unclear, insufficiently organized. A sense datum is that commonsense object of daily experience shorn of all features except those evidenced through the use of sense organs. A perceptual object is a sense datum which is oriented in a substance adumbratively grasped as its locus and ground. Such a perceptual object is simple or complex, depending on whether it is exhibited to a judging unified being, making use of one or more sense organs. Some simple perceptual objects contain a number of distinguishable elements—a sound may vary in brightness over a stretch, a seen shape is also colored. A flash of light, a sound, a taste are simple perceptual objects; a seen pencil in the hand, a drink of water are complex perceptual objects.

Perceptual objects have a distinctive time, quite distinct from that which is characteristic of the commonsense object, and from what is characteristic of other strands. To isolate the perceptual object is to displace, distort, qualify the commonsense object and its characteristic time, space and movement. It is to place it in a time which issues out of the past and terminates in the present, with a vector towards the future, and is thus to make it be that which is available only if one makes use of memory, habits and experienced associations. I don't see a mere brown shape over there; I see a dog. Nor do I see it as just a lump in space; I see it as that which might run towards me, which might bark, and so on. But I would not so see it were it not that I face it now as in a present which issues out of a past where similar adventures had been undergone. Had I once had a traumatic experience with a dog I would encounter this one in the light of that experience. Evidently what I would see in the present would be the past

¹ I use this term to express what I think is the common core of ordinary and philosophical usage: A substance is any unified being capable of action or motion, or of opposing, resisting or rejecting such action or motion. A man, a cow, a tree are substances, and so is an idea on which a man might concentrate and which is thereby effectively enabled to resist the intrusions of the world.

prolongated. But a traumatic experience is just an ordinary experience, high-lighted, accented and upsetting. If it is operative in a present perceptual experience, other past experiences will be operative there too, though not so conspicuously.

What is perceptually known is in a time scheme overrun by the past. We do not move back in time when we perceive; we do not enter into the antecedents of the commonsense object. In the act of perception we utilize experiences from different regions of the past. By means of these we produce a perceptual object in which we, the remembering beings, and the present, encountered content are brought together. That object is what it is because what had been experienced in the past is effective in it now. By transmuting the inchoate commonsense object, which we inchoately confront, into the terminus of sense organs, and by affecting this terminus with the experiences we have had, we isolate a perceptual object in a present which is resonant with what had occurred in different regions of the past. An effective past is then and there made to be. It is not one in which light rays move or one which can be stretched backwards with a minus dating; it is an operative experienced past existing only in the context of present perception. That past tells us what to expect and thereby defines the incipient future which is relevant to the perception.

One perceptual object has affiliations with other perceptual objects of the same type, and no affiliations with those of a different type. The simple colored shaped object here has definite relations to that colored shaped object there, but no relation to the simple taste I also have.

A perceptual object not only has a distinctive time; it occupies a peculiar type of space. The space of sounds is distinct from, unrelated to the space of touch. The items in one of these spaces is related to another not primarily as distant or near, but as contrastive, oppositional, and supportive. In these spaces no change of place, no movement is possible. To change the nature of perceptual objects is to change the space, and conversely. Each fills out, vivifies and gives contours to a region of perceptual space.

Because there are distinct types of perceptual objects there are distinct types of perceptual space. The world of perception is a

world in which space has many distinct dimensions, each occupied by perceptual objects of a distinctive type. We know that there are many of them only because we are not wholly confined to a knowledge through perception.

The perceptual object also has its own characteristic dynamics, its own way of becoming, of changing. Changes in color differ in tempo, nature, rationale from changes in sound, or taste, or touch. Each change is purely phenomenal, leaving over no residue. Its being is exhausted in its career. It does not act, it does not persist; it exists merely as a changing thing.

Because the commonsense object is both visible and palpable, it embraces a plurality of rhythms. It is an irregularly pulsating thing, vibrating here and quiescent there, altering radically in one dimension while remaining comparatively unaltered in others.

The perceptual object is a changing object of the senses in a space of contrasts and complements, embracing a past which has been constituted by vital memory. It is not a substantial object. But, also, it is not a fiction. It is a strand, an abstracted object, or what is the same thing, it is a real object qualified in certain limitative ways. Each of these ways is on a footing with the others. Rails perceptually converge; seen oars in water are broken. To see the oar as broken is, as Merleau-Ponty observed, to see it in water. The fact that for certain purposes seen parallel rails and felt unbroken oars are to be treated as normative, and convergent rails and broken oars treated as illusory, in no way affects the fact that they are perceptually on a par. The distinction between the normative and the illusory is in fact one which requires a reference to something other than perception—to some other strand and its demands, or to the substantial commonsense object underlying all strands. If we want to measure, or if we want to row, we assess the different perceptual objects according to their capacity to make evident whether and how we are to act on the commonsense object.

Scientific objects, like perceptual objects, are commonsense entities subject to special qualifications. If we want to deal with the cup before us in formal terms, as a complex of variables and

mathematical functions², we must neglect the perceptual and other strands in it. We must abstract from that object—or what is the same thing, we must subject it to various special conditions. It is wrong to suppose that the result is an illusion, and wrong to suppose that the result is the real. Nor is the result a commonsense object purged of an irrelevant subjective or distortive element. It is a commonsense object re-defined, given a new context, role, and meaning.

The scientifically known world has its own characteristic time. That time is unlimited backwards and forwards. It has an endless past and an endless future. It is a time, however, which is merely formal, a sheer structure of before and after without any earlier or later within it, a sequence of numbers with plus and minus signs. We say sometimes that we look up into the sky and see a star which existed millions of light years ago. Now it is evident that we cannot look back into an actual past; this has passed away. And if it remained, we would have to look back into it instantaneously and thus traverse millions of light years in the blink of an eye. The star we are looking at is evidently not the substantial star existing at some remote time. Yet we must not suppose that the star we see is inside our minds, or that it was something we projected outwards under the stimulus of some physical object which had its origin in the star. Such suppositions would force us to give up all recourse to scientific evidence. Scientific evidence is objective, public evidence; it is not inside minds or projected outwards from them. It would also be incorrect to say, as I once

² There are of course "descriptive," non-mathematical, "natural" sciences, such as botany, geology, astronomy, anthropology, economics and sociology (all of which have mathematical branches). And some of them consider single occurrences—the origin of a variety or species, the growth of a mountain, the explosion of a nova, the distribution of wealth in a slave society of feudal origin. These sciences, even when occupied with actual processes and focused on commonsense objects, are primarily concerned with patterns which are to be interlocked with a series of patterns to constitute a single abstract strand. They are in effect scientific strands which are oriented in commonsense objects, in contrast with the mathematical sciences whose strands are entirely disoriented. The orientation, though, does not bring them into the area of commonsense or other substances, but merely qualifies, alters and enriches the meaning of the terms used.

did, that the star I see is a real star in the present.² This would require one to identify the perceptual with the substantial star, and to hold that the substantial star does not have a scientifically knowable aspect.

The past of the perceptual star is an experienced past. The past of the scientifically known star is not experienced, not remembered. It is a past in which nothing ever happened, because it is in fact nothing more than a past date to which I assign the star in the attempt to provide a law-abiding account of the operation of causes having the star as focus. What is now in existence must be credited with a great magnitude and a remote date in the past if it is to be properly expressed in mathematical terms. Its effects must also be given remote dates in the future if we are to understand what its law-abiding effects can be. Even this cup now in my hand must be assigned a past date if I am to deal with it scientifically. I must treat it as a teeming set of sub-microscopic entities whose turmoil is to be dated as earlier than the date I ascribe to my vision and touch. For science an object has a position in a series of dates which never happened and never will happen, but which can be called past and future by virtue of their positions as before and after what is dated as the present.

The space of a scientific object is also peculiar to it. It is not a space which things occupy. It is just a geometry with positions and vectors, but no roominess, no extensionality, no place for movement or change. The perceptual star is over the chimney we say; the scientific star is millions of miles distant. The 'nearness' of the perceptual star is not of the same type as the 'distance' of the scientific star. Both are correct ways of speaking, but neither tells us where the substantial star is. That star is neither perceptually nor scientifically defined, and is therefore neither in the space of the one nor of the other. These spaces are derivatives of, abstractions from a real space which has properties quite distinct from theirs. The substantial star, to be sure, has a magnitude, but this magnitude is distinct from that characteristic of the scientifically characterized star. The magnitude of the latter is a matter of

² See my *Modes of Being* (Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1958), p. 209.

numbers, not of extension; it is a magnitude which takes up no room, fills out no space; but a substantial star is spread out, pushing aside other things, filling up a real space.

The scientific object also has a distinctive dynamics. There is no change which it allows, no coming to be or passing away which it encompasses. It is just a set of logical transitions, exhibiting laws which relate causes and effects. This fact is overlooked or distorted when we turn, without reflection, from the theoretical achievement of science to the engineering and technological usages to which it has been put. Those usages take us outside the realm of the scientific objects to substances, where scientific, perceptual and other strands are intertwined. It is only such substances which are capable of being moved, used, worked over; only these have power, potentiality, the capacity to ground a plurality of changes, to remain self-same as they alter in space, to persist through time, and to act. What exists all on the surface, here and now, or what is exhausted in formulae or derivations from these, has nothing left over which can persist, resist, act, move. To find what can do these things we must enter the world of substances, either through the powers of our own substance or by means of those resident in or made available by tools, instruments, and similar objects.

An event is distinct both from a perceptual and a scientific object. It has its own time, wholly present. Past and future are not relevant to it; they exert no pressure on it. If an event is now affected by what had been, it is because some exterior power is bringing that past to bear on it; if it is now being influenced by the prospects before it, it is because some power in control of it compels the event to conform to them. Existing only in the present, the event occurs in an atomic moment. It is like a scientific object compressed within a tiny span; it is like a perceptual object, something to be encountered only by abandoning a stress on formulae, necessities and structure; it is unlike either, having a distinctive time of its own, a time which encompasses the whole of the event's pace and its single adventure of becoming, a time which perishes as it comes to be.

The space of an event is also peculiar to it. It is a space of interlocked vectors which knot together and untie to make the

career of an event a set of tensional configurations differing from moment to moment. The vectors of the event reach beyond its boundaries to terminate in other spatial events, thereby constituting with them an intervening environing space for all. Each event is an extended tensed region inside a larger spatial whole, an island in a sea it has helped constitute.

Each event also has a characteristic way of taking place. A locus of sheer activity, an ongoing, a happening, a process of causation freed from causes and effects; there is no accounting for it, no rules or controls, no compulsions to which it is subject, no directions it must follow. It has a dynamics of its own. Whatever laws and necessities there be are submerged in it, subjugated by it, made to conform to the event's career. An event is mere process, exhausting itself in its becoming, incapable of acting or being acted on. The paradox of process philosophies such as Bergson's or Whitehead's is that they do not allow for any possibility of action, creation or movement, for as we saw, these demand the existence of substances, expressly denied by these philosophies. Such philosophies therefore have no room for ethics, politics, engineering, art, or anything else which demands that there be something that can act, move, or make.

An action embraces a series of events. That series is no more and no less real than the events which compose it. It is an abstraction just as they are. Scientific and perceptual objects can at times show us where changes in an action's pace and direction occur. They cannot tell us what the action's space, time, and rhythm are like. A space ship will be aimed at some planet through the help of mathematics. It will, as its camera will make evident, face a series of perceptual objects, at one extreme of which is the perceptual object seen from here, and at the other extreme of which is the perceptual object to be seen when the ship arrives. But the ship will move in a space and over a time which is encompassed by neither the mathematical nor perceptual strands. One cannot travel to a scientific or perceptual object, for these are not to be found in the dimension where traveling takes place. When we travel in the light of what we learn from science and perception we are moving towards a substance and as substances. Our traveling is an event, but one which is sustained and produced by something other than

it. If we isolate the traveling movement, we will separate out a strand of mere action, of events, which is no less but also no more real than the strands isolated by science and perception.

A fourth strand is the strand of importance. Here there is also a distinctive time, and space, and dynamics, coordinate with those characteristic of the perceptual, scientific and eventful objects. Its time is essentially future, and the present and the past are for it items which are temporal and significant only in the light of the standard which the future imposes. Here time seems to run backwards, transforming dead material into pointers for it. It is this time which is stressed in those philosophies of history that look at all history in the light of the day of last judgment. In a less striking way it is the time employed by every historian in the course of his re-presentation of the past. In such a time the past is made, produced by the future, out of material which would otherwise be just hard data, without order or temporal meaning. It is a time which is the reciprocal of that which we encounter in a perceptual strand.

The space of the important is one of affiliations, of help and opposition, of intensification and frustration, of adoption and rejection. It is a space which, like that of science, reaches far beyond the powers of perception, but which, like perception's space, has a qualitative, intensive character. It is a space which, like that of an event, encompasses an area inside of which the content is to be found, but which, unlike the space of an event, makes connection with all there is.

The dynamics of the important is one of mastery and subjugation, of assertiveness over against, and submissiveness to others. Here we have shifting alliances and disassociations which force items into a valuational hierarchy. It is a process in which an ideal conquers content, in which there is no genuine passing away and no real coming to be, but only re-alignment perpetually. Here teleology operates; what is possible governs what is. Cosmically, it is the dynamics of some final perpetually dominating value. In a more limited guise it is the dynamics of our re-assessments of our accomplishments.

Each of the four strands, perceptual, scientific, eventful and important, can be made the object of a judgment. Each can be

then analyzed into a component making evident where or how an item is to be located, another making evident its meaning or nature, and a third expressive of the unity of the two. The third element is rooted in the strand itself and merges imperceptibly into a background in which something more substantial can be faintly discerned. All the strands are thus open to knowledge, and all of them can be recognized to be aspects of something more concrete than they.

Each of the four strands has a tonality, an aesthetic quality which can be immediately encountered, apart from all judgment. This quality is the terminus of an aesthetic experience, of an unconceptualizing mode of acknowledgment. The quality has often been thought to be the primary concern of art or at least of an artistic sensitivity, in part because it has been confused with the very being of an encountered substance. Actually it is only an abstraction from an abstraction, not to be identified either with a strand or with a substance from which strands are derived. It takes sensitivity to be alert to the immediate nature of any strand, and such sensitivity is not to be despised. But the artist or the spectator of art has a much more penetrating concern. He has an ontological, not a phenomenological interest in what he and other things are.

We see a movement on the screen. "That is not a real movement," we are told. "It is only the apparent movement of a moving picture, the result of passing a number of stills so rapidly before the eye that they cannot be distinguished. What is seen is only a semblance of a movement, an illusory motion, something imagined, not motion in fact." It is of course true that we do not see an actual man then and there move; we see an abstraction from this. Just as the man we report in anatomy or biology is not a real man but an abstraction from him, so the man and the movement which we see on the screen are not realities but abstractions from these. However, the two types of abstraction are distinct. An anatomical structure or biological activity exhibits a man and his activity under conditions which make them intelligible, but not necessarily similar to, imitative of what the man and his activity are in and of themselves. The movement seen on the screen is a distinct type of movement—the perceivable movement

of a commonsense object subjected first to camera distortions and then to montages, splicings, discontinuities, in the effort to make the seen movement iconic with a real existential movement. The one, in short, is offered as iconic of an abstraction, the other is offered as iconic of a reality. Biology claims to report what is scientifically the case; the screen claims to report what is ontologically the case. The former has left ontology behind even though what it speaks of are not qualities, accidents, but the essence of a man; the latter leaves appearances to a side, even when it confronts us with a picture and not with what is being pictured.

The movement on the screen is a created movement. Precisely because it is not a part of an abstracted strand, it must report either something less or something more real than that which any strand can. If it reports what is less real, there is no art and apparently no artifact, from bombs to paintings, from books to automobiles which must not be viewed as a kind of beguiling error, falsifying what in fact is the case. If, on the other hand, it tells us more than any strand can, it must reveal something beyond the reach of the wisest commonsense, the most acute perception, the most developed science, the most effective action, or the most accurate evaluation. The space of a painting, the time of a poem, the dynamics of a dance are ways of portraying a space, time, and dynamics more real than any to be found in a strand.

That the various strands belong together seems quite clear. The real is more than what is revealed in perception, science, action or evaluation. But we have no way of showing what the nature of that real is except by making use of the strands with which we are acquainted. We take it for granted that a strand is the real. We recognize it to be an abstraction only when we become aware of other strands no less and no more real than it, and recognize that no strand has potentialities, sufficient complexity, or the capacity to stand over against us, which it should have if it is to be on a footing with us. We are substantial active beings, with an interiority; we subtend any strands one might abstract from us; what cannot oppose us in the very terms with which we insist on ourselves must be an abstraction from something as real as ourselves.

We combine our acceptance of a given strand with the

recognition that it and others are abstractions, by treating it as the ground in which the other strands can be located. Sometimes we take the perceptual object, sometimes the scientific object, sometimes the event, and sometimes the important object, to be basic, depending on whether we are functioning primarily as bodies, minds, emotions, or wills. By means of emotions, for example, we bring to bear something of our substance on the event we confront to make it the locus of the perceptual, formal and important strands. The result is the acknowledgment of a substantial occurrence which is primarily but superficially exhibited in an event, and which is expressed in the guise of perceptual, formal, or important objects. In a similar way we use the perceptual object to make possible an acknowledgment of individual natural substances, use scientific objects to make possible an acknowledgment of substantial instruments, and use important objects to make possible an acknowledgment of substantial sacramental objects.

A known substance is partly our own product. What we initially encounter are either commonsense objects, or strands derived from these. The former are substances but only inchoately grasped; the latter are known but are only abstractions. It is when we make use of one of these strands as the unitary ground of the other strands that we find ourselves faced with known substances. I come to know the substantial tree I vaguely apprehended in commonsense experience when I recognize its cellulose and rings, its life and rhythms, its grace and beauty, to be rooted in what had been perceptually apprehended as a rough, brown-and-green, upright and spreading thing. I come to know the substantial ruler I vaguely apprehend in commonsense experience when I recognize a yellow inflexible strip, a sluggish event and a desirable tool to be imbedded in what I understand to be a rigid, stable, repetitively demarcated object.

Each one of us is a substance who can know four different types of substance. In each of these substances a distinct set of three abstract strands are intertwined and rooted in a fourth. These substances have something like the space, time, and dynamics of that fourth strand; but precisely because they are loci of other strands as well, each with its own type of space, time and dynamics,

the substances have a space, time and dynamics not identical with what is to be found in any of its four strands. That is why we cannot know what their space, time, and dynamics are by studying any or all of those strands. We can know the space, time, and dynamics of substances only in an experience which cuts beneath the strands to the being which we are then and there constituting to stand over against all other beings. Known substances are the inchoate commonsense objects of daily life, reconstructed, purified, reorganized, made the firm correlatives of ourselves.

Known substances are constituted by us out of materials we derive from commonsense things. If we use the materials in a creative way, our emotions help us constitute the nature of the resulting product, while still enabling us to hold it over against other substances. There are four types of known substance, and there are four types of known created substance. No one of them can be identified with what is ultimately real. The ultimately real must embrace all types. To know it we must combine all types, or use one of them to represent all.

A combination of different types of known substance is difficult to achieve. When we retreat into our privacies, when we fully obligate ourselves, when we pray, and when we act with radical spontaneity, we do sometimes bring about such combinations for fleeting moments, and thereby come to have quick glimpses of ultimate reality. We are then in immediate relationship to reality, and see it to have properties other than those possessed by any substance. But we also lose the distance and the release which are so necessary for a leisurely apprehension. A surer, steadier grasp of reality results if we use one type of substance to represent the rest. Yet if anything less than a created substance is used, we will be dependent on the presence and functioning of something over which we have little control. The passive use of available materials yields opaque substances which can function as representatives of a further reality only by assuming the role of signs pointing to what is distinct from them. They do not enable us to know the texture, the feel of that ultimate reality, but only that it is the ground or locus of substances. To get the feel of reality we must use created substances, functioning as representatives of all others. Since those created substances are partly constituted by our emo-

tions they will of course tell us not what reality is in and of itself, but what it is as emotionally charged, as having relevance to us.

As a representative of reality, a substance offers a neutral report of its nature; as emotionally constituted, it is particularly germane to only one mode of reality. Elsewhere I have tried to show that there are four irreducible modes of reality, each of which is best grasped in some one discipline. The created representative substances of philosophy are emotionally sustained ideas exhibiting the texture of real private actualities. Mathematics provides us with emotionally sustained meanings which exhibit the texture of real pure possibilities. The texture of a real, accepted ultimate unity is conveyed by the created representative substances of unchanging structures. And the created representative substances of art, finally, are emotionally sustained works exhibiting the texture of a real existence. Each discipline forges an account of one real mode of being.

The modes of being are at a distance and quite distinct from the created substances which we use to represent them. How could these substances then have the texture of these beings in them; how could they serve to represent them in any other way than by functioning as distant signs of them? I know no better way of answering this question than by taking advantage of an insight of Thomas Aquinas⁴ relating to a somewhat different question. There are, he saw, two types of meaning, forms or ideas—those which portray essences or meanings in and of themselves, and those which portray such essences as having residence in something other than themselves. A sphere⁵ is a mathematically defined object. The idea of a sphere gives us the entire essence, nature, meaning of the sphere. There is no claim here that the sphere exists in the world or that it has any function or role in some other context. A balloon is a sphere made of nylon or some such material. If I have an idea of a balloon I have an idea of a material sphere, of a sphere in material. I do not have the material inside my mind, but I do have in my mind something more than the idea of a mere sphere and something other than the idea of

⁴ See his *Essence and Existence*.

⁵ The illustration is my own.

the essence or structure of nylon. The idea I have of the balloon is iconic of a sphere as possessing the texture of some material. If I just had an idea of material I would have another idea alongside that of the sphere; I have texture in mind only by having the conceived material function as a residence for the conceived sphere. That texture is capable of being made integral to the sphere only so far as that sphere is seen to be richer in meaning than it was before. I conceive of a balloon only so far as I conceive of a sphere which is capable of existing, of being resident in the material. If I invent the idea of a balloon I not only know what a sphere is like but grasp the fact that it is embedded in material. The texture of that material distinguishes the balloon from the sphere; the mental grasp of the texture distinguishes the idea of the balloon from that of the sphere. If there is no balloon in fact, the texture I have in mind is that of some material or other.

The texture I have in mind is but a faint copy of the texture I experience. But when I make something I use material and thereby get an experience of the texture. If that material is made integral to a meaning more comprehensive than that of a substance, its texture will, if appropriate to that meaning, convey to us the texture of the being in which that meaning is resident. This is what happens when we treat a work of art as self-sufficient. We then make the work not only represent existence but convey something of its meaning and being.

Not every work of an artist can be treated as self-sufficient. It may be too incomplete, too chaotic, too frustrating, too tight, or too loose. To be self-sufficient, we must be able to remain with it. We must not only push aside everything else to enjoy it, but must find that, by doing so, we achieve a peace, a satisfaction, a completeness we did not have before.

It is the case, of course, that the cheap, the tawdry, the sentimental are sometimes found to satisfy men. Such works are at most minimal works of art and are only faintly revelatory of reality. Their being does not require a full emotional involvement, either to constitute them or to enable them to stand apart from other substances. Instead of being deliberately held over against the rest of the world, the rest of the world is in part carelessly ignored for the moment and in part allowed to intrude. And what

is made of the work or read in it is some idea or feeling which the work fails to entrap because it lacks the appropriate texture. The sentimental work is one with which a man might be content. But it is neither substantial enough, nor capable of utilizing his emotions. Those who remain with such a work do not often know of its poverty. But others, who see that such a work does not do justice to the joys or tragedies of men, or who have had experience with other works of art, can judge it with considerable objectivity and accuracy.

"But what reason," it might properly be asked at this juncture, "do we have for assuming that the texture of the substantial, emotionally affective, and self-sufficient work of art reproduces the texture of a reality beyond it? Perhaps there is no such reality. If the only evidence we have of it is provided by art, obviously we cannot say that there is anything outside the art which answers to it." The point is most acute. No one, so far as he is immersed in art, knows whether or not there is a reality beyond it. However, we can get at least three assurances that there is such a reality; each tells us something of that reality and thereby provides us with checks on what art portrays.

We live in a commonsense world whose substances are caught in a dynamic field. Those substances interact and move into the future concordantly. In the region between the various substances we know, we are aware of a power embracing and affecting them all. That power is the power of existence. Secondly, we come to learn through speculation something of the categoreal nature of being, the features it has at every time and in every place; we know through speculation something of every mode of being in itself and in relation to others, though only, of course so far as these can be caught in abstract concepts. Finally, we ourselves are substances who know, who interact with and live together with other types of substance: This we can do only because we enter into a domain which is inclusive of us both. We are always acting inside a reality less specialized and limited than ourselves or other substances. What art portrays can then be checked by what had been independently discovered through commonsense experience, philosophic inquiry, and practical action. These make evident

to us aspects of the real in terms of which the relation of art to reality can be judged—and conversely.

Art offers only one way of grasping ultimate reality—or more sharply, existence as pertinent to man. Art is man's way of making existence his own, and incidentally grasping something of the nature of other modes of being. It is not then the immediacy of the artist's experience, or the rendition of such immediate experience with accuracy or insight that distinguishes his work from that of other men. He might not be interested in immediate experience; he might concern himself with ordinary commonsense objects in their conventional settings. Or he might be interested in substances. In any case it will be his task to deal with space, time, and becoming independently of the manner in which they function in daily life or in known substances. Only by exploring them in their own terms can he grasp what existence is in fact, apart from the limitations to which commonsense experience or different substances subject them. If he portrays familiar things in his works it is only for the sake of enabling him and others to locate themselves better in that deeper, more ominous challenging world which man has a need to master, but which he cannot adequately deal with so long as he tries to act on it directly, or to study in the shape in which it appears in daily encounters.

A work of art is actually unique, ideally complete and existentially insistent. But most evidently it is self-sufficient, final, worthy of man's most passionate devotion. And it is this because it presents him with the nature and texture of what is in fact self-sufficient, final, worthy of man's most passionate devotion. This it can do because it is produced by holding real existence at a distance in the course of an emotional creation of a new space, a new time, or a new becoming.

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HUMAN LIKENESS AND THE FORMATION OF EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS

EDWARD CALHOUN

THE GENERAL PROBLEM with which I shall deal is how we recognize objects of experience, and, in particular, the formation of the concept through which we know what we think a given object is. Toward a solution of this problem, I shall suggest that one element in the formation of concepts of objects of experience is the likeness of the experiencer to himself. The way I think of this likeness must emerge in the account of its function.

I shall add to this suggestion that what we would ordinarily think of counting as concepts—those for which we can find words—demand an extension or distribution of this likeness among those who use language together. I have little confidence in a method that would look to words for the original derivation of concepts. It seems clear that sounds or written signs that are to pass for words must be recognized as words. No signal or indication that this is what they are will gain for them this recognition, unless the signal is itself recognized. A concept, as I am thinking of it, is presupposed in any act of recognition. It is, to speak broadly, the knowing what to think of an object that may be given.

The process of forming concepts has some life to it. My understanding of it is not complete enough that I dare take it too much apart into its elements. Classic classroom propositions like "this is a table" have always disturbed me when they were offered as prime expressions of knowing. They are very nearly empirical tautologies, if such a thing is possible. They are statements which simply would not get made in practice, except in the teaching of language or epistemology. It is possible, of course, to suppose that a child might be idly scratching with a fork beside his plate, and his mother might say to him, "That's a table, you know." But the child whose response to this utterance was a mere assent to the truth of the expressed proposition would prove himself either unbelievably dull or a master of the arts of domestic politics.

A proposal should finally stand the test of close analysis, but it is sometimes better at the beginning to make an estimate of the subject matter in terms of plausible generalization. Before making an exploratory operation it is well to have a general idea of where to start cutting. I shall begin, then, with what belongs to one popular image of the philosopher, an attitude of homely observation.

I shall take for illustration the experience of teaching professionally and distinguish with respect to it three senses of knowing. That sense of knowing for which I am seeking an account is that in which concepts play their most obvious role. It is represented in a man of whom we say, "He knows teaching," meaning that he is a competent judge of what takes place in a teaching situation. If we add in support of our statement that the man is an experienced teacher, we clearly are not saying that he has been experienced by a number of students. We do not mean, either, simply that he has suffered many, many hours of listening to himself hold forth. We mean that he *has* experience, and has significantly *more* experience in teaching than is usual.

Now this use in ordinary speaking of the term "more" with regard to experience must startle reflection. Everyone has experience, or is having experience, at least while he is conscious. It is possible that in degree of consciousness there is a meaningful basis for judgments of more and less with regard to having experience. But the limits of variation are too narrow to allow the proportion by which the experienced teacher has *so much more* experience than the inexperienced. It is quite possible, even, that in the classroom the consciousness of the moment of having experience is more heightened for the inexperienced teacher than for the experienced.

Having experience in the way of being for the moment affected is not the way one has it who is experienced. It comes closer to the sense of the proportion of the experienced to the inexperienced to bring in past time to give meaning. Length of time has, to all appearance, wider limits of variation with respect to quantity of experience than has degree of consciousness, or degree of being sensibly affected.

Nevertheless, it is not precisely our meaning to say that the man knows teaching because he has spent a lot of time doing it.

The two are not necessarily connected. Teaching might by now have driven the man out of his mind. We do not say that he has *had* much experience, but that he *has* much experience. This way of having is distinctive, if the quantitative modifier "much" is to retain any meaning. One neither has a long series of past experiences all gathered up in a supreme moment of present consciousness, nor does one have such a series, in the sense required for "being experienced," simply by the living through those times. The one who has all this experience is in many ways different from the one who was going through the experience he now has. Not the least of the differences is that the time for having a quantifiable experience is the present, even though a determination of particular quantity may be derived from length of past experience.

The way of having that is distinctive here is the way of grasping through concepts. The man who has a lot of experience and knows teaching is the man whose thinking is informed with rules for taking a wide variety of materials and situations that come up in teaching for what they are—for what they are, that is, in regard to the facts and purposes that make teaching what it is. He can tell pretty well whether he is getting something across or not, and he can judge whether it deserves the time it takes.

There is a great deal, of course, that goes on in a classroom of which the teacher, simply as teacher, is not thoroughly competent to judge—things to which he cannot give full and explicit recognition without diffusing his own function to the point of ineffectiveness. Some of these things are physical, some medical; some would be better understood by the psychologist or historian, some by the master of dramatic or poetic art; some, of course, are better understood by the students themselves. From the point of view of social justice, it may well be true that some of the members of the class have small right to their places there. This may be a fact of greater importance, finally, than that this teacher's classroom is a good place to learn. It is a fact, nevertheless, which a professional teacher, once the class hour begins, must all but ignore. He can give it explicit recognition no more effectively than does the mother who uses the example of starving children to try to get her own child to clean his plate.

This definition of a context of reference within which clearly

discriminating judgments can be made is a prime characteristic of the fully formed grasp of a situation through concepts. The possibility of this definition, however, is not clearly explained through the concepts which presuppose it, nor through other theoretic concepts. The educator who knows education may know a good deal more about the elements and wider relations of teaching than does the teacher himself. With all this, he may quite well fail to understand teaching itself. In the classroom he may fail to give that definition to the situation by which he is able to discriminate, for example, between dullness, confusion, inattention or bias in the student and ineffectiveness of the presentation.

To find a source of explanation for this definition of a context within which judgment by concepts becomes possible, I shall turn to the two other senses of knowing which I want to distinguish. I have no suggestion that these ways of knowing are non-cognitive. That would be, at best, a very mixed use of words. I do not think that concepts play no role in these ways, nor that the drawing of distinctions produces absolute separations. I do think that these senses of knowing are different, that concepts function differently with respect to the knowing, and that an examination of these other functions can illuminate the possibility of the detached, theoretic, or objective judgment.

Of a man teaching, or setting out to teach, we may say, "He knows what he is doing." We do not mean simply that he is capable of making the theoretic proposition, "I am doing or am about to do that which is called teaching." Neither do we mean precisely that he has a scientific understanding of how he is affecting his environment, narrow and wide. We mean primarily that he has taken responsibility for his action, that he is relatively sure of his determination to teach, even under conditions which he cannot entirely foresee.

This "knowing what he is doing" is not for the teacher immediately related to the possession of experience. The man who goes into the classroom to "get experience teaching," is still a graduate student who has not finally made up his mind. If he thinks he is becoming a teacher by getting experience, he doesn't really know what he is doing. Getting the kind of experience by

which a teacher becomes experienced presupposes his having known all along, in some way, what he was doing. Otherwise, it is likely that he will turn out an experienced pedagogue, not a teacher.

In some ways the certainty of determination is most distinct at the outset of a demanding activity like teaching. The determination is not yet tested, but it is less likely to have become misdirected. In the midst of the experience and its unforeseen difficulties, the teacher may be taken up with what kind of a teacher he is. If this usurps the center of his concern, he gets lost. Under this kind of pressure he may say and even mean that he no longer knows what he is doing teaching. At such a time, a recollection of his earlier self or a reminder by another less touched by the facts of life of teaching may bring him back to himself.

There is a kind of innocence or hopefulness which characterizes the distinctly practical approach to experience of one who knows what he is doing. This is perhaps because the determination is so centered upon the accomplishment of a chosen object that the subject is simply expected to meet any instrumental conditions laid upon it. A determined man who counted in his determination the reflection that he might not prove to be so determined in the event, would simply not be very determined. This is the nature of practical determination. It centers upon making its object possible, not on measuring the potentialities of the subject. The object of undertaking to teach lies in the advancement of common understanding, not in the addition of one more teacher to society. To forget this is to lose the possibility of forming rules of judgment with any objective application within the limits of teaching. Attributes of personal charm or impressiveness lie somewhat outside these limits.

Nevertheless, no one becomes a true professional without finding out what it is like to teach. Mere determination will not give this kind of knowledge. There is a kind of blindness about rigid determination that prevents the merely practical man from being practical at all. He is unable to become the sort of agent who can bring about the object he sets himself. Knowledge of what one is doing teaching is prerequisite, but to know what it is like to teach is a way of knowing distinct from this.

A demanding occupation does something to the one who

undertakes it. In this case, what it should do is make a teacher of him. This kind of experience is not, perhaps, so distinct in teaching as in many arts and skills which deal more directly with the natural environment. A situation like teaching, defined almost entirely in human terms, often does not draw its lines too sharply.

Someone who has spent countless hours practicing a musical instrument may one day find himself playing what actually sounds like the music he intended. Now why should this be such a distinctive personal experience when he is only doing at last what he has been trying long enough to do? It is because until he actually plays music, it is other people who are musicians. It is only when his determination to play, which makes the music possible, issues in actual music that he knows what it is like to be one who plays music. It is then that he begins to be a musician, something else than intending to play music.

This objectification, or better perhaps, realization of the subject of action, cannot be brought about directly through practical determination. The attempt misdirects and corrupts genuine productive intention. It results in "acting like," not in "knowing what it is like." Subjective realization is effected through a receptivity to the objective actuality upon which productive determination is directed.

Teaching works changes in the worker. Some of these changes, of course, can be quite disturbing, even dangerous. Teaching has many pitfalls. There is the sense of being bloated, which reflects the illusion that one's words are being multiplied by twenty-five eager minds. There is the fluency which one does well to watch closely. There is the casualness which comes from the many chances one will have to teach the same thing again, if one can forget that the student gets only one education. Put together a sort of largeness, a fluency and a certain superiority to history, and one can quite well affect the college teacher. One must sometimes wonder whether this is all one is doing.

Subjectivity alone, a sense of good intention, will not answer such a question. This is why it is necessary to have known at some time what one was doing teaching, to be able to recall this determination and to reapply it. But it is as dangerous as forgetting one's object to ignore what it is like to be doing one's work,

badly or well as the case may be. It is necessary, finally, that the one who is doing one's teaching be a teacher. A teacher must be a fully functioning person. In the case of one's own work the only candidate is, of course, oneself. This being a teacher, the one who actually does teaching, is not a practical object to work for, but it can be given back by the practically directed work. It is something which one does not produce but accepts or acknowledges in oneself. This receptivity to one's working is of first importance, for it is here that signs are given that original determination must be matured if its hope is not to become an illusion. The work which is making an ass of the worker is due for redirection.

What teaching makes of the one undergoing the experience may at a given time be a mess. He may be almost without hope though ready to acknowledge that he has had experience. Someone who knew him at the outset of his career may say that he is not the same person. Knowing what he is doing and finding out what it is like does not necessarily give him an integrated personality.

Say that knowing is an integral act, that it takes a person's full participation. Say that in knowing what he is doing and in knowing what it is like, a person is not necessarily the same. Then agree that the distinctive mark of the professional, the man who knows his work, is his responsibility—that he is the same person both in determining his work and in acknowledging it. What he does is like him. In this likeness to himself, then, we may have come upon a possibility of that detachment which is the remarkable subjective characteristic of objective judgment. For productive knowing and receptive knowing each take up the whole subject in an integral relation to the object, one active, the other passive. If it is the same person in either relation, the activity and passivity may balance each other off.

The practical determination to effect an object adds to the object a supposition of contingency. I would not take the trouble to determine to teach if I thought I would teach anyway. For although I determine to teach without including in my object the fact that it will be me teaching, this is nevertheless the fact. Teaching which is to be *my* teaching is contingent upon my doing it, even though the object is simply that something shall be taught.

In having an object at all in a practical way, I add to it its dependence upon being my object, even though this reference to me is inappropriate to the object taken theoretically.

In being personally affected by my dealing with an object I withdraw contingency from the object. That which makes me a teacher cannot but be teaching, though to the physical elements it may be little more than a slight stir in the air. This withdrawal of contingency due to my being the one affected in a given way is in contrast to the theoretic requirement that an object of experience is what it is only with regard to the frame of reference in which it is taken.

Now it is interesting to note that the practical commitment to an object adds contingency to the knowledge *that* it is. The acknowledgment in oneself of the object withdraws contingency from the knowledge of *what* it is. This addition and withdrawal of contingency may be balanced off if essence and existence are differentiated in the object. It is only objectivity which presumes that the object is what it is.

To recognize that an object is what it is begins the theoretic way of knowing and distinguishes it from the two ways that experience brings to a likeness. To make this likeness—which is the justification for discounting the subject—appropriate to objectivity, it is necessary to undo the adding or withdrawing of contingency. This is what is done in the proposition of empirical fact. Just in so far as I determine to experience the object by paying attention to it, I take it as given, as non-contingent in *that* it is. On the other hand, just in so far as I am taken up with the object in what is for me a definite way, I take it as contingent in *what* it is upon the fact that it only appears to me, according to my way of experiencing it.

There are two grounds for the adjustment of contingency and non-contingency to obtain detached objectivity. The first ground is the likeness of the personal subject in his productive and receptive interaction with the object. Only this likeness, as a sign of balance, justifies taking the object objectively, as not containing in its experience subjective content. This likeness is not, however, a sufficient condition of objectivity, for it differentiates the object into two senses. One is its existence as terminus of a practical

intent; the other is its character or essence as reflected by what it makes of one having it as object.

The other ground is the recognition that an object must be what it is. This is the primitive law of contradiction as the condition of the recognition of an object in general. The law of contradiction in this primitive sense, as informing the theoretic function of knowing in general, cannot perhaps be given appropriate formal expression within a logic of objective judgment.

The concept in general is the rule that a given object be taken for what it is. The concept of an object given in the particular terms of experience must, however, be applicable in particular. The formation of such an empirical concept takes place upon the two general grounds just described. On the principle that an object is to be taken in its own sense, the empirical concept represents as cancelling each other the addition and withdrawal of contingency from its object. Now the productive and receptive interaction with the object, even though balanced, do not cancel each other with respect to the contingency of the object, for they retain distinct senses of this contingency ("thatness" and "whatness"). The addition and withdrawal of contingency by reason of the subject of experience should cancel out in the single sense of taking the object for what it is. This requires of the theoretic function of knowing something more than the general demand for non-contradiction. It requires that the cancellation be effected, not in the two senses appropriate to productive and receptive knowing respectively, but in the one sense appropriate to the recognition of an object in objective terms.

This cancellation of subjective reference is what is prescribed in the formation of an empirical concept. The contingency that is added to the object by reference to the experiencer's being intent upon it, is theoretically withdrawn in taking the object as given, as empirical datum. The contingency that is withdrawn from the object by reference to its being the object of the kind of subject who has such an object (what one who is a teacher must be doing is teaching; what one who is a table-seer must be seeing is a table)—this contingency, withdrawn from what the object must be, is theoretically replaced by taking the object as appearance or phenomenon. This balancing of denotative non-contingency with con-

notative contingency, within the single sense of detached recognition, forms the empirical concept of an object of experience.

Thus, the verbal formula, "This is a table," which does not express an empirical judgment apart from being seriously asserted by someone, does express an empirical concept. In this concept both the givenness, through the word "this," and the definition, through the word "table," are prescribed for a possible object in a balance, represented by the copula "is."

An empirical concept is applied to its object in the proposition which experience may prove true or false. This proposition may use the same words, but it uses them to make an assertion under given conditions. The truth or falsity of the proposition is not determined by the balance theoretically prescribed in the empirical concept. It is determined by whether or not this balance is justified by a likeness in the subject intent upon and reflective of the object in interacting with it. Consequently, empirical truth or falsity is not wholly definable in terms of the detached way of knowing alone. On the other hand, if it is admitted that the productive and receptive ways of knowing are distinct but genuine senses of cognition, the truth or falsity of empirical judgments need not be left an ineffable mystery.

Here is an illustration. An archeologist comes upon a flat, rectangular piece of wood about four feet by six, protruding from the dirt. In spite of the fact that he is intent upon this object and also knows that he is seeing it, he doesn't immediately make sense of it. He would not say, "That's an old piece of wood," because in his intentness the proposition misrepresents what he would mean by "that." He is looking for something more, even though all the object immediately makes him think of is an old piece of wood. He gets a look under one corner and notices, sunk in the wood, a hole that a table leg might have fitted. He is now put so strongly in mind of tables, which have legs, that he loses some of his intentness upon this particular object. He is not ready to say that a table is what *this* is. He digs around some more and, in fact, unearths the buried corner with leg attached. He has come to a balance in his two functions of looking for and being the finder of something in the object. For him the concept of this being a table now applies.

Abstractly, the denotative "this" can be made to correspond analytically with the connotation of "table." This can be done simply by thinking of "this" as signifying only what are to all intents and purposes taken to be tables. But this is the kind of proposition which no one would make for its own sake. In the situation of concrete perception, the possibility of recognizing an object is not given by thought alone. If there is recognition at all, it reflects something distinct from anything subjectively possible, something that is sorted out in interaction with an object and necessarily ascribed to the object.

Where does the reason lie that accounts for that poise which justifies detached observation? I doubt that we know, but empirical knowledge ascribes it to the object of the concept which understanding is able to form and apply. I have not really made out why this reason for poise cannot be ascribed to the subject. This is a problem in the distinction and cofunctioning of the mental faculties. I will only remark that ascription through a concept belongs to the theoretic function and falls under the condition of the primitive law of contradiction. It is the *object* which is what it is. A personal subject may very well be who he is not and not be who he is, and in the same sense, namely, his personal identity.

Some experience becomes objectively recognizable, some does not. The pain of another person, unless he is a saint, fixes the attention of the bystander to a great degree, but he is capable of acknowledging in himself little of what the pain is like (without affectation). The concept of another's pain reflects this in the fact that the pain is less *given* than it is *definite in character*. The empirical concept, then, of another's pain remains incompletely formed. A balanced attitude of detachment with regard to this area of experience is, in another sense, unbalanced. In extreme cases, it is psychopathic.

To return to the opening illustration, the teacher who is a professional has worked in an area of experience that gives some objectivity. The great experience which he has is great because of all the experience it takes to make a teacher. He has this experience, in contrast to merely having been through it, by virtue of his knowing all along that it was teaching which he meant to do. The one actually doing the teaching which he was deter-

mined should be done turned out, probably to his wonder, to be himself. Justified by his identity with his work, his being a professional and the categorization of a teaching situation come to the same point. With his experience, that is to say, with his personal identity, he is capable of making empirical judgments regarding objects within the categories of his teaching. As an administrator of teaching, of course, he may be anything but professional. It is interesting that pedagogy does not of itself refer to an area of experience that yields objectivity. The mere pedagogue is never quite professional. Pedagogy falls within the categories of teaching, as teaching method. It cannot establish true categories of its own. As Socrates said, reality has joints.

I shall conclude with a rapid extension of the necessary condition for the formation of empirical concepts and the possibility of detached judgments—the condition of likeness in the personally active and detached subject.

The formation of concepts of objects of experience represents a kind of professionalism respecting sense experience as such. Directing attention to something and being occupied with it become so alike that it stands out in its concept with an indifference to the way it is taken subjectively. Through conception and granting a possible likeness among different subjects, communication becomes possible. For a sound intended as a word must be received as a word. If it is not *foreign* (in a wide sense) to the language of the listener, he hears it with the sense that he would himself intend a certain meaning by using it.

There is, in fact, a double likeness that appears with the use of language and underlies its reciprocity. The speaker speaks as one who could have his words addressed to him; the listener listens as one who might say the same thing.

A general theory of concepts should very likely provide a distinction between having words for a concept, whereby the concept is recognized in speech, and having the concept of an object, whereby the object is recognized in someone's experience. Knowing something and saying it come to the same point less often than may be supposed. That they should ever come to the same point, however, argues the remarkable condition of a com-

mon humanity—a non-theoretic, practical and responsive likeness among men which is all that could justify the professionalism of a science that categorizes a world of experience as public.

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LEVELS: A SEMANTICAL PRELIMINARY

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As used in contemporary science and ontology, the term *level* is highly ambiguous. Most authors do not care for a definition or even for a distinct characterization of this word; as a result, one and the same name—'theory of levels'—is applied to a variety of doctrines having different referents. Thus, whereas a neo-Platonist has in mind links in the Chain of Being, a mechanist may refer just to degrees of complexity, and a biologist either to integrated wholes or to stages in evolution. No wonder that they should often misunderstand each other, if they speak of different things while designating them with one and the same word.

The aim of the present paper is to list the usual and some possible meanings—or at least those the writer found the most interesting—of the word 'level,' to specify them briefly, to illustrate them, and to propose some problems in which those concepts are involved. Should this semantical clarification prove useful in clearing the ground for ontological speculation, the thesis would be confirmed that there is no conflict between semantics and ontology as long as the former does not deny the legitimacy of inquiries into the denotata of certain universal words, and as long as metaphysics is not reluctant to linguistic hygiene.

Lets us then proceed to examine the meanings of 'level.'

1. *Level_i = degree*

As used in ordinary language, levels are conceived as grades in a static scale, or as stages in a process. Different levels are not, in this sense, necessarily marked by differences in qualities: they may just be different intensities of the same property. Fig. 1 shows an obvious symbolic representation of this concept.


Definition (implicit): An object belongs to a degree D_n higher than another degree, D_{n-1} , if and only if it surpasses in some respect all the objects belonging to the lower degree.

Peculiar relations

(1,1) $D_n = D'_{n-1}$ (D_n is the follower of D_{n-1} in the given series.)

(1,2) $D_n > D_{n-1}$ (D_n is higher than D_{n-1} in a certain respect.)

Illustrations: (1) Degrees of extensive properties (e.g., height) or intensive ones (e.g., population density). (2) Degrees of integration, adaptation, learning, proficiency, originality. (3) Degrees of importance in relation with some end.



Queries: (1) Why use the word 'level,' instead of 'degree,' when no qualitative changes are involved in the transition among different degrees? (2) What is the range of the hypothesis of continuity, according to which differences in degree can all be made as small as wished? (3) Does classification require dis-

continuity in some respect, or is it possible to classify according to the degree or intensity of continuous variables?

2. $Level_2 = \text{degree of complexity}$

As conceived by mechanistic philosophies, levels are nothing but degrees in scales of complexity, to the exclusion of qualitative newness. In this sense, $level_2$ is a specification of level. For a symbolic representation of the notion of degree of complexity, see Fig. 2.

Definition (implicit): An object belongs to a degree of complexity C_n higher than another, C_{n-1} , if and only if the number of its constituents, and consequently the number of its interrelations, is larger than both the number of elements and mutual relations of the objects belonging to the lower degree.

Peculiar relations

(1,1), (1,2), and
 (2,1) $\hat{x}(C_{n+1}x) > \hat{x}(C_nx)$ (The higher the degree of complexity, the more members it contains.)

Illustrations: (1) Simple machines—Complex machines.
 (2) Magnetic domain—Large scale magnet. (3) Comte's classification of the sciences.

Queries: (1) Is it possible to define an absolute degree of complexity, or are there as many scales of complexity as respects (number, quality, relation, . . .) that are being investigated? (2) Is there a lowest level of complexity *in re*? (3) Is there a limit to the possible increase in complexity, so that entirely new patterns emerge when critical degrees of complexity are reached?

3. $Level_3 = \text{degrees of analytical depth}$

With the exception of phenomenologists, most philosophers and scientists are prepared to grant the existence of levels of analysis, even if they do not acknowledge that some of these levels of knowing may correspond—certainly in a complex way—to levels of being. In this sense, $level_3$ is a specification of $level_1$.

Definition (implicit): A piece of knowledge (description,

theory, method, technique) belongs to a degree of analysis A_n deeper than another, A_{n-1} , if and only if it accounts for a larger number of features of the referents common to both pieces of knowledge, and/or if it explains some properties occurring in A_{n-1} in terms of concepts peculiar to A_n , and/or if it decomposes its object more thoroughly than A_{n-1} does.

Peculiar relations

(1,1), (1,2), and
(3,1) $A_{n-1}(\Pi \cup \Sigma)A_n$ (The lower level of analysis is part of (Π) and/or sublated or subsumed under (Σ) the higher level.)

Illustrations: (1) Geometrical optics—Young and Fresnel's wave optics—Electromagnetic theory of light—Quantum theory of radiation. (2) Thermodynamics—Statistical mechanics. (3) Propositional calculus—Predicate calculus.

Queries: (1) Granted that not all the levels of scientific and ontologic analysis disclose different levels of being, why should some of the jumps in the degree of depth of analysis not correspond to objective levels—as happens, e.g., in the case of psychology in relation with neurophysiology? (2) What are the contributions of objective complexity in a given respect, and richness of conceptual and empirical outfit, to the degree of analytical depth? (3) Is there a maximum depth in the analysis of matters of fact, as there is a limit in the analysis of ideal objects?

4. $Level_n = emergent\ whole$

A level, in this sense, is a (concrete or ideal) whole, a self-contained unit—such as a cell or a proposition—characterized by qualities of its own and, if complex, by a strong integration of its parts. The lower order wholes are the building blocks of the higher order ones: the latter emerge through the harmonious mutual action (integration) of lower order individual units; and in some cases the higher levels are the environment of the lower ones. This connotation of 'level' is usual among biologists¹ and psycho-

¹ See e.g. Joseph Needham, *Time: The Refreshing River* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1943), pp. 160 ff and 233 ff. Alex B. Novikoff, "The Concept of Integrative Levels in Biology," *Science*, 101, 209 (1945).

logists,² who often add to it the qualifier 'integrative'; the concept was also used by Nicolai Hartmann³ in connection with the lowest (prepsychical) levels of reality. A picture of a level structure is in this case a set of concentric circles (see Fig. 4).

Description: An emergent whole is an entity that, in some respects, behaves as a unit; if complex, it is highly integrated and has qualities which its parts lack; and it arises from lower order units and/or gives rise to higher order emergent wholes.

Peculiar relations

(1,1), (1,2), (2,1), and

(4,1) $W_n \Pi \cap \Sigma W_{n+1}$ (The lower emergent wholes are parts of (Π) and sublated or subsumed under (Σ) the higher ones.)

Illustrations: (1) "Elementary" particle—Atomic nucleus—Atom—Molecule—Body—Celestial body—Star group—Galaxy—Universe. (2) Aminoacid molecule—Protein molecule—Protein crystal—Cell—Metazoan organism—Social unit (forest, community, etc.). (3) Concept—Proposition—Theory—Science.

Queries: (1) If the predicate 'integrative,' which derives from 'integration' (coordination of the parts, or harmonious interconnection) applies to complex objects rather than to grades in an evolutionary sequence, is not 'integrative level' advantageously replaced by 'emergent whole'? (2) Is the two-place predicate 'sublated under' inherently non-extensional? (3) Are there ultimately simple wholes (atoms of some sort) in the external world, or is wholeness rather relative to the level of existence?

5. $Level_s = poistem$

By 'poistem' (from *poiótes*, quality, and *systema*, system) I mean a system or bundle of qualities, a group of interrelated

² See e.g. T. C. Schneirla, "Levels in the Psychological Capacities of Animals," in R. Wood Sellars, V. J. McGill and M. Farber (Eds.), *Philosophy for the Future: The Quest of Modern Materialism* (New York: Macmillan, 1949).

³ Nicolai Hartmann, *Philosophie der Natur* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1950), ch. 41. Emergent wholes are called *Gefüge* by Hartmann.

properties, without implication of intrinsic order either within the system itself or in the sum total of systems. Quality groups or domains have been considered by Keynes;⁴ bundles of sensible qualities have been dealt with by Russell.⁵ A picture of a level structure is in this case a set of partially overlapping circles (see Fig. 5).

Description: A poistem is a system of interrelated qualities or variables. Symbolically: the n -th poistem is the n -th group of qualities: $P_n = \{Q_i\}_n$.

Peculiar relations

(5,1) $(i)(\exists n) Q_i \in P_n$ (Every quality belongs to at least one poistem.)

(5,2) $(\exists i)(\exists k) Q_i R Q_k$ (Some qualities are related to each other.)

(5,3) $P_n \cdot P_{n+1} \neq 0$ (Contiguous poistems partially overlap.)

Illustrations: (1) Domain of mechanical phenomena—Field of vital phenomena—Realm of historical events. (2) The state of a system (physical, biological, social, etc.) is specified by the set of values of a system of variables. (3) The intension or connotation of a concept is the system of predicates (the poistem) that characterize it.

Queries: (1) Do poistems have a factual counterpart, or are they arbitrary (or else subjective) categorizations (as diffusionism maintains with regard to cultural traits)? (2) Are there non-overlapping poistems? (3) Is there a finite number of poistems?

6. $Level_k = rank$

The term 'hierarchy' (system of hierarchical grades) is abusively used with a variety of meanings; often, when only linear order is meant. It is convenient to restrict it to sequences of terms ordered by a one-sided dependence relation. A picture of hierarchies is the staircase pyramid (see Fig. 6).

⁴ John M. Keynes, *A Treatise on Probability* (London: Macmillan, 1921 and 1929), chapter xxii.

⁵ Bertrand Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1940), chapter vi.

Description: A rank (or hierarchical grade, or grade in a hierarchy) is an element in a discrete linear sequence, such that its status (importance, and/or power, and/or value) is higher or lower than the neighboring ranks, and such that, unless it is the highest of all, it is dependent in some respect on the higher ranks.

Peculiar relations

(1,1), and

(6,1) $R_n > R_{n+1}$ (The status of R_n is higher than that of R_{n+1} .)

(6,2) $R_m \cdot R_n = 0$, $m \neq n$ (Different ranks have no common members.)

(6,3) $R_n \downarrow R_{n-1}$, $n \neq 1$ (The lower ranks depend on the higher ones.)

(6,4) $\hat{x}(R_{n-1}x) < \hat{x}(R_nx)$ The higher the rank, the less members it contains.)

Illustrations: (1) Institutional hierarchies. (2) Plotinus' chain of being: The One—Spirit—World-Soul—Earthly things—Matter. (3) Functions in living beings.

Queries: (1) Are hierarchies absolute, or is every gradation of ranks relative to one or more predicates? (2) Are hierarchical orders not occasionally reversed? (3) Are there strict hierarchies in nature, or are there rather nets of interdependent entities, out of which approximate hierarchies can be isolated for limited space-time regions?

7. $Level_i = layer$

Levels are sometimes conceived as layers,* i.e., as superposed strata arranged according to the order of their emergence in time, and/or their logical precedence. A picture of a level structure in this sense is a set of geological strata (see Fig. 7).

Description: A layer or stratum is a section of reality characterized by emergent qualities. Symbolically: $S_n = \{Q_n\}$, where 'Q_n' designates one of the *nova* peculiar to S_n .

* E.g., Nicolai Hartmann, *Neue Wege der Ontologie*, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1949), especially ch. v. The relation between the supraorganic layers (soul and spirit) and the lower strata (matter and life) is regarded by Hartmann as one of superposition (*Überbauungsverhältnis*).

Peculiar relations

(1,1), and

(7,1) $S_{n-1} PS_n$, where 'P' designates the class of relations of precedence (temporal, causal, logical, etc.).

(7,2) $S_m \cdot S_n = 0$, $m \neq n$. (Different strata have no common members.)

Illustrations: (1) Sense-data propositions—Empirical generalizations—Transcendent law-statements. (2) First-order functions (properties of individuals)—Second-order functions (properties of properties)—etc. (3) Singular propositions—Theorems—Axioms.

Queries: (1) Are the *nova* in each stratum altogether independent from the qualities of the lower strata as regards their subsistence, or are they free in limited respects only? (2) Are layer structures static, or do occasional reversals occur? (3) Are strata not exclusive of discourse, since apparently the higher grades both in nature and in society are rooted to the lower ones and not simply superposed on them?

8. $Level_n = \text{rooted layer}$

If the successive grades of being are regarded, not only as emergent upon one another in a linear way, but also as rooted to the lower levels and as retaining all the qualities characterizing the latter, then the concept of rooted level is involved. This concept can be found among biologists⁷ (often intermingled with those of emergent whole and degree of complexity, whether *in re* or in analysis); it is also typical of emergentist philosophers.⁸ A picture of a level structure in this sense is that of a telescopic system (see Fig. 8).

Definition (implicit): An object belongs to a rooted layer Y_n ,

⁷ E.g., Orville T. Bailey, "Levels of Research in the Biological Sciences", *Philosophy of Science*, 12, 1 (1945).

⁸ Samuel Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity* (New York: The Humanities Press, 1920), vol. II, pp. 46, 68 and *passim*. C. Lloyd Morgan, *The Emergence of Novelty* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1933), pp. 29, 41 and *passim*. Roy Wood Sellars, *Evolutionary Naturalism* (Chicago: Open Court, 1922).

higher than another, Y_{n-1} , if and only if, in addition to all the qualities that characterize Y_{n-1} , it has a set of emergent qualities Q_n of its own.

Peculiar relations

(1,1) and

(8,1) $Y_n \leftarrow Y_{n-1}$, where ' \leftarrow ' designates 'emerges from'.

(8,2) $Y_n = Y_{n-1} + \{Q_n\}$, where ' Q_n ' designates the *nova* of Y_n .


(8,3) $Y_m \cdot Y_n \neq 0$ (Superposition with common elements.)

Illustrations: (1) Levels of language (Object-language—Meta-language, etc.). (2) Logic—Arithmetics—Mathematical analysis (in Russell-Whitehead's rational reconstruction of mathematics). (3) Superposition of cultural patterns derived from cultural contacts (conquest, colonization, commerce, etc.).

Queries: (1) Is there a ground floor of being, i.e., a bottom sublevel underlying every other grade of existence? (2) What is the relation of rooted layers to emergent wholes: are the latter simply the members of the former? (3) Are there rooted layers in the external world? (It would seem that the superposition of patterns occurs only in the highest levels, whereas the spontaneous emergence of qualities in nature is not cumulative, some qualities being lost in the process of emergence.)

9. Level,

Levels in this sense are grades of being ordered, not in arbitrary ways, but in one or more evolutionary series. Although most authors conceive of the level structure of reality as a linear gradation, non-linear (parallel, branching, etc.) arrangements are conceivable; for example, the following scheme has been proposed for the main levels of reality⁹:



⁹ Mario Bunge, "On the Connections Among Levels," *Proceedings of the XIIIth International Congress of Philosophy*; to appear.

*Description*¹⁰: A level is a section of reality characterized by a set of interlocked properties and laws, some of which are thought to be peculiar to the given domain and to have emerged in time from other (lower or higher) levels existing previously.

Peculiar relation

(9,1) $L_n \leftarrow L_{n-1}$ (L_n emerges from L_{n-1} .)

Illustrations: (1) Atomic phenomena—Chemical phenomena.

(2) Ganglia—Spinal chord—Palaeoencephalon—Cerebral cortex.

(3) Reality—Experience—Knowledge.

Queries: (1) What does 'higher than' mean in connection with levels? More complex, or qualitatively richer, or better organized—or all this taken together? (2) Could definite criteria be set up for the splitting of levels into sublevels? (3) Could the mind-body problem be construed as the question of the mutual actions of bodily functions belonging to different levels?

10. Concluding remarks

Most, perhaps all, of the nine meanings of 'level' examined above are used or usable in ontology. Since they are definitely different, no occasion for conflict should arise among ontological theories having different meanings of 'level' in mind. One and the same object may fit in various level structures—especially if the connotation of 'level' changes in each case. Thus, a classification according to the degree of complexity (in a given respect) is not inconsistent with a classification according to the qualities involved; e.g., heavy atoms are not only more complex wholes than light atoms but belong also to different poistems and, moreover, their properties are determined by the number and kind of nuclear particles involved.

Of all the nine concepts the last—which we may call plainly *level*—seems to be equivalent to what many biologists, psychologists, and social scientists¹¹ call 'level of organization.' (On the

¹⁰ Mario Bunge, *Metascientific Queries* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1959), chapter 5.

¹¹ E.g. Julian H. Stewart, "Levels of Sociocultural Integration: An Operational Concept," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, 7, 374 (1951).

other hand, what scientists call 'integrative level' is often identical with the kind of systems we have called 'emergent whole.') Notice that, according to the description given in the last section, (a) if the principle of limited variety is rejected, there is no a priori limit to the division of levels into sublevels; (b) every derivative level is rooted to the parent levels (lower or higher) but need not retain all their qualities (the emergence of new characteristics may be accompanied by the loss of some properties); (c) the relation 'higher than' has in this context nothing to do with valuation; (d) lower levels may arise from higher ones (as is the case with parasitic organisms and artifacts); (e) events and processes at lower levels may be produced by changes at higher levels (as illustrated by the purposeful movements of the limbs); (f) the higher levels, in contrast with both emergent wholes and ranks, need not be less populated than the lower ones (e.g., there may be less thinking rushes than machines); (g) level structures are not static but dynamic; (h) one-way relations are not found among all levels.

Although perhaps none of the nine concepts listed above can be dispensed with in contemporary science and ontology, the notion of level,—or level, for short—seems to be particularly useful in the building of scientifically oriented ontologies and outlooks, since it affords a means for a realistic and unified categorization of the pieces of material and cultural reality, in a way reminiscent of natural or evolutionary classifications. Let us hope that such theories may yield an increasingly faithful and rich picture of the universe such that, to the extent to which it succeeds in combining diversity with unity, it could be called *integrated pluralism*. All nine concepts examined in this paper might occur in such a picture.

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NEGATION AND FREEDOM

THOMAS S. KNIGHT

IN THIS PAPER I shall explore the function of "negation" in perception, recognition, and inference. I shall use the word "negation" in three senses. "Perceptual negation" shall refer to that power or faculty by which I am able to transcend the demands of my immediate situation. "Recognitive negation" shall refer to that power or faculty by which I am able to sublimate immediate memory in favor of some particular object of recall. "Inferential negation" shall refer to that power or faculty by which I am able to reject alternatives in the inferential process. Through an investigation of these three types of negation I hope to throw some light on the traditional problem of freedom and determinism.

Within each of these negational ranges two general facets of negation may be distinguished for analysis. I shall call them "free" and "bound." Negation, however, is never completely free nor completely bound, so "free" and "bound" shall refer to negation in a relative sense.

Perceptual Negation

Perceptual negation is free in so far as I constitute its origin; it is bound in so far as its origin is constituted by some demand external to me. But in either case perceptual negation cannot be absolute. I cannot, during my conscious moments, merely be aware of nothing. I may find an odorless and soundless spot, close my eyes, and concentrate on the obliteration of all consciousness. I negate each percept in turn: the taste in my mouth, the tenseness in my jaw, the itch on my back, but each negation gives rise to a new awareness, until I am left with the general awareness of the functioning of my internal organs. Alas, I cannot negate them. Absolute negation of all perception is impossible.

However, there are instances when I may come very close to an absolute negation of all perception, and such negation may be called "free" in so far as it approximates the absolute. While I

write this paper there are periods, however short, during which I have nearly lost my situation, periods during which I have transcended the given, periods during which my thought seems to run freely and easily. Invariably I am brought back by a demanding sound or a demanding itch or by any percept that intrudes and robs me of my transcendence.

On the positive side I may try to be aware of everything within my perceptual range. Lying down in a sumptuous flower garden where the surrounding trees are full of chirping birds, I may try to employ all my sense organs at once. I may taste a blade of grass, smell the flowers, hear the birds, see the colors, and ensconce myself in the foliage. I can certainly do all this, but not all at once. My attempt is frustrated by the flitting of my awareness from one sense to another. I find myself aware of the odor, then the sound, then the color, not alone of course, for the background always remains, but one percept invariably dominates the others. I can never have them together in equal intensity. To affirm one sense I must partially negate the others. Hence, absolute affirmation of all perception is impossible.

However, there are instances when I may come very close to an absolute affirmation of all perception, and such affirmation may be called "bound" in so far as it approximates the absolute. Suppose while walking home one evening a gunman accosts me and demands my wallet. For a second or two I will lose my situation, but such a loss of situation could not be called transcendence. In transcendence the demand is almost absent; here the demand is almost absolute. Furthermore, such an affirmation is not free, and it does not involve an awareness of everything within my perceptual range. An extreme demand is really more negative than affirmative, for I seem to be bound by the threat to negate everything else, and in such instances I am suffering an apparent necessity. Negation, which was seen to constitute the principle of my freedom, is now seen to constitute the principle of my slavery.

In free negation the situation becomes less demanding as transcendence approaches the absolute; in bound negation the situation becomes more demanding as immanence approaches the absolute. Thus all acts of perceptual choice may be judged on a continuum with free negation and bound negation as extremes, and since the

situation is never completely demandless or never completely demanding, perceptual choice is neither completely free nor completely determined. Similar analyses may be made to show the relative nature of freedom on other levels of consciousness—recognition and inference.

Recognitive Negation

The negativity inherent in recognition requires a different analysis. Suppose while I'm lying in a flower garden I ask myself the question, "How do I know I'm in a flower garden?" I know I can call what I'm in a flower garden, because I "re-cognize" what it's like to be in one from my previous experience. If I have had no prior experience with a flower garden, I cannot give it that name. Only by comparing what I perceive with some recalled percept am I able to recognize, and such comparisons require negation.

Some quality or group of qualities must be distinguished from my perception of the flower garden for comparison with a quality or group of qualities I remember from my past experience. I perceive the flowers orderly arranged, and I compare that order with the order of a reconstructed image or with the concept which I remember is associated with flower gardens. In either case and on both sides of the relation, that is to say, in perceiving order and in remembering order, I must negate to compare. To perceive order—a group of relations among things in this case, and, therefore, spatial order—I must to some degree negate the things ordered in preference to the order itself. Similarly, my remembered order, whether in imagination or in conception, must be differentiated or selected or called forth (any word here is inadequate) from my memory. Such selection of an image or a concept from my memory flux involves the sublimation (negation) of all related images or concepts in my consciousness. To remember one thing is to negate a multiplicity of possible others. Without negation in the form of sublimation memory would be impossible.

The memory flux, however, is constantly under negation, so to speak, but never completely negated. The recognition of one percept or concept requires negation of others—a more complete negation than is constant in consciousness. When I attend to any-

thing, whether it be demanding or demandless, bound or free, the negation of my memory remains constant until I remember either by choice or on demand. Such remembering involves a calling forth among possibles of one or more related images or concepts, and such calling forth requires a more profound negation of the unwanted possibles. Therefore, negativity in recognition vacillates between what may be called constant and profound negation of all or part of the memory flux. This involves a negation of the negation which is less intense and less free than the constant negation of the memory flux in that the control is less sovereign. Hence, memory is neither completely free nor completely determined, for its constancy is spurious and the profound negation of the negation at times fails to bring forth the desired concept or image.

Inferential Negation

The function of negation in inference is even more nebulous than in recognition. When from the comparison of my percepts with my memories I conclude that I am in a flower garden, I am making what appears to be a purely positive judgment. Analysis, however, proves otherwise. To say that I am in one place is to imply that I am not in an infinite number of others. "I am in a flower garden" implies that I am not in a group of wild flowers, or that I am not in a briar patch, or that I am not in a truck garden. Here the negativity of the judgment is as weak as it ever appears in inference. When, perchance, I speak of the flower garden in the superlative, the negativity in my judgment becomes more obvious and therefore more intense. The judgment "This is the most beautiful flower garden I have ever seen" not only implies but also means its negative formulation: "I have seen no flower garden more beautiful than this." If, however, on the negative side I conclude that I am not in a briar patch, am I not affirming that I am somewhere other than in a briar patch? And if I infer that no garden in my experience has ever had its flowers so perfectly juxtaposed, am I not implying that this garden has the most perfectly juxtaposed flowers I have ever seen?

So another continuum presents itself. All pure assertions of fact such as "I am in a flower garden" or "This pen is ball-point"

certainly imply their negative corollaries, "I am not in a briar patch," "This is not a fountain pen." A more general statement of the implication in "I am in a flower garden" would be, "I am not in any place other than a flower garden." Here the negative implication in positive inference is general, weak and vague. In all judgments in the indicative the negative implication is general and weak, but as I change to the comparative the negative implication gets specific and stronger. When, for example, I infer from my remembrance of other gardens that "This flower garden is more orderly than others I've seen," the negative implication, "I have not seen a flower garden more orderly than this," is definite and strong. In the superlative it becomes even stronger. "This is the most colorful flower garden in my experience" implies "No flower garden in my experience was as colorful as this." Hence, as inference of quality approaches the superlative the negativity of the judgment gets more specific and more intense; as inference of quality approaches the indicative the negativity of the judgment gets more general and weak.

But this is not inconsistent with our negative analysis of perception. When I make a simple assertion of fact the demand of the situation is greater than when I grant a superlative quality to some aspect of my perception. Some degree of transcendence is necessary for indicative inference, and for comparative or superlative inference greater degrees are necessary. Hence, the situation becomes less demanding as I make more specific inferences.

From this analysis of negativity in the acts of perception, recognition and inference I conclude that the traditional either/or formulation of the problem of freedom and determinism is too simple; an investigation of the problem reveals it as involving the question: "When am I free?" and "when am I determined?" or "how much freedom have I in this situation?" The question, "Am I free or determined?" is seen to be illegitimate. Human action will not conform to the logic of non-contradiction and the excluded middle. The most we can say is that man is more free in some contexts than he is in others.

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CRITICAL STUDIES

CONTEMPORARY FRENCH READINGS OF DESCARTES

J. F. BANNAN

DESCARTES is an imposing presence on the French philosophical scene today. This is noteworthy, in view of the fact that the Existentialists, whose style has prevailed there since the end of World War II, have constantly sought him as a target. However, contemporary scholars, prolonging the movement of modern reflection on his work initiated by Gilson and Hamelin early in this century, have fashioned a series of new and distinctive interpretations of Cartesianism, and these have accomplished this presence. We shall consider them as they are to be seen in works published since 1955.

The most important events of the immediately preceding period—1945-1954—were attempts at general readings of Descartes' thought by Jean Laporte, Fernand Alquié, and Martial Guéroult. In *Le Rationalisme de Descartes*¹ Laporte struck sharply at stereotype by insisting that Descartes was not a rationalist. Deftly exploiting such issues as the soul-body union, the knowledge of the infinite and the faith-reason relationship, he draws the conclusion that "... if it were necessary to characterize Descartes' philosophy by one name, the name which would fit it best, all paradox aside, would be *empiricism*, radical and integral empiricism."² The readings of both Alquié and Guéroult are carefully attuned to the *development* in Descartes' thought. In *La Découverte Métaphysique de l'Homme chez Descartes*,³ the former maintains that this development is dominated by the progressive discovery of the meaning of man. Guéroult takes a remark from the *Discourse on Method* as key to the unfolding of Descartes' thought. The "long chains of reasons, so simple and easy, which geome-

¹ Paris, 1945.

² *Ibid.*, p. 477. Underscoring Laporte's.

³ Paris, 1950.

tricians use to arrive at their most difficult demonstrations . . ." ⁴ are the central inspiration of *Descartes selon l'Ordre des Raisons*.⁵ Cartesianism, it is maintained, developed primarily by deductive movement along these chains.

We shall have the occasion to look more closely at both Guérout and Alquié since each has published a book on Descartes since 1955. So has the remarkable Henri Gouhier who established his claim to prominence in Cartesian studies in 1924 with his *La Pensée Religieuse de Descartes*, and then reiterated it in 1937 with *Essais sur Descartes*. So also has Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, author of prior studies of the unconscious and individuality in Cartesian philosophy, and Jeanne Russier, whose major earlier effort was a study of Pascal. None of these offerings, however, pretend to the amplitude of perspective which might make them major works. That honor during this period has fallen to Roger Lefèvre of the University of Grenoble. In what must be one of the most abrupt entries on any intellectual scene, Lefèvre has published three separate volumes in successive years to present and attempt to verify an interpretation of Descartes quite different from those which we have noticed.⁶ We say "abrupt" because the bibliographies reveal not as much as a book review bearing Lefèvre's signature prior to the appearance of these volumes. We shall center our account of this period on his work, introducing the others' mentioned above where the opportunity for comparison arises.

The "Lefèvre thesis": *Cartesianism is a humanism*. Its germ, we learn in *La Vocation de Descartes* (hereafter V.D.), is "a sort of joyous need of spiritual plenitude, at one time exasperated by obstacles, at another surfeited with success and consequently volcanic, with mute laborings, eruptions, triumphs" (V.D. 96).

⁴ *Œuvres de Descartes*, Édition Adam et Tannery, Vol. VI, 19. Hereafter we shall abbreviate with the conventional A. T. followed by the number of the volume and the number of the page.

⁵ Paris, 1954.

⁶ *La Vocation de Descartes*, Paris, 1956, 228 pages; *L'Humanisme de Descartes*, Paris, 1957, 246 pages; *Le Criticisme de Descartes*, Paris, 1958, 340 pages. Lefèvre also announces two further works, *La Bataille du Cogito* and *Réveries Cartésiennes*, for publication in the near future.

This generates a doctrine whose axis "is not to be found in the metaphysics, or the physics or the more or less artificial relating of these. It is in the will to assure the mission of man, in a word, in the moral order" (V.D. Avant-Propos).

V.D. presents the genesis of Cartesianism in the form of a commentary on the *Discourse on Method*. In its first section, Lefèvre describes the fashioning of that work, and in the three sections which follow he analyzes the intellectual history which it recounts. Descartes wrote the *Discourse* to introduce his already completed physics into an intellectual climate which had recently promised official hostility by condemning Galileo. In his pages which describe the tremendous variety of personal and public pressures which resulted in the tailoring of the *Discourse* to accommodate them and at the same time maintain integrity, Lefèvre gives a splendidly balanced picture. He devotes careful attention to the psychological dimension, but keeps it subordinate to the movement of intellectual development as did Descartes in the work itself.

The remainder of V.D.—the three sections which survey the philosopher's intellectual history—is dominated by the theme of evolving doubt. For Lefèvre the doubt is not a theme among others in this history, a philosophical procedure basically negative in character. Rather, it is the very movement of that history: "the leaven of the other themes . . . a source of doctrine . . . the élan of a soul-generating doctrine" (V.D. 68). In this light the *Discourse* itself is "the adventure of a doubt seeking ingeniously its own reduction" (V.D. 68). During the years preceding 1618, Descartes, the student and traveler, lived the doubt in the form of disappointment with the claims of erudition and travel to be sources of truth. This disappointment was balanced, partially at least, by delight in mathematical invention. In the period 1619-1620 these themes are intimately joined. The doubt becomes methodic and generalizes itself in an expanding movement which accomplishes analytic geometry—the beginnings of a mathematical physics—and whose momentum carries it toward a horizon which will include metaphysics. Lefèvre follows the convention of organizing the interpretation of this period of rapid maturation around the dream sequence of the night of November 10-11, 1619. The

interpretation itself is conservative, emphasizing the continuity of the sequence with the excitement over the scientific successes of the immediately preceding period, and its deliberate symbolization by Descartes at a later date. Such a reading reduces, appropriately we believe, the note of abruptness in the event and so diminishes the ground for treating it as fantastic (cf. V.D. 109 ff.).

In this Lefèvre agrees with Gouhier, whose *Les Premières Pensées de Descartes*⁷ (hereafter P.P.D.) is also a commentary on the *Discourse*. Agreement between the two extends further since each sees Descartes' acceptance of a mission which he took to be proffered by God as the central meaning of the dreams (cf. P.P.D. 55 and V.D. 125). Both also treat the symbolization of the dreams as an attempt to deal with this entry of the spiritual at a time when the method was insufficiently generalized to accommodate it. A propos, Lefèvre remarks: "... if it is God who inspires the dream, reciprocally, the élan of the dream elicits concern for God" (V.D. 132); and Gouhier concedes that "the *Olympica* are our first documents on the interest that the young physicist-mathematician takes in metaphysical questions. In them is a sign, worth long discussion, that mathematical symbolism spontaneously gave him the idea of a metaphysico-religious symbolism" (P.P.D. 90).⁸

Now, however, the readings begin a divergence which soon becomes quite sharp. Lefèvre admits that the accounts of the dreams indicate that Descartes had not yet worked out his philosophy-theology distinction (cf. V.D. 133), but he treats them primarily as evidence of an already established conviction that reality is a whole in which metaphysics and physics cohabit, and the organization of which can be grasped by reason (cf. V.D. 133-134). Gouhier flatly rejects such continuity. He follows the last-quoted remark with "admitting this, the content of the *Olympica*, notes and descriptions, the schemes of thought at work, the very idea of a sensible translation of spiritual things—all that

⁷ Paris, 1958. To be precise, this work comments on the first three sections of the *Discourse*.

⁸ The *Olympica* is a segment of Descartes' notes and descriptions of this early period.

reveals a pre-cartesian spirit. The apprentice-soldier is not yet twenty-four years old . . ." (P.P.D. 90; cf. also 103).

The insistence on continuity on the one hand and the challenge to it on the other are typical products of the difference in approach which separate these two commentators. Gouhier practices an austere historical technique in virtue of which he rejects very pointedly the practice (Lefèvre's, though he goes unnamed) of interpreting this early stage in the light of the later and more mature philosophy (cf. P.P.D. 9). Thus, while Lefèvre's reading of the documents of this period is oriented in the movement of an intellectual life interpreted primarily by reference to its goal, Gouhier's avoids such reference in favor of scrupulous attention to the present which they describe. However, this rejection of the finalistic interpretive scheme must not be taken to imply an option for a pedestrian conception of historical process. The subtitle of P.P.D. is "Contribution to the History of the Anti-Renaissance." In Gouhier's eyes, Descartes is "the living and lucid consciousness" of the scientific reaction against the Renaissance (P.P.D. 9). "The first word of Descartes' philosophy, and the last as well, is a *no* to history" (P.P.D. 149). The *no*, however, is not uttered against a renaissance or middle ages taken as prior or antiquated periods, for Descartes would have recognized no such structuring.

In the world into which the Fathers at La Flèche introduced young Descartes, Horace and Virgil, Cicero and Seneca are contemporaries . . . Chronology exists, but without dividing off the actuality of antiquity. But Descartes regards himself as modern, the sentiment arising from his work. His science is entirely new: it is a question of putting the ancients in their place, of constituting a past which is truly past and which will be antiquity in opposition with modern times. (P. P. D. 143-144.)

The *no*, then, gave rise to antiquity, and we see on the historical level a thesis already popular on the psychological, that of the constitution of the past by the present.

The idea is a fascinating one, and Gouhier's treatment of Descartes' early life is impressively rigorous. But the effort to unite these two elements in P.P.D. is surprisingly ineffective, and they seem simply juxtaposed. The distance from the intellectual biography of the philosopher's twenty-second, twenty-third and

twenty-fourth years to the major intellectual currents of several centuries is enormous, and Gouhier attempts to bridge it without reference to intermediate issues or institutions, and without the general currents emerging in any sense from the chapters which discuss the life. The effort at union is made only in the Conclusions. It is based on only a pair of texts, one simply reported by Baillet (Descartes' biographer of 1690) and the other from a letter by Descartes written in 1630, well beyond the time discussed in the biographical sections. We must still confess, however, to being charmed by the thesis, and we wonder if an impressive case for it might not be made from the theme, so strong in the *Regulae* and the *Discourse*, of the practical and operational nature of Cartesianism. The priority of present over past seems to us to be an essential feature of praxis.

Lefèvre's estimate of Descartes' sense of his own historical position does not contrast sharply with Gouhier's. For one thing, he agrees that Descartes felt himself in rupture with what has come to be identified as medieval and renaissance thought. For another, his emphasis on the young philosopher's intentions turns him away from the past in his search for a basis by which to interpret Descartes' present. But the manner in which he crystallizes these intentions enables him to manage the union of the historical and the personal far more smoothly. While Gouhier speaks of Renaissance and Anti-Renaissance, he speaks of church, scepticism, science and scholasticism in their early seventeenth century tensions, thus seizing the historical situation at a level of much greater specificity. The union is accomplished simply by formulating Descartes' intentions in these terms: serve science and religion by forming a philosophy to combat scholasticism and scepticism.

The obstacle to carrying out this intention is a most unfortunate alignment of forces:

(Descartes) sees religion blocking science in the name of a sterile physics; reason undermining faith in the name of a deceptive scepticism. And neither side advances because science is ignorant of its principles and faith of its proofs . . . Only the true philosophy can remedy this disorder . . . By founding each in the order of certitude, science is removed from its error and faith from its criticism. A basic shift on the rational level serves both established belief and

developing science. Victory over atheists implies simultaneously victory over Aristotle. (V. D. 193.)

The symmetry of this conception should not be allowed to justify suspicion. Its basis lies in Descartes' most frequent and familiar expressions of his attitude toward faith, science, scepticism and scholasticism. Accepting it involves no more than believing that Descartes meant what he said. The contrary can scarcely be taken seriously.

Developing in view of this intention, Cartesianism moved toward the mature state in which its challenge to scholasticism reached a point of greatest tension. Lefèvre holds that when he composed the *Regulae*, Descartes was still "only a scientist" (V.D. 153). But the method described there implies that "by 1628 the theory of knowledge is virtually completed" (V.D. 183). Reading these implications, Lefèvre sees the basic lines of the break with empiricism, the duty *abducere mentem a sensibus*, which he holds to be the central theme of the *Discourse*: distinction of intellect and senses with the assertion both of the superiority of the former and of the unity of all knowing faculties in its animating force; the innate character of the *simple natures* which makes these anchors of the method's long chains of deduction accessible to intuition and prepares the way for the conception of eternal truths imprinted by God in the soul (cf. V. D. 182-187). "Far from denying the *Regulae*, the metaphysics extends to God the geometric evidence which the *Regulae* are content to apply to nature" (V.D. 185). The note of continuity persists, then, as it does a bit later in the concluding section where the theme of doubt returns to serve a resumé. Descartes' philosophical life is seen as a movement through stages of doubt: empirical (youth), methodic (scientist), metaphysical (philosopher) and didactic (writer and teacher). V.D. has led us through the first two of these.

While reserving comment on the general thesis for the conclusions, let us add to what we have already said that in V.D. Lefèvre demonstrates a remarkable command of the historical period in question and that he utterly dominates the Cartesian texts. These sources he marshals in a style where all is mutual implication. Remarks in the pattern of "the first gift of thought to the rule of evidence is the evidence of thought; the first object

of the method is the subject which poses the method" (V.D. 153) occur on virtually every page. The effect is to restore the whole that has been minutely analyzed and at the same time accomplish a remarkably—and agreeably—fluid exposition. Some of the relief of the *Discourse* as a particular work has been lost to its sources, even for a commentary which declared itself to be primarily interested in those sources. Tentatively, one can't help wondering if greater use of such a theme as *abducere mentem a sensibus* as additional reference point might not have helped restore it.

Lefèvre's most forceful assertions that Cartesianism is a humanism occur in his second book. This is not surprising, for the work *L'Humanisme de Descartes* (hereafter H.D.) is a treatment of Descartes' moral philosophy which it traces through the spheres of the individual, social and religious life. It begins with the question of tendency, taking it in the form of the classic movement from the provisional to the final ethical doctrine:

The moral philosophy is exposed at two poles of the doctrine which it envelops and animates: at the beginning as an "imperfect ethic" and at the end as a "perfect ethic." Since it is the same ethic which reason perfects, the passage from one to the other demonstrates how thought organizes life. (H. D. 3.)

The initial term of this passage is treated briefly and soundly. The imperfect or provisional ethic should be understood in a parallel with the methodic doubt: it submits practical life to discipline in the absence of certitude just as the doubt does for the life of thought. As for the "perfect ethic," it cannot be considered totally accomplished. When he said that "God alone has perfect wisdom" * (Preface to *Principles*), Descartes made it clear that perfection enters the moral scheme simply as the ideal for action. The morality actually achieved can be rational, but it must be incomplete, both because of its dependence on other sciences which are incomplete and—more important—because it governs human action which, by nature, is incomplete. What is gained by the movement from provisional to perfect morality? Metaphysics and physics place certitudes, e.g. the existence of God, spirituality of the soul, immensity of the universe and the unity of all things in

* A. T. IX, 2.

creation (cf. H.D. 18 ff.), at the disposal of the latter. These are principles of orientation which give the rational ethic an advantage which consists in "directing desire according to the good, and establishing the mastery of action over passion" (H.D. 28).

Directing desire according to the good demands, of course, the most effective operation of reason in the moral sphere. "A good man is one who does whatever right reason dictates" (H. D. 39 citing letter to Elizabeth, Sept. 1646).¹⁰ Reason will operate at its best when passions are mastered, and Lefèvre's description of the grounds for mastery is a splendidly detailed picture of Descartes' passionate man. It reaches a climax when he draws up a table, in the style of casuistry (H.D. 74-75), of the indications of preferable choices in cases of conflict among passions which Descartes left scattered through the correspondence and the *Treatise on the Passions*. Reason fights for mastery by the exercise of choosing the best and accomplishes mastery with the establishment of the habit of such choice. This is virtue, when the will decides "to follow what it believes to be the best" (H. D. 28).

The steps toward the emergence of virtue are also exposed in a small work, *La Morale de Descartes* (hereafter M. D.)¹¹ by Geneviève Rodis-Lewis. With the intention of supplying a short introduction to Cartesian moral philosophy, she traces the development of the doctrine from the provisional to the final stage attempting, in the process, "to disengage a directive line which will unify the Cartesian texts" (M.D. 6). The line which emerges from her treatment in chronological order of the *Discourse*, the *Treatise on the Passions*, the Preface to the *Principles* and relevant correspondence begins with Descartes' awareness of the ethical as "a means of access to wisdom" (M.D. 22) and ends in wisdom conceived as human: "from the time of the *Regulae*, Descartes aimed at no more than a human wisdom" (M.D. 111).

M.D. is a very good introduction. The exposé is clear and well-paced, and avoids prejudicing the solution of the more technical problems which it does not attempt to treat. For all this, the conclusion is sufficiently distinct to provide an interesting contrast

¹⁰ A. T. IV, 490.

¹¹ Paris, 1957.

with one of Lefèvre's central themes. Mlle. Lewis exposes her view of the human character of Descartes' moral doctrine in a commentary on the famous lines from the third part of the *Discourse*: "it is sufficient to judge well in order to do well, and to judge the best one can to do one's best, that is, to acquire all the virtues and all the other goods which can be acquired."¹² Like Lefèvre she has set apart perfect wisdom as an ideal. This accomplished, she remarks that "the acute sense of the human situation, of the complexity of events and of the exigencies of action leaves in our conduct the element of risk, despite the most attentive elimination of the doubtful" (M.D. 119). If each man will do his best, however, he can gain "what is needed for contentment" (M.D. 123 citing *Passions* 148).¹³ For her, in short, the lines from the *Discourse* are a formula which, while holding out the possibility of happiness to man, emphasize primarily the difficulty of his situation, his distance from the ideal.

In commenting on the same lines, Lefèvre insists upon the immanence of the nonetheless distance ideal, holding that it "determines rather precisely the direction and degree of . . . (moral) . . . achievement" (H. D. 86). To the extent that a man judges well, he interiorizes the ideal and is elevated, transformed. The psychological basis in Descartes' scheme for a state of advanced perfection (in which, incidentally, the physical order is transcended) is a set of purely intellectual emotions: admiration, love, hate, joy, sorrow, desire. Our happiness depends on these "interior emotions belonging to the soul alone" (H.D. 90). They "combine for the direction of the soul" (H.D. 89) in its main task, the pursuit of truth. In such a perspective, the soul itself becomes "an aspiration toward God" (H.D. 92). Such a remark might have been drawn from a work on mysticism! It now dawns upon the reader that Lefèvre intends his statement that Descartes final ethic establishes "the mastery of action over passion" (H.D. 80; cf. above p. 11) to be taken in a completely literal sense. In a move which will astound those who conceive Cartesian knowledge as a framework of clear and

¹² A. T. VI, 28.

¹³ A. T. XI, 442.

distinct ideas, he insists that it is action: "knowledge is an act of behaving which must elevate behavior" (H.D. 94). In the ultimate depths of knowledge "one can see the fusion of understanding and will, of science and morality. There the unity of the spirit appears in all its purity, for since it is impossible to conceive without willing and to will without conceiving, *the progress of knowledge is the fruit of a decision of the will and immediately brings about a more lucid will*. This freedom in the truth defines morality, that is, the sovereign good" (H.D. 95 Underscoring Lefèvre's).

Action expands beyond the individual and into the social order, "following the ways organized by the nature of things and human institutions" (H. D. 140). Society is a unique order "totalizing the values accumulated by history . . . in order to prolong them" (H.D. 184) and maintain them at the disposition of those who seek the good. Between individual and society a productive tension exists: "not to be useful to someone is truly to be worthless" (H.D. 141 citing Disc. VI)¹⁴ but, on the other hand, as members of society individuals "participate . . . in the benefits which are common without losing those which are individual" (H.D. 142, citing letter to Elizabeth of 6 October 1645).¹⁵ Finally, "there is in society a good born of the accord of goods, and which sings God's glory" (H.D. 143). In the interest of maintaining social order, Descartes would permit the ruler certain surprising expedients: alliances calculated on profit and abrogated where this fails to materialize; the accommodation of justice to usages; great concern for honor, prestige, appearance and propaganda etc. (cf. H.D. 152). But he is not a Machiavelli, and "what separates Descartes from Machiavelli is that he always connects political relativism with a moral absolute. . . . It is always in the name of good that (the prince) . . . directs society, and he directs it toward the good" (H.D. 152). His legitimacy has its most genuine foundation in "practical virtues" (H.D. 147).

Lefèvre makes Descartes' counsels to Elizabeth and his hopes for human betterment through mechanics and medicine occasions for treating the penetration by Cartesianism into the practical

¹⁴ A. T. VI, 66.

¹⁵ A. T. IV, 308.

order. However, as we might anticipate on having read *La Vocation de Descartes*, the most important occasion for such discussion lies in the fabric of the early 17th century: the conflict of religion, science and scepticism. This is taken up in the final section of H.D. which treats of the religious sphere of life, inevitably an ultimate dimension in a doctrine where action toward beatitude is the central concern, in this historical framework. If the philosophy which Descartes brings to this collision of forces is suitable for science, it also intends to be appropriate to theology. Lefèvre calls its relation with the latter "an organicism" (H.D. 216). This means that it establishes the clearest distinctions between theology and physics, the former as the domain of faith and the latter the domain of mechanism permitting a mathematical approach (cf. H.D. 216-217). But it also asserts their union, in those areas of reality which are the domain of metaphysics: the soul and God. Thus "what is most certain and central in Cartesianism is that zone of spiritual life where reason and faith absolutely fuse" (H.D. 217). "The principle of their accord . . . is the very nature of God which both religion and metaphysics affirm" (H.D. 220).

The relation of faith and reason in the moral order is the issue with which Jeanne Russier deals in her *Sagesse Cartésienne et Religion*¹⁸ (hereafter S.C.R.). This small work is devoted to the following question: In Descartes' eyes, does the knowledge necessary for a good life require faith? Lefèvre, who prefers to consider this issue on the institutional scale, has not posed this question. Jean Laporte has, however, and in his *Le Rationalisme de Descartes* (hereafter R.D.) answered: "The moral order cannot do without Christianity" (R.D. 452). This is one of the reasons why Cartesianism is not a rationalism. Laporte's position is the occasion for S.C.R., which discusses faith and reason as themes converging in Descartes' doctrine on the immortality of the soul. Mlle. Russier divides the question into two parts: 1) how does one know that the soul is immortal; and 2) how does one know what immortality promises? Her answers: "The clear intuition of the thinking substance really distinct from the body permits affirmation that the soul is immortal by nature, and destined by nature to beatitude"

¹⁸ Paris, 1958.

(S.C.R. 133). The indivisibility of the soul guarantees the former affirmation and the superiority of its nature (indicating an order of satisfactions distinct from those of the corporeal) which guarantees the latter, and without appeal to faith. Note, however, the "by nature" qualification: speculatively these questions can be driven beyond the nature of the soul to the creative action of God on which that soul depends. What is the guarantee of continued support after death? Assurance of this immortality *de facto* cannot be discovered by reason in its own order, but must be gained in "the experience of what lies beyond experience: revelation" (S.C.R. 59).

The question of *de facto* immortality arises, however, only when the mind adopts the posture of hyperbolic doubt. But Descartes has made it clear that this doubt "must not be used for those things connected with conducting one's life."¹⁷ Here, a certitude which Mlle. Russier calls quasi-certitude—Descartes' "certitude vulgaire"—as opposed to the product of geometric-style demonstration (cf. S.C.R. 113) is quite adequate. Convinced, then, that reflection on the nature of the soul is sufficient for the problems of mortality where they actually arise, she takes exception to Laporte's insistence that "virtue remains unstable, incapable of exactly determining its ends, if it does not seek the help of revelation" (R.D. 464). She has differentiated levels of certitude where he has not, and treated common certitude as far more respectable than he has. These moves strike us as appropriate.

Mlle. Russier has conducted her inquiry through a variety of resources in a highly lucid and concise way. She has introduced Thomism at some length as the major alternative philosophical position in Descartes' time, and described it accurately. At certain times it is also used to sharpen the distinctions to which attention is being drawn. For example, one senses that the discussion of what reason can know and what must be experienced draws upon a philosophical experience in which the existence-essence distinction is more important than it is for Descartes. The texts do control this entry, however, so that attention remains focused on matter genuinely Cartesian.

¹⁷ A. T. VII, 460.

The question of the textual regulation of interpretation rises for Lefèvre also, though not from promptings by Thomism. In H.D. he has wed the discussions of Cartesian morality and Cartesianism as morality. A propos of the first issue, we should recall that Descartes never wrote a formal treatise in moral philosophy. There are interesting and important texts scattered in works already mentioned, but in comparison with, say, metaphysics, they are relatively few. In such a situation one expects a generous amount of reading of implications which the original author did not spell out, as well as frequent supplementing from sources other than the texts. Lefèvre does both, and never implausibly. Consider his treatment of the morality of the individual with its emphasis on the *fusion* of all elements in *action*. We have been unable to find anything in this reading of implications which is basically opposed to the fundamental metaphysical structures according to Descartes. Why, then, does it have a tone so different from that of the original work? There is something approaching Blondel in the comments on action.¹⁸ And who could imagine Descartes saying "In philosophical progress, the love of mathematics engenders the mathematics of love which prorates passion according to merit" (H.D. 57)?

We are not making the silly suggestion that the commentator must sound like the original author. But we do wish to indicate at this point some of the things which separate *this* commentator from *his* original author. Descartes treats cogito, understanding, will, etc. in a manner that is a model of *analysis*, eager above all for distinctions. There are remarks which maintain "fusion," but the general address is analytical, and his conclusions usually have the ring of *minimum positions which must be admitted*. Lefèvre *synthesizes*, insisting on the interpenetration of elements, and reading each situation for its maximum allowable implication. Often, especially in the discussion of the social and religious spheres where texts are particularly sparse, he draws very heavily on the history of the early seventeenth century to complete the picture

¹⁸ "... it is the *expansion of action*, the progress of spiritual activity, which links life with thought, makes the unity of thought, and links thought with life" (H. D. 103. Underscoring Lefèvre's).

which available texts and the tendency of the physics and metaphysics suggest. For example, the greater part of the discussion of the religious sphere of action is in the form of a detailed and highly impressive description of religion and scepticism in Descartes' time. The doctrine is woven into the period by an analysis which indicates its appropriateness for solution of the issues separating the combatants. Its appropriateness is then taken as testimony of philosophical vitality, testimony gained by the device of reconstructing prevailing historical circumstances—which Descartes himself rarely mentioned.

From the point of view of plausibility, however, it is very difficult to blame Lefèvre in his reconstruction and readings of implications. In treating Cartesian morality, he does not, to our knowledge, violate any textual evidence. But by situating much of his argument beyond the texts, and simply in the direction in which they point, he sets up a distance between himself and this particular source of support, with the result that his view, if plausible, fails to persuade as one might hope that it would. Hard to attack, it is hard as well to defend.

One must wonder if Lefèvre's general thesis—that Cartesianism is a humanism—is not to attract the same verdict simply because so much of the case for it is made in the moral philosophy, where textual control is least. Perhaps, but not inevitably: H.D. is followed by *Le Criticisme de Descartes* (hereafter C.D.) in which the author exposes his thesis in that area where texts most abound—to say nothing of disputes—metaphysics. The issues with which it deals arise in the *Meditations*: the attainment of basic principles, the nature of evidence, the spirit-matter question in its soul-body, cogito-world and metaphysics-physics forms. The order, however, is not that of the *Meditations*, but is commanded by the movement of doubt which returns as a central theme: the task of C.D. is "to study the role of doubt on the levels of sensible and rational thought" (C.D. 2).

Lefèvre's conceptions of doubt as an "élan of the soul" (V.D. 68) makes Cartesian metaphysics a spiritual movement toward the source of all things. The rejection of the uncertain in the pursuit of an intuition of first principles is treated as an asceticism, with doubt operating "to break the soul away from

a precocious illusion . . . sensualism . . . (and) . . . from a tenacious attitude, utilitarianism" (C.D. 15-16). Beyond the sensible "the conscious seizing upon these principles realizes a deliverance, inviting the free spirit to the expansion of its freedom" (C.D. 32). At the point of deliverance, there is the now-familiar fusion of elements: "With Descartes, the deepest bond linking metaphysics and physics is the interior unity of thought and its works, of active nature and the expansion of action" (C.D. 32).

If the arrival at principles has demanded the elimination of the world, the expansion of action to say nothing of the fundamental work of metaphysics, "the rational organization of thought and matter" (C.D. 33), requires its restoration. For the unfolding of the doctrine, then, the existence of the exterior world is the "decisive problem" (C.D. 63) a fact which makes the *locus classicus* of its discussion—the Sixth Meditation—"probably the key to Cartesian philosophy" (C.D. 80). Lefèvre comments on this with particular attention to the order of discussion: *first* the distinction of soul and body, *then* the argument to the existence of bodies, and *finally* the union of body and soul (cf. C.D. 64). Once the distinction is established, it is the impossibility of reducing sensation to spirit that demands and validates the affirmation of matter (cf. C.D. 78). Though matter is discovered as a "limitation of the spirit" (C.D. 67), "its presence for the philosopher is not as a disappointing restriction" . . . it is "an invitation to think and live" . . . (C.D. 85).

The condition for accepting this invitation is the effective interaction of soul and body. Though these have been sharply distinguished, Descartes has insisted that they penetrate each other so intimately that their union is not directly accessible to thought, but only to experience. Lefèvre's analysis of this experience is masterful (cf. C.D. 109-118). He deploys it in its variety of modes from the purely organic, through sleep, dreaming, reverie, wakefulness and thought, capitalizing on the gradation, which he finds, to display the delicacy and subtlety of the interaction which occurs within the union. Like Descartes, he denies that the soul is "lodged in the body like a pilot in a ship" (6th Med.).¹⁹ But has not the former,

¹⁹ A. T. VII, 81.

insisting that body and soul are distinct substances and this by contrast with the scholastic notion of each as an "incomplete substance" demanding the other as complement,²⁰ clearly opted for one of two historical alternatives in the soul-body question? Does not such an explicit doctrinal commitment invalidate all insistence upon interpenetration and leave disciples like Lefèvre to try and neutralize the embarrassing consequences of the position by calling on what can only be Descartes' expressions of the intention not to accept these consequences?

There is a serious question here of the relative value of text and intention, but Lefèvre does not wish to leave us balancing one against the other. He attempts to show that Descartes brought a new position to the level of system. Of the union, he says that it is a "composition of substances" (C.D. 75). It is "not accidental but natural, because it expresses the living nature of man as God instituted it. . . . The union is substantial, not because it is a substance but because it unites two substances. The modes of the union imply two substances whose 'mixture' they express" (C.D. 75). This contrast of *accidental*, not with *substantial* but with *natural* is certainly a refusal of the scholastic use of these terms, and suggests that their meaning must be sought, not in the prior history of the issue, but in Descartes' thinking alone. The latter refers to the union as a "composition of mind and body" (6th Med.)²¹ and says that they are "substantially united" (4th Resp.).²² But we do not know of any instance in which Descartes brings this contrast of *accidental* and *natural* to bear on the question. It seems to us, in fact, that he avoids wherever possible the use of the term *accident* in discussing this issue. If we are correct in this, then this is one point where Lefèvre's fidelity to Cartesian terminology weakens. It is, we confess, small enough an instance to testify as well to the remarkable degree of the fidelity to which it is the exception. It also calls attention to the importance of Descartes' intentions in Lefèvre's finalistic perspective by intimating that they outstrip, more than he believes, the actual formulations.

²⁰ A. T. VII, 221.

²¹ A. T. VII, 83.

²² A. T. VII, 228.

In the second section of C.D., "thought is going to devote itself entirely to justifying the right to think" (C.D. 179). Descartes' vehicles for this extension of the critique beyond the sensible are the hypotheses of the deceiving god (Dieu Trompeur) and the evil spirit (Malin Génie) which Lefèvre characterizes as "two critical stages of a continuous analysis which scrutinizes reality to its greatest depths" (C.D. 185). The deceiving god who may have made me "in such a manner that I am . . . deceived when I add two and three . . ." (1st Med.)²³ extends doubt to all truths by "attesting to the uncertainty of their cause" (C.D. 182). The evil spirit drives doubt even further by turning attention from the cause of truth to its content, imposing a deliberate and systematic refusal of every evidence which is not perfect. Thanks to these devices, Descartes arrives at his principles: the cogito, "first principle in the order of knowledge" (C.D. 202) and God, first principle in the order of existence.

Because it is a movement beyond the Cogito, the attainment of God is a crucial aspect of the general expansion of action. On the level of the cogito, the expansion question takes the form of the problem of evidence. Doubt has attacked the value of even clear and distinct ideas. Descartes, according to Lefèvre, responds with an analysis of thought which becomes an appeal to causality. "Thinking being, like every being, depends upon the absolute being and depends absolutely" (C.D. 209). It is the "omnipotent creator . . . (who) . . . brings ontological sufficiency to logical evidence" (C.D. 204).

Many commentators insist that it is the clarity and distinctness of the ideas which make for this sufficiency. Lefèvre reviews the positions of Hamelin, Gilson, Lachiez-Rey, Gouhier, Laporte and Guérout in order to situate himself among them. Let us turn for a moment to Guérout and use this opportunity to introduce his *Nouvelles Réflexions sur la Preuve Ontologique de Descartes*²⁴ (hereafter N.R.). This work is part of a debate with the ever-present Gouhier which began with the publication of *Descartes selon l'Ordre des Raisons* in 1954. In the latter work, Guérout

²³ A. T. VII, 21.

²⁴ Paris, 1955.

had insisted that the ontological proof in the Fifth Meditation was entirely secondary in Descartes' eyes to the *a posteriori* argument of the Third Meditation and, in fact, depended on the latter for its validity. Gouhier protested²² that Descartes had made it first in order of treatment in certain works, e.g. the *Principles*, and that the conception of a proof dependent on a prior proof of the same fact would be inadmissible to Descartes. The key to Guérout's position lies in his distinction of the two orders of development in Descartes' work: a natural order in which the Cogito is the principle of evidence; and a metaphysical order where God is its guarantee. In the former, clarity and distinctness impose a psychological certitude, and "doubt is *impossible de facto* as long as the intuition of . . . evidence is present to me" (N.R. 34-35). But the ultimate justification for this certitude lies only on the metaphysical level: "the analytical order of reason" (N.R. 56) where the presence of God's power and perfection settle the *de jure* issue. The passage to the metaphysical level is a movement beginning with the Cogito conceived as an "obscure" and "in-authentic" consciousness to a clarified and illuminated Cogito which sees that it is always consciousness of God.

Guérout situates the ontological argument in the order of nature, along with the deceiving god with which it is interestingly paired. The latter generalizes a doubt which arises naturally over the validity of memory. It is banished by the ontological argument which offers a clear and distinct idea of God which imposes as certain because of our psychological makeup. It cannot touch the *de jure* question, however, for this is only posed on the metaphysical level where the evil spirit is paired with the *a posteriori* argument. The evil spirit, which has cast doubt on the certitude of clear and distinct ideas, must be banished in advance of any reliance upon clear and distinct ideas, even that of God. It is, by the *a posteriori* proof in the Third Meditation. Thus the dependence of the ontological argument upon the *a posteriori* demonstration is an aspect of the general dependence of the order of fact upon the order of ultimate justification. As for the priority of the

²² Gouhier, H. "La Preuve Ontologique de Descartes" in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*; Bruxelles, 1954, No. 29, Fasc. 3.

ontological argument in the *Principles*, it is to be understood to be a function of the same distinction: "the *Principles* are deliberately situated on the level of the nature of our minds, without posing the metaphysical problem of certitude" (N.R. 105).

There is an excellent clarity about N.R., something entirely fitting for a commentator of Descartes. Guérout carries off his emphasis upon the systematic and deductive aspects without the conventional sacrifice of the intuitive. Lefèvre, however, maintains certain exceptions to his views on evidence, several of which center around the device of the deceiving god. "It would be *too vague*," he remarks presenting his own treatment of remembered evidence, "to say that the deceiver discredits the testimony of memory, and that it is this testimony that the Perfect One guarantees" (C.D. 217. Underscoring Lefèvre's). He then distinguishes the content of memory from its value as truth, attributing the former to memory's own power which may be greater or less, but placing the continuous creating by God behind the latter (cf. C.D. 218). Furthermore, he holds Guérout's assignment of the deceiving god strictly to the attack on memory to be inaccurate, reminding us that in the First Meditation, Descartes used the device against simple and directly intuited truths like the sum of two and three.²⁶ This seems well-taken, though his complaint that the "obscure" and "inauthentic" cogito with which Guérout's ascent begins is not genuinely Cartesian is not. Here the latter seems entitled to support from several remarks in which Descartes indicates how little he is aware of what he is at the beginning of his voyage of self-discovery.²⁷

As for the terminus of the ascent in an intuition where the soul knows itself to be consciousness of God, Lefèvre calls this "impeccable, from a Cartesian point of view" (C.D. 250), and closes out his own discussion of evidence with an acceptance of one of Guérout's usages: in the cogito "evidence appears in its psychological aspect" (C.D. 257) while in God it appears "in its metaphysical aspects" (C.D. 257).

In his final major section, Lefèvre turns to the question of

²⁶ Cf. A. T. VII, 21.

²⁷ Cf. A. T. VII, 25.

Descartes' metaphysics and his physics, something for which the preceding discussions have prepared the way. Both because he holds for the utmost balance and coherence between these two aspects of Cartesianism, and because he insists that the doubt is the methodic key to both, he comes into sharp conflict with the most venerable figure in modern Cartesian scholarship—Gilson. For Gilson, and for many other commentators, the doubt is secondary and contrived. Descartes would have preferred to publish his physics first, introducing his metaphysics after this had destroyed and replaced sensualism and the doctrine of substantial forms. Balked in this move by the condemnation of Galileo, he simply produced the doubt which is, then, simply a substitute weapon against sensualism. (It would be interesting to know if Gilson is still satisfied with this). Lefèvre reacts with a broadside textual and doctrinal defense of the doubt, much of it reinforcing the importance of the First Meditation. Its doubt, for example, does not bear "essentially on the testimony of the senses" as Gilson has said, but on the testimony of reason as well (cf. C.D. 283). He also calls attention to the obvious dependence of the following Meditations on the First, and to the presence of all the themes of the *Meditations* in the doctrine as early as 1629 (cf. C.D. 266-280). This was to have been expected, since the method was already well advanced by then, and "metaphysical doubt results naturally from the application of the method to the problem of certitude" (C.D. 275).

Gilson, maintaining that the axis of Descartes' doctrine lies in the relation between metaphysics and physics, subordinates the former to the latter. In Lefèvre's conception of a general development on an ethical axis, the two reinforce each other. He uses the word *circulation* (C.D. 266) to catch the dynamic and intimate relation where "metaphysics discovers in a confused experience the principal distinctions whose multiform consequences physics verifies in more specified experience" (C.D. 292). Within the same moving framework, a comparable cycle exists on the metaphysical level in the relations between the critiques of sensation and reason, to which C.D. has been devoted. The cycle of criticism has been the condition for the expansion of action into the world required by the physics-metaphysics "circulation."

Lefèvre closes his treatment of this cycle with a return to the Sixth Meditation to defend Descartes' handling of the body-soul and cogito-world distinctions against Gilsonian charges of incoherence.

C.D. does not probe all the major issues which rise in the *Meditations*: the classic examination of the piece of wax in the Second, and the discussion of truth and error in the Fourth, for example, are barely touched upon. Perhaps we shall see them in the promised volumes. The structure of C.D. is, as we said earlier (cf. p. 426), determined by the theme of doubt which polarizes the issues which are treated around the concerns of the First Meditation—the ascetical action of doubt—and the Sixth—the restoration of the world as field of action. One of the results of this polarizing is concentration on these two points, productive of a remarkable display of the philosophical possibilities of Descartes' address to them. Another result is that certain problems become masked. We have in mind particularly the treatment of the existence of God which, drawing heavily on the devices of purification by doubt, makes the arrival at God the accomplishment of an intuition. This is entirely in order, and an option for one of the classic alternatives. But we find no appropriate discussion of the other alternative—that this arrival is a *demonstration*, despite assertions by Descartes that it was such.²²

It is the very fact of the polarizing which is the most interesting result of this encounter of text and theme, however. It testifies again to the priority of the latter which we have already seen (cf. pp. 418-19), and to which Lefèvre alludes in his conclusions when he insists that it is the movement of a doctrine rather than its content that counts (cf. C.D. 331). But is it possible to conceive of a single movement sufficiently rich to contain the sharply divergent drives which the polarizing manifests: the first away from the world and toward the source of all things, and the second through the world toward the goal of all? Granted that for Descartes God is both, still source and goal are profoundly different perspectives which the familiar conceptions of the doubt as negative

²² In the letter by which he presented the *Meditations* to the faculty of the Sorbonne, Descartes called this a "true demonstration" A. T. VII, 3. Cf. also his response to Arnauld A. T. VII, 236-241.

in character and the moral drive as positive reflect, perhaps, appropriately. Lefèvre's originality requires that they both be understandable as a single movement. But we can make our final appraisal of this relevant to the contemporary scene only after a glance at Alquié, for whom the movement of the philosopher's life is also central.

His *Descartes, L'Homme et L'Œuvre* ²⁹ (hereafter D.H.O.) is a compressed restatement of the thesis which he introduced in *La Découverte Métaphysique de l'Homme chez Descartes*, composed with particular attention to Guérault. "These are two Cartesian orders. The first is that of Time and the second that of System . . ." (D.H.O. 8). Contrary to Guérault, he opts for the order of time: "It is in replacing the systematic order toward which Cartesian thought tends, in the temporal order where it develops that we will follow Descartes and be faithful to his lessons (D.H.O. 9). The decisive moment in the genesis of Cartesianism which D.H.O. recounts is reflected in the *Meditations*. Prior to 1640, Descartes would have been simply a scientist. Even the *Discourse* must be seen as geared to the institution of the new physics and charged with hope for the technical domination of the world. The pre-suppositions of such science—the existence of the world and the guarantee of truth—become questions only in the *Meditations*, and this not by any natural movement of inquiry. It is personal tragedy: the death of Descartes' father and daughter in successive months of 1640, which brings about "a conversion of the spirit" (D.H.O. 81). From this point onward, the questions posed are ontological: what exists, and of what existence can I be certain? The discovery of the self is the first return on this concern, and the discovery of God as condition of self and world its ultimate reward.

In the Cogito, being and its affirmation are one, as is the case with God who is "inseparable from the I think" (D.H.O. 119). The direct presence of being and idea in these two cases is adequate to guarantee certitude, but without total revelation. Each order of reality, in fact, resists this: God, because of his infinity, and both cogito and matter because neither is simply identifiable with

²⁹ Paris, 1956.

the characteristic property by which it is known, thought, and extension respectively (cf. D.H.O. 131). This view determines a rather unusual interpretation of Cartesian physics. Here, where there is some distance between thought and object, God guarantees the idea. But Alquié holds that the guarantee applies strictly to the idea in its own orders, and without reference to its object (cf. D.H.O. 122-123). Mathematics, then, is assured, but physics cannot be since the physical object is not identical with its extension, the quantity which mathematics handles so well. "This is why, at the end of the *Principles*, Descartes must affirm the necessarily hypothetical character of physical knowledge. Physics explains how things can be without revealing with certitude how they are" (D.H.O. 135). "With this, the dream of universal certitude is abandoned: the probable has entered science" (D.H.O. 137).

What strikes the reader first about D.H.O. is the clarity with which it manifests its mid-twentieth century inspiration. Unlike Lefèvre, whose fidelity to Cartesian terminology and historical setting is amazing, Alquié explicitly formulates Descartes' development as a turning from *object*, the realm of science and technique to which we are bound by our natural attitude (cf. D.H.O. 68, 70, 72, 83, 169), to *being*, mysterious and transcendental ground of all objects, discovered by man in himself when tragedy ruptures that natural attitude (cf. D.H.O. 72, 75, 109, 165-166). This is, obviously, an existentialist reading. The results are uneven. The theme of the probable nature of Cartesian science is highly provocative and, we think, well-taken. We are less confident in the priority which Alquié gives to the abrupt in Descartes' personal psychology, and its effect on the doctrine. Here he should make a concession to Guérault on his own (Alquié's) ground: the development of a philosophical system was of the greatest moment in that psychology. A prolonged and continuous event, rather than an abrupt one, it merits greater emphasis than it receives in D.H.O.

Le Cercle Culturel de Royaumont held an international colloquium on Descartes in October 1955. Lefèvre is not listed among the participants, whose papers and discussions are available under

the title *Descartes*.³⁰ The final session turned, perhaps inevitably, to the nature of the history of philosophy, and seems to have been dominated by the exchanges of Guérault and Alquié: system vs. psychology. As one tries to place Lefèvre in such a debate, comparisons with Alquié are at first inviting. He is unmistakably concerned with the genesis of Cartesianism, and meditates profoundly the life of the philosopher as its principle. But his interpretation of this genesis by its goal rather than by its source radically differentiates his understanding of *life* from that of Alquié. By making Descartes' personal goal an end as broad as philosophy itself, and one embraced by a major segment of western philosophy—seek the Truth which is the Good—he transforms Descartes' existence into something resembling a life of philosophy itself. "We force ourselves here to follow the movement of the great soul in quest of Sovereign Good" (H.D. Av. Pr. viii). Particular incidents in personal history and systematic formulation as well are dominated by this movement which is larger than any personal existence.

The difficulty with such interpretation according to goal is not, of course, that other elements do not contribute. Lefèvre has said of Descartes that "his vital moral doctrine, predominantly rational, leaves room for all its sources" (H.D. 106). The same is certainly true of Cartesianism as morality. There is nothing in philosophy or its conditions—text and implication, personal life and historical circumstance—which cannot find a place in such a scheme. When one interprets according to intention, all one needs is a good intention. Who can quarrel with "a quest for the Sovereign Good"? And what grounds could be found for saying that any given element of doctrine is out of harmony either with such an end or with other elements? Indeed, the possibilities for the cohabitation of themes are so broad that there is a tendency of explicit doctrinal content toward indifference. This is what frees Lefèvre to concede to doubt its corrosiveness and to moral drive its creativeness, and yet insist that they are one movement. We wonder if he doesn't convey something of an awareness of this when, in his conclusions of C.D., he lists the characteristic features

³⁰ Paris, 1957.

of the doctrine, shrugs a bit ("all this seems to return Descartes to his very first disappointment"—C.D. 331) and then says "what survives in a doctrine is less its content than its *élan* . . ." (C.D. 331).

Still, it is impossible to deny that this pre-occupation with *élan* produces some remarkable strengths. This is partly due to responsible handling. Lefèvre violates no texts, we have said, and his introduction of the extra-philosophical in historical form makes possible a measure of control over it. (He has, incidentally, made the best use of history to date in the exposition of Cartesianism). But it is the finalist perspective itself, despite its responsibility for weaknesses mentioned above, which is the primary source of strength. What it offers is the ability to contain and manifest *all* the features of the philosophy, even its inconsistencies. Demanding nothing more of any item of content than that it be philosophy, it opens the way for all elements to emerge in full relief. Every age owes a great seminal thinker at least one such reading, where he can simply *be* at his best. By providing this interpretation, Lefèvre has done something of genuine importance.

What he has done realizes in a particularly full way a tendency characterizing the post-war period in Cartesian studies. Whatever the peculiarity of his emphasis, today's scholar selects an interpretive framework which permits him to take Descartes seriously in all the areas to which he gave attention. Interpretation according to system can and has led to conceptions of the philosophy as immobile in the contemplation of clear and distinct ideas. But Descartes is seen today as dynamic, and maintaining an orientation toward discovery. Thus Guérout accommodates his attention to the deductive ideal with the presence of obscurity, intuition of the inexhaustible, and genuine development. Concern for Descartes, the man in his time, can and has led to a view of him as devoted to the development of scientific method, but a sceptic as regards traditional views of ultimate values who cynically maintained both faith and metaphysics as valuable camouflage before Church and royalty. But he is looked at today in a manner unembarrassed by the careful attention which he gave to God. Alquié makes his reading of Descartes the man an encounter with *being*, a category

quite adequate to situating scientific method, metaphysics and faith.

To the extent that these developments indicate something about the character of the time, they suggest that there has been some sort of triumph over the need to belittle, and that we have become sufficiently sure of ourselves to accept the presence of a powerful figure. This could have as its basis a deepening of a sense of the philosophical intention, so important to Lefèvre, and which we can share with Descartes.

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ON BEING OLD-FASHIONED IN PHILOSOPHY

HENRY VEATCH

LET'S FACE IT: there are reigning fashions in philosophy, just as there are in dress, in the novel, in hit-tunes, and in motor-cars. But just how is it that a philosophy gets to be fashionable, or, what is perhaps more to the point, just how is it that one has the misfortune to go out of fashion? Doubtless, this is something we'd all like to know, particularly if we happen to be partisans of one of those philosophies that would seem to be currently out of fashion. For professionally and academically, it is almost getting to the place where, if one's philosophy be not *à la mode*, one's voice becomes like that of one crying in the wilderness, but with considerably less chance of eventually being heard.

But there's no good in our merely feeling sorry for ourselves. Instead, we might do well to read and seriously reflect upon the example set by Professor C. A. Campbell's *On Selfhood and Godhood*.¹ For imagine anyone in the present dispensation of insular philosophy in Great Britain writing a book on selfhood and Godhood, of all things! This might have been all very well for the Gifford lectures of 50 years ago, and yet the present book comprises the Gifford lectures of 1953-54 and '54-55. Nor is Professor Campbell himself unaware of being a seeming anachronism. For in his very preface, he flatly declares, "Readers of this book will not be long in discovering my inability to do obeisance to the twin gods of so much recent British philosophy—empiricism and linguisticism" (p. xi). And he then goes on blandly to acknowledge that for this reason he may very well be classed among those authors who are but "philosophic Rip Van Winkles talking in their sleep" (p. xii). For that matter he is not averse, every now and again, to interject a wry aside of the following type: "I propose to lead up to my own (as usual old-fashioned) view, etc." (p. 182).

But what more exactly is the nature of this admittedly old-fashioned philosophic undertaking on the part of a by-no-means

¹ London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957.

unself-conscious "philosophic Rip Van Winkle"? To state it baldly, one might say that the book is a careful and sustained essay in natural theology, the purpose being to provide a purely and also a rigorously philosophical account of the nature of man (selfhood) and of the notion of God (Godhood), so as to be able finally, in the last three chapters, to face up directly to the question, "Is religion true?" And perhaps it might not be amiss, by way of indicating the manner and temper of the book, albeit not its specific objective, to remark just in passing that Professor Campbell is purported to be the only philosopher left in Great Britain who has a portrait of F. H. Bradley prominently displayed in his study!

But if such be the flavor of the book, not to mention the flavor of the author, one's first and quite prejudicial reaction might well be, "But how is such a thing possible any longer? Is it not rather like discussing how many angels can dance on the end of a pin?" Be assured, however, that Professor Campbell is a thinker of obvious philosophic competence and, to judge from this present work, an eminently reasonable man. Indeed, being reasonable is, one might say, the very hallmark of Professor Campbell's entire philosophical style. For it is not a style marked by any feats of linguistic analysis or even by any richness of phenomenological description. No, there aren't even any very illuminating insights drawn from science or from the history of philosophy or from other specialized departments of knowledge. Instead, there is nothing but straightforward philosophical argument, involving always a careful marshaling of reasons in support of a conclusion, as well as a constant concern to give a fair hearing to possible objections that might suggest themselves.

As for the course itself of this high argument, one might summarize it briefly as follows: Reflection upon the fact of human cognition leads one necessarily to a recognition of judgment as central to such cognition and of the human self as the self-conscious cognizing or judging subject. Moreover, what we are judging of in such judgments is always objective reality, and in such a way that Reality itself becomes, *à la* Bradley, the ultimate subject of any and every judgment. And on the other face of the coin, that of the cognizing or judging subject, we find that such a subject is active, that such activity must be the activity of a sub-

stance, that this substantial subject or self is marked by both self-consciousness, that this identity is at least the identity of a mind or spirit, and that this mind exists in only a *de facto* and not at all in an essential union with the body—which fact, incidentally, would certainly seem to indicate that “the continued existence of the self after the destruction of its body falls at least into the category of abstract possibilities” (p. 102).

Turning, then, to the moral and ethical implications of this account of the human self, Professor Campbell argues that such a self will manifest that “specific mode of self-activity which is (or appears to be) involved in ‘free will’” (p. 143); not only that, but he insists that the moral experience of such a free self or agent definitely confirms the so-called non-naturalistic analysis of such experience. In other words, for Professor Campbell, “the moral ought is ultimate and unanalyzable, incapable of definition.” “We can know what the ought means in, but *only* in, actual experience of it. That meaning is as incommunicable to a person who cannot enjoy the requisite experience (if such there be) as the sensory quality ‘redness’ is to a colour-blind person.” Furthermore, “the moral ought is experienced as an *unconditional* or *categorical* imperative” (pp. 200-201 *passim*). Nor can we recognize this unequivocal testimony of our moral consciousness without also recognizing that such an ought must have objective validity, that “a ‘moral order’ is *somehow* ingredient in the very nature of things” (p. 206).

So much, then, for the account which Professor Campbell gives of the selfhood pole in his bi-polar scheme of selfhood and Godhood. Indeed, at the conclusion of his whole discussion of selfhood Professor Campbell is careful to point out that this view of the self which he has been engaged in expounding and defending philosophically is a view which is not merely reconcilable with, but which actually serves to make “intelligible the sort of language theology is constrained to use in telling about the human soul” (p. 207). And with this, Professor Campbell proceeds to turn his attention in the second part of the book (which originally comprised a second series of Gifford lectures) to those issues which more properly pertain to Godhood—i.e. to issues of natural theology and religion.

What, then, is religion for Professor Campbell? Without hesitation he pronounces it to be a state of mind involving both emotive elements and belief elements. And what is the object toward which this emotive, believing state of mind is directed? Professor Campbell replies that the object of religion is the 'worshipful,' which is simply to say that it is an object which is at once supernatural, of transcendent value, and having transcendent power. In other words, the religious object turns out to be none other than Otto's *Mysterium Tremendum et Fascinans*.

From here Professor Campbell's next step is to identify religion, so understood, with theism, i.e. with belief in a "Single, Eternal and Infinite Spirit, Perfect in Power, Wisdom and Goodness, Who is the Source of all that is, Who is the Moral Governor of the World, and Who is yet a living presence in the hearts of men" (p. 254). And yet it must not be thought that these divine attributes, so-called, are to be understood literally. No, for Professor Campbell enters upon a very thoroughgoing critique of what he calls "rational theism," wishing to replace it with a "supra-rational theism," in which all the key theological assertions will have only a symbolic meaning. Here again, Professor Campbell considers that he is both following and developing some of the insights of Professor Otto, for whom the "relation of the rational to the non-rational element in the idea of the holy or sacred is one of 'schematization'" (p. 336).

Nevertheless, even though a supra-rational theism of the sort here described is what the religious consciousness attests to, still such a mere deliverance of the religious consciousness is not in itself sufficient to prove that such theism is true. And here Professor Campbell parts company with Otto. For while he feels that Otto has provided a superb account of the psychology of the religious consciousness, he does not feel that he has succeeded in proving the objective validity of religion. But where else, then, can one go for such a proof, if not to the so-called 'classic' arguments for God's existence? And so Professor Campbell proceeds to an elaborate, not to say subtle, examination of the so-called moral argument, as well as of a Bradleyan version of the cosmological argument, the conclusion of which seems to be not that God's existence can be proved, but rather that the most one can

achieve is a certain "philosophical corroboration of religion," a corroboration which "relates to no more than the most general picture of the human situation; the picture of man separated by an intellectually impassable gulf from the ultimate reality, yet at the same time rightly claiming that certain concepts are valid as symbolic representatives of the ultimate reality" (p. 404).

But unfortunately, we cannot go further into the details of Professor Campbell's ingenious and yet eminently balanced account of the nature and the limits of this so-called corroboration of theistic religion by metaphysics. Instead, we must proceed at once to the more critical question, "So what?" Just what is one to say of Professor Campbell's enterprise and achievement as a whole? That it represents what might be called traditional Western Philosophy and metaphysics at their best goes almost without saying. Oh, it's true that one might want to take issue here and there with Professor Campbell's specific theses and arguments. For instance, is it true that a Bradleyan theory of judgment will enable one to escape the difficulties which realists supposedly get into over the status of such fictional and unreal entities as centaurs, square-circles, and the present king of France? Or what of the contention that any bare togetherness or conjunction of different, in the absence of any mediating ground of their unity, not only involves contradiction, but is actually what contradiction ultimately consists in? Likewise, is it perhaps extreme to say that "no metaphysical argument can tell us anything about any *specific relationship* between the supreme being and finite selves" (p. 412)?

Nevertheless, all such objections and criticisms against Professor Campbell's contentions would be, as it were, like so many disputes within the family; or better, they would be mere differences within the same universe of discourse, which is simply our common heritage of Western metaphysics from Plato on. The only trouble is that, given the present fashions in philosophy, both the contentions and the objections to them seem equally futile and beside the point.

Thus it is not hard to imagine how on the more superficial level it might be urged that any such complex of metaphysical argument and counter-argument represents a serious misuse of language. For one thing, it will be said that such arguments

nearly all purport to yield conclusions that are at once necessary truths and yet at the same time truths about real existence. Thus, consider Professor Campbell's argument from the diversity of a human being's cognitions to the substantial unity and identity of the self which has these cognitions. Or to take a different example, consider the argument to the effect that if the real is non-contradictory, reality must be one; and if one, then infinite; and if infinite, then eternal (p. 405). Will it not be said that arguments of this latter type exhibit the typical metaphysician's error of taking words like "one," "real," "time," "finite," out of the context of ordinary experience, where their origin and use are quite intelligible, and projecting them into a context where such experience is entirely lacking and where, in consequence, these words can only move, as it were, in a void?

Or if the new fashion in philosophy to which one is accustomed be not linguistic analysis, but rather phenomenology, then one's strictures on Professor Campbell's method of metaphysics will be somewhat different. Instead of a misuse of language, one will accuse him of a misuse of that very introspection which Professor Campbell, especially in the first part of his book, is constantly appealing to in support of such contentions as that the self is not in essential union with the body, or that there is a basic distinction between decisions of the self (creative decisions) and decisions that flow merely from our characters (expressive decisions), or that the moral ought is an unconditional or categorical imperative. For it would certainly be argued here that Professor Campbell's whole technique of introspection is faulty, for the reason that not having been careful first to carry out the necessary phenomenological "reduction," he has not purified his introspective findings of extraneous, inherited philosophical theories and constructions and so has not been able truly to "return to the things themselves."

And yet it somehow seems to me that all such criticisms of Professor Campbell's method in metaphysics, or for that matter of the method of the whole tradition of Western metaphysics—that these hypothetical criticisms of method do not go to the root of the matter. Instead, the current dissatisfaction with traditional metaphysics is much more deep-seated. It springs, if I mistake not, not from any mere feeling that the method of a thinker like Pro-

fessor Campbell is wrong, but rather from the conviction that his entire universe is wrong, so to speak. For there is no denying the fact that the whole of traditional metaphysics seems always, as it were, to be set in and to presuppose a kind of basic and common frame of reference: that frame of reference is simply that of the universe, of reality, of the order of things, of *rerum natura*, on the one hand, and of human beings who are parts of that universe on the other, and who thus are committed to the task of understanding this pre-existent order of things and of adjusting themselves to it.

But now, what if there just isn't any such frame of reference at all? What if one quite literally hasn't anything to go on, save what one might call a man's own existential situation (sc. my situation, my world). Or if one prefers a different terminology, suppose that all one has to go on are just the "things themselves," in Husserl's sense of pure phenomena stripped of all interpretative theory. Or perhaps one might say that all one has to go on are the concrete uses of ordinary language. Nor is that all, for in all of these much-vaunted new ways and new fashions in philosophy, the insistence is not merely that one must in philosophy always start from one's own existential situation or from the concrete contexts of ordinary language, and without presupposing any overarching, all-embracing universe or order of being. No, in addition, the conviction seems to be that one must not only start from existence, or phenomena, or ordinary language, but that one must end there as well, that one can never move out beyond one's concrete human situation so as to attain anything like an independently real order of things, that in so far as we do arrive at anything like a universe or an order of nature, this must always remain completely dependent, derivative, and in a sense a mere abstraction from our *Lebenswelt* or *monde vécu*.

In short, what we have here is a potential challenge not just to Professor Campbell, but to the very frame of reference of the whole of traditional metaphysics. Moreover, if the challenge be at all legitimate, then metaphysics of the sort that Professor Campbell has been doing will have to be regarded as not so much mistaken, as idle and beside the point. Not only that, but Professor Campbell's whole way of conceiving the possible pertinence of metaphysics to religion will simply have to be washed down the drain

as well. For on the new view religion will be understood not so much as man's response to the entire order of nature and the divine ground of nature, but rather as the individual human person's response simply to his own existential situation with its features of anxiety, meaninglessness, and finitude.

Now, of course, in one respect it is entirely unfair to tax Professor Campbell with having failed in his book to meet this kind of new-fashioned challenge to the tradition of Western metaphysics. For this is not the task which Professor Campbell has set for himself at all. No, even as regards what he calls "linguisticism" in philosophy, while he shows himself to be quite familiar with such new developments and while he does undertake with great skill to rebut certain specific arguments that the advocates of linguistic analysis have advanced, he nevertheless nowhere attempts to meet the challenge of this new type of thinking in any very radical way. And as for the sort of challenge to traditional metaphysics that comes from the Continent, from existentialism and from phenomenology, Professor Campbell would appear to pay no heed to this at all. Instead, he frankly says that his concern in this book is not to engage in polemics, but rather to get on with the business of simply making clear what his own first principles are and what are his reasons for holding them (p. xii). His presumption seems to be that if his adversaries do not like what they will read in his book, they will at least come to know what they will have to reproach him with in the future.

Nor is there any doubt that such an attitude bespeaks a commendable fortitude and even inflexibility on Professor Campbell's part. And yet it does leave him, almost by this own admission, quite powerless to deal with the currently changing fashions in philosophy. And this, one might say, is precisely the problem which is brought to the fore by the contemporary situation in philosophy: is the entire metaphysical tradition of the West, of which Professor Campbell is so competent a representative, itself a mere passing fashion, or is it the real thing? Unfortunately, one cannot answer this question just by merely going on doing metaphysics in the same old way, even if, as is the case with Professor Campbell, it be done exceedingly well.

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ANALOGY, SYMBOLISM, AND LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

WILLIAM L. REESE

"OURS IS THE AGE of philosophical sandhogs working far below the surface at the foundations of the theory of being, not the age of steeple jacks and decorators who put finishing touches on an already erected metaphysical edifice."¹ So James Collins comments on the present philosophical scene in his *God in Modern Philosophy*. The figure, interesting in itself, gains in affective power when beside Collins' work, written from the standpoint of Neo-Thomism, one places equally recent publications bearing on the same topic, yet existentialistic and linguistic in tone—Paul Tillich's *Theology of Culture* and Ninian Smart's *Reasons and Faiths*.

If the figure of philosophical sandhogs is appropriately descriptive of this recent work, still one must recognize the manner in which modern philosophers are working away in different caissons; the workers differ in judgment concerning what is hardpan and what bedrock; while some believe only hardpan confronts us all the way down, a philosophic version of the bends would seem not to be uncommon in the analogate. And it is tempting, while possibly not unfair, to think of the linguistic philosopher functioning in the equipment of the skindiver, boldly setting off destructive charges at the foot of any piling which might be capable of furnishing support to a prospective "metaphysical edifice." Or, more modestly, one might say that whereas both Collins and Tillich are at work on the "foundations of the theory of being" Smart's enterprise, in "a spirit of higher-order neutrality,"² is directed toward the linguistic foundations of the theory of "being", carefully bracketed from ontological reference through a rich use of inverted commas.

¹ James Collins, *God in Modern Philosophy* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959), p. 384.

² Ninian Smart, *Reasons and Faiths* (New York: The Humanities Press Inc., 1959), p. 4.

Preliminary Comments

In appearance these three works, roughly classifiable as belonging to the subsection of philosophy called "philosophy of religion," are more diverse in method and goal than has been thus far indicated. The lines of exposition extend variously and range widely. The most imposing of the three studies both in volume and in sheer multiplicity of reference is Collins' *God in Modern Philosophy*. The thesis which controls the historical approach of this book is: "The continuity and critical interchange in modern philosophy depend in large measure upon positions taken on the problem of God."³ Now, if Collins is contending that the most decisive influence upon a philosophy is its position with respect to the idea of God, his own analysis is sufficient to disprove the claim. The idea of God is one important factor; but, as his own investigation demonstrates, the position taken with respect to the nature and limits of human knowledge has equal importance, at least, and possibly paramount importance. Nor could one claim with much reason that a philosopher's position with respect to human knowledge is marked out in order to exhibit a predetermined attitude with respect to the idea of God. But in any case, Collins has chosen to view the history of modern philosophy from the standpoint of the above thesis, and the result is an interesting and valuable book. Indeed, the book has both a plot and a moral! The first chapter treats of Cusanus, Calvin, and Bruno. Cusanus' view still contains many of the elements of realistic theism (the protagonist of the piece, lurking in the wings), although in Cusanus essence has begun to tip the balance against existence. But Calvin and Bruno reflect, upon comparison, "the portentous split between finitism and rationalism" which is to plague philosophical thought from this moment on. In the great seventeenth century rationalists essence is still more controlling, existence still further underplayed; one result is that God is called upon to function within systems of physics and metaphysics. The role is doubtful indeed for a supreme being, inasmuch as a successful nontheistic explanation of these functions serves as an argument against the supreme being. On the other hand, the

³ Collins, *op. cit.*, p. ix.

empirical philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, turning toward existence, but limited to phenomenal existence, tend to neutralize the role of God, even when his existence is affirmed. The figures of the eighteenth century Enlightenment are treated as antagonists in an inconclusive battle between rationalism, empiricism, fideism, and skepticism, their contributions finally clearing the ground for the syntheses of Kant and Hegel. It was Kant's intention to give due weight both to material and formal elements, holding in unity the virtues of rationalism and empiricism. But the shape of empirical philosophy in the preceding age dictated that Kant would be able to grasp only possible existence. He is never in possession of the existential, really; the result is that strict knowledge of God must be denied. And the idea of God can be derived only through a moral functionalism. Hegel, faced by the problem of making speculative knowledge of God possible once again, is forced to substitute the immanent absolute for the transcendent being. His metaphysics becomes, then, a metaphysics of logic, and the essentialism is still more pronounced. From this point it is easy to predict how the history of philosophy will fall away into the contemporary world with fragmentary philosophies of phenomenism, existentialism, and positivism. With respect to the idea of God one will find atheism, finitism, and personalism, as men seek escape from the essentialism, doubtful morality, and impersonality of the Hegelian absolute. Meanwhile, waiting in the wings, and permitted to enter briefly at the close of each major section of the analysis, is realistic theism, properly fusing "essence" and "existence," while employing causal analogy and analogical predication to rise to a vision of the non-polar deity whose act is identical with his existence. In the final chapter of the book, "Toward a Realistic Philosophy of God," realistic theism is permitted to emerge into the center of the stage. Since realistic theism is the view from which, in this account, modern speculation has emerged, the implication is that the piece will, or at least should end with the view which marked its point of origin.

I find little to criticize, and much to praise in the individual analyses. The attention given to Christian Wolff, for instance, allows him to emerge as a major eighteenth century figure, illumi-

ning more than a little the history of philosophy in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, I find the framework of these analyses somewhat artificial. It was the intention of James Collins to produce an inductive table, as it were, of success and failure in the history of modern philosophy, while allowing to the idea of God a critical role in the shaping of philosophic doctrines. It is possible in theory to conceive of such an objective survey. But in practice judgments of this kind are most often a simple record of the manner in which other views either depart from, or reinforce the position of the surveyor. Nor is it easy to avoid this bias, since judgment presupposes a position from which to judge. And the content of Collins' analysis lends itself particularly well to such treatment. Because a dissolution of the medieval synthesis did occur in the history of philosophy between the fifteenth century and our own, and because many of the movements of thought within the intervening period can be viewed as aspects of the medieval synthesis, it must be particularly tempting—for one who is systematically inclined—to regard the views of essentialists and existentialists within these centuries (to oversimplify the problem) as instances of imbalance which require the corrective insights of the preceding synthesis. Should one succumb to the temptation, a point of origin would have been translated into a norm. One might then be tricked into thinking of views which do not pretend to represent Thomism as in fact misrepresenting Thomism, departing from its synthesis of essence and existence. I am not convinced that Collins has avoided this egregious error. Certainly we discover, as the inductive survey proceeds, that progress in speculation about God is going to be progress right back to the thirteenth century. And, curiously, this prejudgment may be read from the figure with which we had begun; a metaphysical edifice requiring "steeple jacks and decorators" having a certain recognizable form. To be more fair, the progress outlined is toward realistic theism, the twentieth century revival of Thomistic thought. But since Thomism, or Neo-Thomism, is taken as a norm the value of the book lies not so much in its announced objective, as in its record of how the development of modern philosophy appears to a Thomist. (Let it be admitted, however, that if Thomism or Neo-Thomism is the

adequate philosophy, this bias is nothing less than bias toward the truth!)

Professor Tillich's *Theology of Culture*, on the other hand, is a collection of essays, to some extent re-written for inclusion in this volume. The book is designed "to show the religious dimension in many spheres of man's cultural activity."⁴ It is a happy circumstance that among the essays of the volume are Tillich's well-known "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion" and "Existential Philosophy: Its Historical Meaning." A third essay of substance, "The Nature of Religious Language," is helpful in understanding Tillich's doctrine of symbolism. Beginning with a set of essays on "Basic Considerations," the analysis continues into the cultural applications and comparisons of these themes. Along the way one garners Tillichian conclusions with respect to art, psychoanalysis, science, ethics, and education; in addition, elements emerge similar to his earlier (in point of publication) analyses concerning the political structuring of society, and the estrangement present in modern industrial organization. In effect Tillich, religious existentialism in hand, turns from one aspect of culture to another, producing a variety of interesting conclusions. Apart from the long standing difficulty literal-minded philosophers have in interpreting the rich matrix of metaphor employed by Tillich, the chief defect of this work will be found to lie in its nature as a collection. Important ideas, suggested in one essay, are not carried on and developed in the next as one would ordinarily have a right to expect. A few of the essays (e.g., a six page discussion on "Science and Theology") are so brief as to be somewhat less than philosophically satisfying.

Where Collins provides us with historical analysis, and Tillich with cultural analysis, the contrast of methods is completed, appropriately enough, by Ninian Smart's linguistic analysis of basic documents from the major religions, including non-canonical expressions by religious leaders and mystics. *Reasons and Faiths*, an effort to "unpack" the meanings of religious doctrines, confronts the reader with a terminology concerning "language frames,"

⁴ Paul Tillich, *Theology of Culture*, ed. Robert C. Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. v.

"strands," "boundaries," etc., and much more rarely with "concepts." For reasons which will appear in due course, both the exposition and criticism of the three basic strands of religious discourse—numinous, mystical, and incarnation—employed by Smart will be deferred to a later stage of this investigation.

Beneath an appearance of sheer diversity in these three works, a common purpose is to be discerned. In fact, only Smart has made the nature of religious discourse his primary objective; and yet each of our authors in his own way defines or defends a position designed to make intelligible man's references to the divine. For Collins this is the traditional *analogia entis*; for Tillich it is a doctrine of symbolism; and for Smart it is a rather complex strand analysis which defies brief description. The general position of each of our authors depends upon the successful defense of his position with respect to the nature of religious discourse. This being so, an evaluation of these contrasting doctrines of religious discourse will serve as a test of the more general position of each man. The above comment, to be sure, is trivial in the case of Smart's *Reasons and Faiths* for the reason that, except in a privative sense, linguistic philosophers are prevented by their craft from having anything more than positions with respect to discourse. But both Collins and Tillich represent positions in which discourse concerning the divine is expected to meet with success. And because they represent, and present positions supporting the claim, I shall first attempt to reconstruct and to examine their doctrines: the appropriate version of the *analogia entis*, and Tillich's doctrine of symbolism. Then by way of contrast the linguistic view of Smart will be called upon. Finally, I shall take advantage of the customary diminution of logical rigor at the end of philosophic essays to suggest a more fortunate alternative.

The Analogia Entis

Scores of times Collins makes reference to the adequately developed and available doctrines which approach God through the "causal inference" and "analogical predication." He writes:

An integral part of realistic theism is a methodology of how its propositions are meant and what limits they must respect. This is the task of the theory of analogical predication, which requires that our

propositions about God respect the difference, as well as the similarity, in respect to the ways in which the infinite being and composed, finite beings exist and have their actuality. The purpose of a doctrine on analogy is not to achieve a studied ambiguity concerning the perfections predicated about God but to render the propositions stating such predications as precise as possible.⁵

But Collins does not furnish this view of analogical predication. He does tell us that its development would begin with the causal analogy as fundamental, and once this has been established "other kinds of analogy" come into the picture.⁶ And when one turns to the catalogue of notes, fulsome in other respects, the single reference is to Klubertanz' recent article in this journal.⁷ Because Klubertanz' approach to the problem exactly fits Collins' specifications one must assume this doctrine to be what Collins has in mind. The argument of Klubertanz can be compressed into five steps:

- (1) The entire order of experienced being is caused; therefore, there is a cause for this order of being.
- (2) This cause cannot be univocal with its effect; for the causal proof requires an uncaused cause; and univocity between cause and effect would entail a cause for the cause of this order of being.
- (3) But neither can this cause be simply equivocal with its effect; for equivocity would deprive cause-and-effect of all relations, thus destroying the meaning of an established relation; and since the effect *is*, total equivocity would entail our saying that the cause is *not*, again destroying the meaning of an established relationship.
- (4) It remains that cause and effect are in this instance related analogically. And given the causal inference the nature of this analogical relation can be understood. Merely by expanding the meaning of the concept of "uncaused being," we can legitimately derive statements such as: It is God's proper nature to be; or, He is by His essence; or, God is identical with His act of existing; or, in the statement, "God is" the word "is" is used of God by way of identity. One is forced to say, "God has being-by-essence." And since other things share in being without being identical with it, one must also say, "Other beings have being-by-participation." Thus, between God and other beings, we have discovered the presence of an "analogy of participation."

⁵ Collins, *op. cit.*, p. 400.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 400.

⁷ Klubertanz, George P., S. J., "The Problem of the Analogy of Being," *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. X (June, 1957), 553-579.

(5) The analogy of participation may now be used to found "the analogy of proper proportionality," defining the relationship of the many to each other. Thus "is" has "an intrinsic intelligibility, but one which varies in every use," each thing having "the kind of actuality which is proportioned to the concrete individual nature of that thing." *

The application of these ideas *inter se*, i.e., the necessity of a cause along with the impossibility of infinite inductive series, results in an alleged necessity for positing a different kind of cause with power to interrupt the extension of this series toward infinity. Given this starting point the uncaused cause may now be described analogically by means of predicates apposite to the unusual nature whose conception has begun to gain anchor in the discussion.

Tillich, in discussing "the Thomistic dissolution of the Augustinian solution," * severely criticizes this type of approach to the divine. What we have found in Collins and Klubertanz is precisely what Tillich terms the cosmological approach to philosophy of religion. And even though Martin has well shown that Tillich and Thomas agree upon "Being Itself" as the most proper name for God,¹⁰ Tillich argues that Thomism, using the category of causality inferentially, reasoning from the nature of finite existents, allowing only a mediate relation between man and God, can derive the idea of God as a being but not as "Being Itself." In his language the problem of God has been improperly placed as a term in the general duality of self and world, the subject-object correlation. And Tillich's very strong language concerning Thomism and its later developments would lead one to expect from him the enunciation of a more fortunate alternative:

Out of this paradoxical situation the half-blasphemous and mythological concept of the 'existence of God' has arisen. And so have the abortive attempts to prove the existence of this 'object.' To such a

* *Ibid.*, principally, pp. 569-573; but the material quoted is from p. 561. My apologies to Fr. Klubertanz for this stringent act of paraphrase and condensation.

* Tillich, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹⁰ J. A. Martin, Jr., "St. Thomas and Tillich on the Names of God," *Journal of Religion*, Vol. 37 (October, 1957), 256.

concept and to such attempts atheism is the right religious and theological reply.¹¹

Clearly, Tillich's interest is in a God at least beyond the God of realistic theism. The neo-Thomistic response to this charge can be given in Collins' own words: "There is no need to seek, with Tillich, for a God beyond the God of theism but only for a philosophical theism for which God is known to be other than all finite existents and conceptions."¹²

Tillich's alternative must, then, be examined. And to oppose key words, one might say for Tillich that, whereas Thomists and neo-Thomists believe that in their argument the idea of cause is being used analogically and categorially, in fact they are using a term which is properly "symbolic." The causal symbol is being used as though it were a sign. And even though on occasion Tillich seems to equate the symbolical with the analogical, I shall try to show that Tillich's doctrine is significantly different from any ordinary, including the foregoing version of the *analogia entis*.

The Doctrine of Symbolism

It is possible to extract from the *Theology of Culture*, utilizing especially the essays, "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion" and "The Nature of Religious Language" (while trying not to forget the relevant passages of the *Systematic Theology*), a doctrine of symbolism which parallels in a sense the five step *analogia entis* of Neo-Thomism. The accounts will have at least two points in common. Each utilizes its own distinctive style of inference; and each accords to man a special place in reality in order that human predicates will have relevance in discourse concerning the divine nature. But while neo-Thomism employs a causal inference, Tillich has recourse to the dialectical inference which accords with his preference for an ontological philosophy of religion. Further, while the doctrine of neo-Thomism is expected to yield a mediate philosophical certainty, Tillich expects his view to yield an "immediate religious certainty." And, unlike Thomism, the Tillichian fusion of ontology with revelation blurs the line between

¹¹ Tillich, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

¹² Collins, *op. cit.*, p. 402.

philosophy and theology, reason and faith. Argument, classification, and experience intermingle in this doctrine, which seems as much stages on the way of a religious life, as successive steps in the pattern of an argument. However one may wish to denominate them, four statements together constitute what I shall understand as Tillich's doctrine of symbolism. They are:

- (1) The subject-object correlation, and the dialectical inference which transcends it.
- (2) The distinction of sign and symbol, the former referring back to (1), and the latter on to (3).
- (3) The subject-Subject correlation to which symbolism properly applies.
- (4) Reference beyond the subject-Subject correlation to the ground of Being, itself beyond essence and existence, and all polarities.

In thus ordering his doctrine I am thinking of Tillich as a philosopher of religion; in his role of theologian, my construction would not apply. But since Tillich is often identified as a philosopher, and accepts the role, my construction is not inappropriate. With this qualification I turn to the elaboration of the four steps in order to evaluate Tillich's doctrine alongside that of the *analogia entis*. Accordingly, a brief bit of exposition must be provided for each step.

(1) The subject-object correlation, and the dialectical inference which transcends it. Within experience, carried by signs, and explicated by "categories", bound to the unavoidable polarities of the subject-object correlation, man becomes aware of unconditional elements which transcend these polarities. These are the traditional *transcendentalia*: "esse, verum, bonum."¹³ The transcendental nature of being is, in fact, the genuine content of the ontological argument; truth, denied, asserts itself; and anxiety reveals an ultimate concern which relates itself to transcendental value. These elements, and not the causal inference, provide the basis for directing our attention toward "the *prius* of subject and object [which] cannot become an object to which man as subject is theoretically and practically related."¹⁴

(2) The distinction of sign and symbol. If literal speech

¹³ Tillich, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

necessarily reflects the self-world duality, statements about the *prius* must be other than literal. Hence, speech about the ground of being must lay hold of a nonliteral form of communication. Tillich, thus, distinguishes the sign with its agreed upon connotation from the symbol which "participates" in the power of that which it symbolizes.¹⁵ And while a sign can become a symbol, and be derived from a symbol, the latter is more heavily freighted: "the literal is not more but less than symbolic."¹⁶ Platonic participation involves the impartation of form; and in some sense Tillich must believe that his participative symbols are nonconventional because they do contain some of the reality of that which is symbolized.¹⁷ But the nature of Tillich's symbolic participation is tantalizingly difficult to understand.¹⁸ How literally are we to take this example which Tillich provides?

The whole monarchic idea is itself entirely incomprehensible, if you do not understand that the king is always both: on the one hand, a symbol of the power of the group of which he is the king and on the other hand, he who exercises partly (never fully, of course) this power.¹⁹

Within this power relationship, to be sure, the king as power will be aware of himself as symbol. And the symbolism which he

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 55. Tillich makes the point that the modern scene contains a tremendous confusion concerning the terminology of "signs" and "symbols." It is natural enough, then, that I experience confusion over Tillich's use of these terms; for Tillich means by "sign" what Peirce meant by "symbol"; and I had thought Peirce's classification of sign and symbol rather definitive. For Peirce the term "sign" includes "icon," "index," and "symbol." And by "symbol" one signifies a kind of sign "with an agreed-upon connotation." Not only is Tillich's "sign" Peirce's "symbol," but Tillich's symbols have iconic and indexical components. When Tillich says (p. 55) that the "mathematician has usurped the term 'symbol' for 'mathematical sign,'" the claim is almost certainly false. In fact, we have had two major traditions in the West regarding these usages. Peirce formalized the philosophico-scientific strain, while Tillich is formalizing a theologico-mystical strain. To be sure, the present mingling of these strains engenders confusion.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

¹⁷ Thus, having the essential character of Peirce's iconic sign.

¹⁸ It is tempting to draw some conclusion from the contrasting uses of the term "participation" in the *analogia entis* and this doctrine, but I refrain.

¹⁹ Tillich, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

represents in the minds of his people will "participate"—through his awareness of this symbolism—in his power decisions, resulting in a reciprocal determination between symbol and power. Taking the example seriously, and adding to it another element of Tillich's account, the distinction of sign and symbol can be filled out in the following manner. Just as the king, as symbol, has an internal and living relation to the king as power, in exactly the same sense other symbols participate in the realities they signify. Tillich's suggestion, which would allow us to place symbol and thing symbolized within the same "skin," involves acceptance of the "group unconscious" or "collective unconscious" as the womb of symbols. Both symbol and thing symbolized lie within the realm of human sentience, interacting on conscious and unconscious levels.²⁰ The "sign," then, differs from the "symbol" in its restriction to the conscious level.²¹ And the symbol has a "life" of its own; hence, the peculiarly hylozoistic ascriptions: "symbols are born and die." "Out of what womb are symbols born?" ". . . and so the symbols died."²² Further, it is clear that symbols are expected to mediate between ourselves and reality; and they are to perform this function by means of what may be termed their depth dimension.

(3) The subject-Subject correlation to which symbolism properly applies. Through penetration of the meaning of symbols, levels of external reality open to us, and at the same time levels of "our interior reality."²³ The terminus of this movement in depth is marked by a subject-Subject relation, replacing the subject-object correlation. It is *person*, the profundity of the soul, which encounters the unconditional *Thou* of Being Itself.²⁴ ". . . man

²⁰ It is possible that I have made too much of a single example. Should the "king" example be only symbolic, then something other than my account should be given at this point. On the other hand if Tillich is using symbolic utterances to talk about symbolic utterance, it is possible to long for something like the relatively more clear articulation of themes upon which Thomism hangs its doctrine of analogy.

²¹ If the interpretation is what Tillich intends, the symbolic would appear to take over the field of semiotic, thus largely cancelling the importance of the distinction.

²² Tillich, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

discovers *himself* when he discovers God." ²⁵ And because person is the profundity of the finite we refer to God "experienced qualities we have ourselves." ²⁶ The initial source of the referred qualities of love, mercy, omniscience, omnipresence, and omnipotence is person. And yet it becomes obvious that this relationship is no more stable than the preceding. We know, in fact, that Being Itself is not literally "Thou." The qualities we have mentioned "cannot be applied to God in the literal sense . . . the symbolic character of these qualities must be maintained consistently." ²⁷ The person-Thou encounter, it is clear, is nothing final.

(4) Reference beyond the subject-Subject correlation to the ground of being. The necessity for this reference is supported by Tillich's insistence that religious symbols have "two fundamental levels": "the transcendent level, the level which goes *beyond* the empirical reality we encounter, and the immanent level, the level which we find *within* the encounter with reality." ²⁸ In the preceding point we have been discussing the immanent level of the symbol, "God." Symbolically speaking, God is "the highest being, a being with the characteristics of highest perfection." ²⁹ Precisely here, a problem of interpretation arises. Not only does Tillich distinguish transcendent and immanent levels of symbolism; he tells us that in a symbol, such as "God," there is a non-symbolic, as well as a symbolic, element. The question is whether the non-symbolic is to be equated with the transcendent, while the symbolic is to be equated with the immanent level. The latter he clearly affirms. What about the former? He does tell us that "the predicate 'personal' can be said of the Divine only symbolically or by analogy, or if affirmed and negated at the same time." ³⁰ If we are to negate what we have affirmed, then Tillich would be instructing us "to balance off every theistic statement with its atheistic counterpart," ³¹ as Collins understands the doctrine; and

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

³¹ Collins, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

the program would then turn out to be "a dialectical counterbalancing of symbolic terms."³² But, as I understand the point, Tillich is instructing us to negate the symbolic element, while affirming the non-symbolic, which would be akin to negating the immanent, while affirming the transcendent level of such terms. Thus, the reference beyond the subject-Subject correlation. In fact, however, the consequence of either interpretation will be the same. In either case the final reference is beyond the symbolic element of symbols. The non-symbolic element in the symbol, "God," is "ultimate reality, being itself, ground of being, power of being."³³ And for Tillich God is literally this "unconditional which transcends subject and object and all other polarities,"³⁴ including, of course, our understanding. If this is correct, the final task of the symbolic is merely to point beyond itself.

A Critical Section

It is quite possible that I have allowed neither doctrine its proper subtlety, in which case the following criticisms will not apply with the devastating force I intend. But if I have caught an approximation of each doctrine, I can insist that the two are not equal in philosophic value, even though each is subject to criticism.

The more cogent doctrine would seem to be the neo-Thomistic *analogia entis*, and yet its five step argument contains what may be a fatal defect. Quite aside from our perennial human uncertainty concerning the properties of infinite series, and the constitutive meaning (or meanings) of "cause," which may suggest that a kind of uncertainty does after all invest Klubertanz' bold argument, a much more significant point requires our attention. This argument, one might suppose, requires one to attribute to God in an eminent sense every property of finite things, since God is their cause. And yet Collins explicitly denies the point, stating in reference to the analogical argument: "the validity of one's descriptions of finite things need not depend upon injecting all of their elements into the divine nature."³⁵ Collins in fact does, and

³² *Ibid.*, p. 403.

³³ Tillich, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

³⁵ Collins, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

Thomists generally do, emphasize some properties of finite existents more forcefully than, and indeed to the exclusion of, certain others. And those properties are stressed in the conception of God which pertain to man at his best, i.e., in his essential nature. And the reason generally provided for such selectivity is that man is the highest of sensible beings.

Now, assuming that Klubertanz expresses Collins' view, both are guilty of what seems to me a vicious circularity; otherwise, perhaps only Klubertanz. For if the "analogy of participation" is expected to found the "analogy of proportionality," then surely the analogy of proportionality (from which the judgment that man is the highest of sensible beings must issue) cannot be used to found the analogy of participation. And yet exactly this is the consequence of using man's essential nature as evidence in determining the essential nature of the causal term in the analogy of participation. Even allowing the causal inference, the doctrine of analogical predication does not escape this very serious problem.

We have discovered circularity in the Neo-Thomist version of the *analogia entis*. Is a similar kind of circularity to be found in what we are assuming to be the Tillichian alternative? The doctrine of symbolism does not seem to possess this defect; but the reason it does not may lie in a calculated looseness of formulation, related to the symbolic, so that at last nothing whatever can be asserted of the divine. In fact, the doctrine betrays inadequacy in no less than three respects. Let us take them in order. In the first place the dialectical inference, which furnishes intimations of the ground of being, does not require the identifications which Tillich, and before him St. Augustine, have made. Possibly truth is unavoidable; but the argument does not require the equating of truth and God, or truth and "Thou." This equation marks an addition, as reference to Plato, the mentor of dialecticians, should render obvious. And if in the manner of *The Courage To Be* I write out in the courage of despair, "Life is meaningless," to be sure I have caught myself in the act of expressing a meaning; but it is not wonderfully clear that this meaning is related to the ground of being. Dialectical inference may require a category other than that of "object" for the explication of its subject matter; and if "object" will not do, why not "subject," or still more conveniently,

"Subject?" But in terms of reason the progression represents an hiatus. Tillich's immediate religious certainty is the certainty that unconditional elements are present in experience. But the Platonic alternative has not been disallowed. And if a leap is sometimes requisite, still philosophers and theologians need not exchange their lessons in logic for ballet.

Second, it is obvious that the usefulness of the fascinating journey into depth is prejudiced by the judgment which finally withdraws adequacy from the subject-Subject relationship. On the one hand the whole point of the journey is the person-"Thou" encounter. On the other hand, it is not literally the case that man encounters a "Thou." Apparently, I can be literally a person, but God cannot be literally a "Thou." This is surprising, and in a sense would seem to give me an advantage over God. By way of contrast the Thomistic argument first establishes the logical necessity (purportedly, of course) for an infinite being, allowing an infinite-finite contrast; consequently, a framework exists for the task of establishing the nature of this being by analogical inference from the privileged place of man in the natural order. But Tillich does not establish a comparable framework; and since God is not literally "Thou" the application to his nature of human predicates would seem to lose its point. Without a framework of univocity, embodying the contrast of finite and infinite, we have no reason in any case for taking these predicates in an eminent sense. And lacking this framework God ceases to be the highest being, even symbolically. It is difficult, indeed, to see how the present ordering of themes could ever yield the "immediate religious certainty" which Tillich demands of an adequate philosophy of religion.

Third, the reference beyond the uncertainties of symbolic ascription contains its own kind of uncertainty. In symbolic ascriptions, the symbol suggests a variety of meanings, interrelated by association. In the non-symbolic element of the symbol, "God," we are confronted with a synonymous definition, a tautology, God as "Being Itself." And one cannot avoid a sense of uncertainty concerning how this assertion is to be understood. The comment may seem unfair, in view of Tillich's long and courageous struggle with this conception. But within the scheme of a rational metaphysics an apparent tautology of this sort can accumulate some

precision of meaning from its place in the system. The relation of being to non-being, becoming, possibility, necessity, etc., allows us to interpret the term in question. But within the distinctions of the Tillichian approach, the basic categoreal notions are confined within a framework, consisting of dialectical tensions out of which, through symbolism, this single purportedly non-symbolic exception arises. The exception is presented as a non-polar conception; but it is so situated that in this conception all distinctions merge. It would seem to be improper even to call the identification a conception. If the object of this reference beyond symbolism can only be indicated, if it cannot be thought, it would seem that the non-polarity Tillich achieves, and to which the doctrine of symbolism points, is simply the primal, unadulterated mystery of existence, neither "It" nor "Thou," but rather a vaguely indeterminate and uninterpretable "X" in discourse.

The doctrine of symbolism, then, while seeming to offer in its initial distinctions a refreshing and fascinating alternative to the *analogia entis*, exhibits at last its failure to exercise even a modicum of that rational control over the subject matter which would be required in the creation of a viable alternative to the traditional doctrine. The *analogia entis* need not recognize a rival in Tillich's doctrine. But, now, if the alternatives for choice require us to accept circularity, or God as an uninterpretable "X", one might feel inclined to turn with enthusiasm to that analysis of religious language which does not move beyond the conditions of discourse.

The Strand Analysis

In short, one might be inclined to accept Smart's aphorism that "philosophical theories are decayed religious doctrines"²⁶ with its interesting corollary: "It is wrong to intellectualize religion."²⁷ In this context the problem of analogy becomes solely a problem of linguistic substitutability,²⁸ having no metaphysical use which might allow reasoning from the conditions of experience to conditions beyond and "above" experience. And, playing out this

²⁶ Smart, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 44, footnote.

aphoristic line with respect to philosophical theories, we are told that Thomism has superimposed itself upon religious discourse," and that Tillich is an instance of the "strange conspiracy between philosophy and mysticism" ³⁹ as "betrayed" by his use of "mystical and ontological language," an apparently obvious reaction to "the numinous-based theology of Karl Barth."

The comment, expressed in what has the sound of a private jargon, requires explication through Smart's method of analyzing religious statements. We are in the midst of an attempted sublation of philosophic to religious doctrines. The sublation proceeds in the following manner. Three basic strands are to be noted in religious practice. They are termed the numinous, the mystical, and the incarnation strands. By the numinous strand is meant, as in Otto's usage, the religious attitude of wonder, awed admiration, and fear, which attitude is expressed by the abasement of the worshipper, and the placing of the "divine target" in mystery above and beyond the world; phenomena hence become a screen; and the divine becomes remote, yet the target of inferences from the world. The mystical strand relates to feelings of bliss and joy, wherein the divine is understood to be near and "within;" the goal in this strand is union with the divine, and consequent holiness and self-realization. The incarnation strand turns on the properties of "sinlessness and the power to save" ⁴⁰ as related to one judged to be a God-Man within some community of believers. Because the judgment is historical, the claim relates to the career of the incarnate deity. In this case one must refer to "historical evidence to form the material basis of a quasi-aesthetic judgment." ⁴¹ It is the author's claim that one can understand doctrinal schemes by the kind of interweaving exhibited by these strands. Islām, for example, exemplifies with some purity the numinous strand (embarrassed by the mystical strand in Sūfi mysticism). Hīnayāna Buddhism exemplifies the mystical strand with similar purity; while Brāhmanism and Christianity exemplify an interweaving of all

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴⁰ *Fn.*, p. 133.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 125.

three strands, but with distinguishable emphases. Further, as "realization" is a natural adjunct of a mystically based scheme, so is revelation a natural adjunct of a numinously based scheme.

Although this procedure is much like the identification a botanist might make of a kind of violet, once pistils, stamens, and similar parts of flowers have been classified, it occurs to me that a measure of insight other than classificatory is available here. For instance, one would discover that Tillich's two types of philosophy of religion have their bases in different strands. (This identification is not made unambiguously by our author; I am inferring from his basic distinctions, and tangential comments in the book.) The cosmological approach is numinously based, while the ontological approach is mystically based. The identification can continue with the claim that Thomism (ergo Neo-Thomism, ergo Collins) reflects the numinous strand, while Tillich reflects the mystical strand. And this in turn would explain why it is that the analogy of being does allow an element of univocity in what is analogically predicated of God; while the doctrine of symbolism does not lend itself, despite Tillich's best intentions, to literal statement about God, but to an experience which lies beyond the possibility of propositional content. Smart's evidence for the distinctions which I have so rashly elaborated may be deemed weak; he finds the mystical path employing over and over the language of ontology; and he finds the numinous strand insisting upon a gulf between man and God, the world serving as a screen, and so requiring cosmological inference from the screen to what is presumed to be thus screened.⁴³

Granting the subtlety of this approach, which transfers metaphysical doctrines into their presumed doctrinal settings, and admitting to a measure of cogency in the analysis, I feel impelled, as always in the presence of this strand of philosophical thought, to ask: "What are the conclusions?" And to be told it is wrong to intellectualize religion seems to me an inadequate finale to a highly intellectual analysis. I should rather think that the conclusion would be to encourage one to think metaphysically with greater care and skill. And, indeed, while the following comment

⁴³ *Ibid.*, cf. pp. 131-134; pp. 170-178.

is not in the nature of a refutation of his argument, the book does contain at least one self-refuting suggestion. Although apparently firm in his conviction that it is "logical and epistemological theses which are the concern of the philosopher";⁴⁴ and that metaphysical doctrines (e.g., idealism) often incorporate religious assertions in disguised form; he suggests, although reserving the term "philosophy" for linguistic investigations, that there may be a "metaphysics of Christianity,' etc." which concerns "the establishment of general truths about the world."⁴⁵ Further, he thinks it not undesirable that philosophers also engage in metaphysics. Unless, which seems unlikely, he believes the attempt foredoomed, capable of furnishing nothing more than logical and epistemological problems for the philosopher, this concession alters the outlook of his analysis. Certainly, should the metaphysical attempt succeed in establishing even one general truth about the world, it would be a metaphysical truth in the traditional sense, not brooking the suggested confinement to a "metaphysics of Christianity,' etc." And along this path I discern the problem of discourse about the divine coming into view once again.

A More Fortunate Alternative

If the strand analysis does not lead even to the sublation, to say nothing of the successful resolution, of our problem, it is not inappropriate to consider an additional alternative. An obvious way of approaching this alternative is to notice the manner in which each of our three authors finds it necessary to take account of polar conceptions. Collins describes his position as a "deliberately *nonpolar* approach to God";⁴⁶ and yet everywhere the Thomist recognizes the basic polarity of essence and existence. In Tillich's view, as we have seen, God transcends subject, object, and all other polarities; and yet in his analysis of reality Tillich is sensitive to the polarities of essence and existence, finite and infinite, and many others. For that matter the analysis of Smart reveals polar elements in the conception of God, even though this author

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁴⁶ Collins, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

tends to segregate such elements among different "strands," so that the "nearness" of God becomes a characteristic of one strand, while his remoteness becomes the character of a different strand; and the predication of both impersonal and personal attributes to God in mysticism signals a distinction between impersonal and personal mystics.⁴⁷

But why should not these polarities be employed, rather than denied, in our reasoning about God? Certainly, the loss of meaningful features in Tillich's God is the direct result of his abandonment of the category of essence at this point. And the loss, I suggest, can be overcome only through allowing the categories of essence and existence to apply here, as elsewhere. On this point the Thomists are surely right. My quarrel with the Thomistic account in this respect is that the essentialistic aspect of the divine nature has, in all except a merely verbal sense, deprived the existentialistic aspect of its import. Is it not the case that the polarities in question invariably divide along the lines of abstract and concrete kinds of predication? ⁴⁸ The path toward a reasonable account of these matters, I suggest, will veer away from the Hegelian manner of treating opposition, while avoiding inconsistency through a distinction of abstract and concrete levels of predication. The resultant conception will not be a finite God, as both Collins and Tillich maintain, but a deity in whom both absolute and relative aspects are to be distinguished, and in whom essence and existence are not identical. And if the ultimate polarities apply generally, the virtue of consistency—in order not to make of God an exception to our first principles—would have us apply them to God as well. If we were to understand Tillich's use of the dialectical inference as a method for distinguishing the absolute (he calls them "unconditional") elements in reality from their relative aspects, this portion of his thought would constitute an exploration of the polarities which must apply in some sense to the divine. And in this case

⁴⁷ Smart, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

⁴⁸ This thesis was the subject of detailed analysis in Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, *Philosophers Speak of God* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953). To this date the argument has not received the detailed critical comment which would allow its proper evaluation.

the human condition might well be characterized, and more naturally, by the polarity of anxiety-bliss rather than by the quality of anxiety. One might then accuse the existentialists of psychological monopolarity, the removal of which would have brought Tillich's thought out at a different point. Finally, the vicious aspect of the circularity of the *analogia entis* might well be avoided, should one have the privilege of beginning his inferences from any one of a number of categoreal distinctions in reality generally.

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AUTHORITY AS A SUBJECT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

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IS THERE a philosophical problem about authority? "It is difficult," says Jerome Hall, "to know precisely what questions should be asked about authority." I think that this is true, and that the difficulty calls for philosophical investigation. Yet there does not seem to be a besetting problem about authority. We do not succumb again and again to temptations to misconceive it, and rebound from paradox to paradox in frantic exertions to find its place among other familiar concepts.

Authority does, of course, raise practical questions, and sometimes these have been so provocative as to amount to social crises. People in the awakening colonial countries have had to cope with a painful transition between old foreign authorities and new indigenous ones. In the metropolitan centers of colonial authority, especially in France, there has been profound agitation about received political forms, though fortunately this has not yet resulted in the catastrophic disintegration of civil authority which Italy and Germany experienced during the rise of fascism.

In other countries, for example the United States, authority has been stable enough, but because of its plural distribution in a fluid society, perennially hard to locate. Its existence has been hard to credit for another reason. Liberal political thought since the 18th Century has tended to drive authority out of the picture of democratic society and replace it with the ideal of free rational choice by enlightened individual citizens. This tendency may have triumphed too quickly for its triumph to last, it was never a tendency that consorted very well with the facts about average citizens. But it has swept so fast through older ideas, many people feel, as to cause dangerous and unnecessary disturbances not only in politics, but also in education and family life.

The practical crisis about authority, however, is an ambiguous one. Even a writer so much alarmed by "the loss of authority"

as Hannah Arendt, grants that the diminished role of authority in the modern world can be looked upon with hope as well as fear. In a society too fluid to preserve traditional authority, the guidance of the past is lost, and people will lead troubled and unsettled lives because of this; but their lives may also be more exciting and creative ones than traditional authority would have allowed.

There seem to be three main practical questions about authority. The first is a question for political science at its most general: Must there be persons in authority? The second is a question for political scientists and lawyers: Where (given a particular society) is authority in fact located? The third is a question for lawyers and moralists: Whose authority (given this particular society) should be recognized? In practice, one supposes, the first two questions are bound to arise mixed up with the third; but they are easily disentangled.

The third question indicates that there are problems about authority which, if they are not philosophically besetting themselves, at least wait upon the answers to problems that are. Questions about authority take us by a very direct and rapid route to the heart of problems about moral foundations.

Yet just because the route is so plain, no special problem about authority seems to arise. Questions about authority do not, it seems, surround questions about moral foundations with new confusions. The chronic confusion that philosophers may expect to find when authority is connected with moral foundations does not in fact prevail. Reasonably sophisticated people have little more trouble distinguishing between authority that is recognized and authority that deserves to be, between fact and ideal, than they do in distinguishing between authority *de facto* and authority *de jure* (which is, of course, a different distinction).

The question about whose authority should be recognized thus seems to be quite straightforward and unproblematic, merely one among number of important special cases for applying fundamental moral principles. One makes up his mind about his choice of moral foundations, and then simply deduces what his policy shall be about recognizing authority.

Whether the question is really so simple as this or not, there is, at any rate, good evidence that no simple confusion between

actual authority and ideal authority is current among people who have reflected on the subject. The evidence consists in the collection of essays recently edited by Carl J. Friedrich under the title of *Authority*.¹ A great variety of perspectives for treating authority are represented in the volume; but there is, so far as I can see, no instance in which any of the contributors confuse actual authority with ideal authority.

This is not to say that there are not some narrow escapes. Frank H. Knight begins a sentence by saying, "If truth, or the validity of values, is to be the authority that maintains order as the primary necessity"—but he steers clear in the innocuous consequent, which is that "fairly general agreement must somehow be reached on the content of the values."² A number of contributors collocate different senses of "authority" in a dangerous way. They treat political authority alongside the authority of parents; of savants; even of dictionaries. Friedrich himself associates political authority with the capacity to elaborate reasons for issuing commands.

Nevertheless, the dangers latent in this collocation of themes are avoided. None of the contributors is brought to the point of denying that persons may have authority if they do not have good

¹ Cambridge (Mass.), 1958, the first of an annual series, "Nomos," which the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy proposes to publish. The quotation from Jerome Hall is from the beginning of the essay, "Authority and the Law," which he contributes to the volume; and the reference to Miss Arendt relates to her contribution, "What Was Authority?" Another contribution, a short essay by Wolfgang H. Kraus, is devoted to the crisis of authority among the colonial and ex-colonial peoples. In both Charles W. Hendel's and Frank H. Knight's contributions much is made of how unfavorable the climate of modern opinion has been to authority. Hendel argues that the disfavor is largely unmerited, if authority is conceived to have a plural distribution among determinate offices, as founding fathers like John Adams conceived it. Knight says, "In our liberal system of thinking and valuation, all exercise of power, by persons over persons, is more or less 'wrong' or contrary to the ideal" (p. 69). Arendt's paper, which is mainly a study of how the Roman conception of authority involved the notion of founding, concurs with G. E. G. Catlin's and Bertrand De Jouvenel's in denying that the totalitarian regimes of our time have reasserted or regenerated authority; they have instead these writers argue, obliterated it in its traditional plural manifestations.

² P. 75.

reasons or expert knowledge to justify its exercise. The comparison with parents and savants is carried only so far as to establish among the distinctive features of authority that people obey it even when they do not understand the reasons, or are not persuaded by the reasons, that lie behind particular orders. Moreover, the comparison is justified by the fact that superior knowledge does frequently confer authority, as E. Adamson Hoebel's discussion of authority in primitive societies makes clear.³

Elsewhere, Friedrich does partly fall into the familiar trap. In *The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective*,⁴ which was prepared for the press after the *Authority* volume, his distaste for "relativism" and his enthusiasm for democracy lead him to hold, in the midst of very relativistic pronouncements of his own, that authority develops "as a result of an increasing insight into its rational nature. The fact that it is capable of reasoned elaboration becomes increasingly clear to those who are members" of the legal order in which it is generated.⁵

It does not seem that this can be read simply as a judgment about what should be the case in a genuine community. Friedrich has indicated that he is looking for reasons to support authority and law which if they cannot be marshalled into "a coherent logical demonstration," at least constitute "a humanly possible proba-

³ Hoebel sums up one of the major points of his contribution to the *Authority* volume by saying, "As we move through all the simple, nomadic food-gathering peoples, we find the pattern is essentially the same. Authority rests on an intimate and superior knowledge of how best to exploit the meagre resources of the local ecology" (pp. 226-227). Knowledge as a foundation for authority of course persists in more complicated societies, and it can be seen especially clearly if one turns aside from formal and official cases of authority. Richard Peters, in "The Nature of Authority," a BBC talk printed in *The Listener* for 5 February 1959 (pp. 243-244) makes an illuminating comparison between "charismatic authority" and being an authority "in the sphere of pronouncements," as, for example, "an authority on art, music, or nuclear physics." "Such a man has not been put in authority; he does not hold authority according to any system of rules." "His right derives from his personal achievements," from "his training, competence, and success." When people complain about "inadequate leadership", or the insufficiency of authority, what they are looking for is someone whom they can trust both to know what to do and to do it.

⁴ Chicago, 1958.

⁵ Pp. 204-205.

bility";⁶ and he argues that once private liberties are placed outside the scope of discussion, "the common judgment of common men is more likely to be valid than that of any self-appointed élite."⁷ He would, furthermore, find the rational grounds for authority and law in empirically discovered sociable traits common enough among human beings to be attributed to "human nature."⁸

Frivolous as it would be to deny the power of such arguments, one must recognize that they do not demolish the logic of relativism. People may refuse to be concerned about the sociable traits common to human beings, and so long as they repudiate the premises, no argument for authority, valid or not, need shake them. In any case, authority can in fact be gained and exercised without the sort of justification that Friedrich (and I and a lot of other people) would demand.

In his contribution to the *Authority* volume, Friedrich is quite clear about this. He says that people with genuine authority are people who are believed capable of elaborating their orders with reasons, but he emphasizes the fact that the reasons which are imputed in this way vary from time to time and from culture to culture. He argues that Hitler had genuine authority, however despicable and irrational the reasons imputed to him may have seemed to outsiders.

To judge by the *Authority* volume, then, the conceptual situation regarding "authority" is reasonably unpuzzling—almost too good to be true—in fact, too comfortable to last. There are clouds on the horizon which threaten a new siege of fog. Neither of them is taken into account in the *Authority* volume. One of the clouds represents a problem about where "authority" fits among the concepts of social science. In the other cloud, there lurk the peculiar complications which "authority" does, after all, raise in connection with moral foundations.

It seems to me that there are impressive reasons for doubting whether the concept of "authority" is much use to social science as an explanatory category. For consider such a statement as "M did *x* when N ordered him to, because N had the authority to

⁶ P. 193.

⁷ P. 196.

⁸ P. 197.

give the order." How empty "authority" is here when it is given a causal interpretation! Part of the *meaning* of N's having "authority" is surely that there should be people, like M, *under* his authority, and that these should obey his orders; and making this point, however useful it is to classifying N's and M's relations with each other, does not announce any discovery of causal connection between logically independent facts.

The same thing seems to be true about "power," which at least in the generic sense, is not even an illuminating classification. (Consider the question, "Why did M obey N?" and, as a reply, "Because N has power over him.") The criterion for N's having power over M is that M will do things that N wants which he would not do otherwise.⁹ But to say that M's actions match N's wishes in this way does not explain why he does them. Moreover, the concept of power seems to lead thought into circles. If "the people of Argentina really believe that Peron is dictator," it follows that "they will expect sanctions to be applied to themselves if they do not accept the decisions of the Peron régime. Hence, so long as these expectations remain, they will behave as if Peron *were* dictator, and indeed, he will be."¹⁰ One may compare the tendency of some writers to say that the authority of one person is *constituted* by the obedience of others.¹¹

However, perhaps the apparent causal emptiness of "authority" signifies not that the concept is unsuitable for social science, but that social science is being asked to do unsuitable things when

⁹ See Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. II, No. 3 (July 1957), pp. 201-215.

¹⁰ Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man*, New York, 1957, p. 73.

¹¹ David Easton, in "The Perception of Authority and Political Change," which is his contribution to the *Authority* volume, gives a residual definition of "authority" as a species of influence. He suggests that it be used for those cases of influence where the intentions of the agent are made known to the subject, but neither physical force nor persuasion are used to bring about compliance (pp. 178-179). This seems to leave little work for the concept to do, especially since Easton is ready to acknowledge that "political authorities typically utilize means other than authority to perform their tasks"—means like force or persuasion or manipulation (p. 182). However, Easton does classify mere threats of force under "authority" (p. 183); and acts of unthinking, habitual obedience could be connected with authority in the sense defined, though they would not be causally explained by the connection.

it is asked for causal explanations. This, at any rate, is what is implied by the big, bold thesis of Peter Winch's recent book, *The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy*.¹² "The notion of a human society," Winch declares, "involves a scheme of concepts which is logically incompatible with the kinds of explanation offered in the natural sciences."¹³ I think that we may presume that "authority" is one of "the central concepts which belong to our understanding of social life" and it is worth seeing whether it too is "incompatible with concepts central to the activity of scientific prediction."¹⁴

There have been plenty of attempts to divorce the methods of social science from those of natural science; Winch's theory, however, is reached by the novel device of generalizing from some of Wittgenstein's reflections on language. The central problem of social science, Winch asserts, is that of "giving an account of the nature of social phenomena in general,"¹⁵ and he claims that the problem belongs to philosophy, for "the question of what constitutes social behavior is a demand for an elucidation of the *concept* of social behavior."¹⁶ The elucidation that Winch is prepared to offer is that of identifying social behavior with *meaningful* or *symbolic* behavior, the paradigm of which he takes to be the behavior of people using language.

Winch begins by arguing, following Wittgenstein, that a person using language succeeds in using it significantly by using its terms according to standardized criteria. Without rules of language, and the distinctions between correct and mistaken uses of terms from which the rules may be inferred, no one could tell what a man might mean to communicate; nor could he understand himself. The rules are social ones, shared by the people who speak the language; an essential condition for understanding a person's communications is being able to determine by reference to social rules which of the concepts understood by other people

¹² London and New York, 1958.

¹³ P. 72.

¹⁴ P. 94.

¹⁵ P. 43.

¹⁶ P. 18. I might remark at the outset that the question seems a very un-Wittgensteinian one, it is too grandiose, and insufficiently motivated.

he is using. Such rules are observed "as a matter of course"; they are embedded in social institutions—in ways of behaving—in what Wittgenstein calls "forms of life." A person participating in such a form of life shows that he understands the language used in connection with it by suiting his behavior to the expectations awakened by his communications (and by the words communicated to him).

The prominent place given to the use of rules in establishing that different cases are instances of the same behavior, which characterizes this description of linguistic behavior, reappears in Winch's generalization. All the regularities that are suitable for study by social science, he argues, fall within the scope of a leading concept of Max Weber's, namely, that of 'meaningful behavior,' and this—putting Weber and Wittgenstein together—he interprets as rule-observing behavior. Unlike other animals, men have alternatives to doing what they do, because they understand what the different things are that they might do. They do what they do for reasons that are intelligible to themselves and which can be made intelligible to others (though they may in particular cases be unconscious what these reasons are). What they do commits them, as they themselves understand, to behaving in certain ways in the future, though the commitment may be evaded for contingent reasons.

In each of these respects, Winch contends, social behavior embodies the concepts of the participants, and hence exemplifies rules. "The social relations between men and the ideas which men's actions embody are really the same thing considered from different points of view."¹⁷ This notion, that all social behavior

¹⁷ P. 121. To speak of social behavior as exemplifying rules suggests that one might conceive of it as a system in which all the moves could be precisely fixed or calculated. Winch, however, may be presumed to be using "rule" with the same cautions as Wittgenstein, who denies that using language is to be conceived as "operating a calculus", and holds that "the application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules." (*Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford, 1953, pp. 38-39). Winch's remarks about being "committed" to the future should not be taken too rigidly either. People do often carry out such commitments in detail, sometimes without even thinking of revising their courses of action. They may follow a rule "blindly" (*Philosophical Investigations*, p. 85); but even so, they have not initiated a course of action from which they could not escape. The transi-

consists in some sense of acts of communication, goes far enough to deserve an attentive hearing. One of Winch's leading examples is voting; he might have placed equal stress upon economic transactions of all sorts. Secret actions raise special difficulties; but consider a man seeking revenge, or, to revert to our main subject, a person in authority making a secret investigation of the diligence of his subordinates. In both cases, it seems essential that the man is doing something that he could make intelligible to others by using the same shared concepts in terms of which he himself already understands what he is doing.

The connection also runs the other way. The reasons why people do things cannot be understood except by sharing their concepts. Consequently, Winch argues, whatever a social scientist is seeking to understand, whether it is prayer or leadership or liquidity preference, must be understood according to concepts that he shares, not only with his fellow scientists, but also with the people whose behavior he is studying. It is these concepts, and the rules for using them, that supply the criteria by which the regularities of social phenomena are recognized as instances of "doing the same thing on the same kind of occasion."¹⁸

Winch holds that social scientists cannot hope to generalize about meaningful behavior in all human societies, because reasons for actions cannot be compared when the reasons belong to different conceptual systems. They can only be understood, each within the compass of the system to which it belongs. This limitation is enough by itself to cloud the prospects of constructing predictive

tions that have yet to be made may not follow the rule when they come. (*The Blue and the Brown Books*, Oxford, 1958, pp. 142-143). Winch not only allows for these points; his arguments for the indeterminacy of social behavior depend upon them. Somewhat more difficult to reconcile with Winch's arguments is Wittgenstein's assertion. "We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The chain of reasons has an end." (*The Blue and the Brown Books*, loc. cit. Cf. *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 84, and Norman Malcolm's discussion in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. LXIII (October 1954), 536.) This, however, need not be taken to mean that there are instances of social behavior—indeed, of linguistic behavior—that are not done for a reason, which I think would conflict with Winch's theory; it perhaps means that no reason more basic than following such and such a rule can be offered for doing an action that falls under it.

¹⁸ The last phrase is quoted from p. 61.

theories (and hence explanations of the type found in the natural sciences, which are symmetrical with predictions). Winch thinks that the prospects are very tenuous anyway. If social scientists face up to the fact that they are dealing with intelligent behavior, they will have to recognize that they are always dealing with behavior for which the agent may conceive an unpredicted alternative.

The proper business of social science, therefore, is explication rather than prediction, and it is in terms of explication that Winch interprets the famous concept of *Verstehen*. Winch holds that Weber was mistaken in suggesting that the insights into people's reasons achieved by *Verstehen* needed to be corroborated by statistical laws (though, one supposes, he would allow that the people who followed a certain rule might be counted). On the other hand, he holds that Weber's critics have been mistaken in treating *Verstehen* as a form of "inner sense" or intuition. According to Winch, the observations that Weber demanded in connection with *Verstehen* are best conceived of as observations of the use of concepts; what social scientists should be seeking, Winch says, again alluding to Wittgenstein, is to grasp "the *point* or *meaning* of what is being done or said."¹⁹

The Explication Theory of Social Science, then, would not only deny that it was intellectually profitable to treat "authority" and other concepts central to our understanding of social life as concepts of causes; it would evidently exclude us from giving "authority" any place in a causal-predictive picture of social behavior, for there could not be a place without a picture.

The exclusive claims of the Explication Theory are hardly acceptable, however, either generally or in their particular application to "authority." It is certainly true that the exercise of authority is a leading example of rule-observing behavior; it is true also that many, perhaps most, of the significant things that we presently know about authority consist in criteria for establishing whether or not it is correctly exercised in the institutional contexts in which we encounter it. There are correct ways and mistaken ways of communicating from authority, as there are of heeding

¹⁹ P. 115.

its commands. Orders must be given in proper form: it does not suffice for Truman to execrate MacArthur in the bathroom; he must come out and send an official message to Tokyo. The order commits the person who gives it to the future in ways that he must understand if he is to be considered to be exercising authority at all. He assumes responsibility for issuing the order; he must follow it up if there is any sign of disobedience, or raise doubts about whether he meant anything when he gave it. Similarly, the person who receives the order, must signify, both in the ways that he obeys it (so far as he does) and in the ways that he flouts it, that he understands the authority claimed for the order; or else he can hardly be said either to obey or disobey: it would be more sensible to consider his behavior irrelevant.

Moreover, we are vitally interested in the reasons for which persons in authority issue orders; and, as Friedrich's attention to the capacity for "reasoned elaboration" shows, in the fact that the authorities have reasons even when they do not disclose them. The actions of authorities would in fact be unintelligible to us in just the ways that are normally most important to us if we could not relate them to a rich lore of reasons and motives.

None of these considerations imply, however, that it is idle to look for causes. Winch mockingly contrasts some rather unrewarding statements about physiological "drives" with Shakespeare's treatment of motives.²⁰ The comparison is not only abusively emotive; it is beside the point. Winch seems to lose sight entirely of the fact that the merits of an explanation in science depend upon its having a place—or prospective place—in a systematic theory. The explanatory merits of statements about physiological causes of behavior are not to be judged by taking the statements in isolation, but by seeing what sort of theory they might fit into.

The causal-predictive theories of social science need not, furthermore, be confined to theories about extra-social causes for social behavior. Waiving any questions of physiology, one may inquire why it is that not all of the people who possess the formal qualifications for occupying positions of authority in a given society

²⁰ Pp. 77-78.

have an equal chance of actually obtaining office. Surely in this connection education, social class, religion, occupation, the favor or disfavor of leading interest groups, and so on, are causal factors; and how far they operate at different times and in different societies is an empirical question. Authority can be the subject of causal investigation, even if no theory identifies authority itself as a cause.

In the related subject of power, Dahl's lead may be followed and *differences* in power among various political leaders (in his case, United States Senators) systematically studied.²¹ Finding out that bills on certain matters of foreign policy are more likely to pass if Senator George favors them, while neither Senator Byrd's favor nor his disfavor seems to affect their chances, amounts to discovering an aggregative cause. One could point to the distribution of power in the Senate as the cause of one bill failing and another passing. One could go on to causal investigations of how this distribution came about, and why it was that different sets of people heeded different leading Senators.

Certainly the distribution of power in the Senate cannot be identified with anybody's motive, and then shown to be not a "cause," but a "reason." Winch's theory is in every way at its least plausible when we try to connect it with aggregative phenomena. It has no place for them either as cause or a effect; but social science has both sorts of place for them. The most impressive example in political science of theories that trace aggregative phenomena back to the actions and decisions of individual citizens are the theories of Maurice Duverger and Anthony Downs about the emergence of two-party or multi-party systems under different electoral rules. Another example can be found in the *Authority* volume, in Easton's proposals to study how the discrepancy, between what people believe to be the pattern of authority and what they wish the pattern were, affects the stability of political systems.

None of these types of causal-predictive theory give any basis for Winch's claim that social scientists must use the same concepts, and hence the same criteria of identity, as their subjects. (Winch would no doubt have seen this himself, if he had not ruled out *all* such theories in favor of theories explicating reasons.) Political

²¹ See Dahl, *op. cit.*

scientists do typically choose to identify the phenomena that they seek to explain by the same, or very nearly the same, concepts as their fellow-citizens; but even this a matter of choice, and certainly once the phenomena to be explained have been identified, they and their colleagues may elaborate whatever esoteric concepts they please.²²

Destructive as these rather obvious remarks may be to Winch's claim that he has given a theory that embraces the whole of social science, they do not affect his genuine achievement, which is to have given a succinct and penetrating account of one branch, a branch which is empirical in its method without being causal-predictive in its results. The notable clarification which Winch effects in the concept of *Verstehen* is one sign of this achievement. The extent to which the light of Winch's theory penetrates throughout social science can be judged by its affinities, not only with *Verstehen*, but also with the anthropologists' notion of culture; with the formal economic theory of distribution and consumers' behavior; with certain studies of bureaucracy; with Talcott Parsons' concept of social institutions; with the concept of *anomie* (which can be defined as a condition of rulelessness).²³

²² If Winch had not confused the fact that social scientists must share concepts with their colleagues (one set of concepts) with the fact that together with their fellow-scientists they share the concepts (another set) of the society to which they belong, he might not have adopted Maurice Cranston's argument against determinism, which is that there are actions, like writing a poem with such-and-such phrasing, which one cannot predict someone else's doing without incorporating a performance of the action in the prediction itself, thus making it impossible to say that it is going to happen before it does (p. 94). This is ingenious, but also highly inconclusive. Suppose a scientist, N, had a technical language in which he is able to predict that a poem corresponding to a certain numerical formula (something like its Gödel number) would be written by a man, M. N does not have to translate the formula into the poem himself beforehand in order to predict that the poem will be written. In any case, the possibility of prediction (if not the position of determinism) would be sufficiently vindicated if N could predict what M would do, even if doing this did sometimes involve N's rehearsing M's performance. (It is to be noted that Cranston's argument, as cited by Winch, is quite different from Karl Popper's argument that "no scientific predictor . . . can possibly predict, by scientific methods, its *own* future results". (My italics.) *The Poverty of Historicism*, London, 1957, Preface.)

²³ Respecting "culture", for example, Clyde Kluckhohn says, "A cul-

Authority, which is always manifested at the center of the rule-giving and rule-observing practices of social institutions, clearly demands extended treatment by the Explicative Branch of social science. Moreover, disastrously mistaken as Winch's exclusive claims prove to be when they are confronted with aggregative phenomena, there are certainly some problems about aggregative phenomena which it helps us to understand. One of these is the connection of the aggregative phenomenon of social decision with the question of whose authority should be recognized.

This is the problem that complicates the relation of authority to moral foundations. Suppose one holds that "all authority is derived from the people." Taking this as a moral judgment, it follows that those whose authority should be recognized are those upon whom the people have chosen to confer authority. But how do the people choose anything? The nearest thing

ture is an interdependent system based upon linked premises and categories whose influence is greater, rather than less, because they are seldom put into words" . . . "Culture regulates our lives at every turn" . . . "A mere list of the behavioral and regulatory patterns and of the implicit themes and categories would be like a map on which all mountains, lakes, and rivers were included—but not in their actual relationship to one another The full significance of any single element in a culture design will be seen only when that element is viewed in the total matrix of its relationship to other elements." (*Mirror for Man*, New York, 1949, Chap. II.) Kluckhohn's map-metaphor recalls the familiar slogans of ordinary language philosophers about "logical geography," and it is not only the coincidence in metaphor that supports Winch's claim that a good deal of social science is philosophical analysis. Much of economic theory can be regarded as consisting in elaborate explications of the pure concept of rational choice (as applications of the theory outside economics, for example, to political choices, show). In a recent book concerned with bureaucracy and formal organizations in general, the question of "inferring the program" (of routine procedures for handling business) "that an organization unit uses from observation of behavior by members of the unit" is characterized as a leading research issue. (James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations*, New York, 1958, p. 212). In his contribution to the *Authority* volume, Talcott Parsons says of social institutions that in his view they are "generalized patterns of norms which define categories of prescribed, permitted, and prohibited behavior in social relationships" (p. 203). Winch rather oddly treats Durkheim, who originated the notion of *anomie* in social science, wholly as a methodological opponent. For an extended use of the notion in a study of political authority, see Sebastian De Grazia, *The Political Community*, Chicago, 1948.

that there is to the people's choice is an aggregative phenomenon that presupposes a political organization and involves a pattern of institutionalized interactions through which a social decision is reached. One cannot make the choice himself, and hence (if he values the will of the people in this way) he cannot make a choice of moral foundations sufficiently determinate to deduce by himself whose authority, other than that "of the people," should be recognized. He must wait for the results of the process. It is only in such a process, furthermore, that the authority of the people is expressed.²⁴

The process through which the choice is expressed, however, is a process in which opportunities for established authorities to intervene are presumed, and, besides these, those who have authority to speak for the various interest groups affected. Even if the results of elections were not normally ambiguous respecting choices of policy, it would be idle to identify what the people want with anything short of the results of the full process. The people want to act constitutionally, and hence the courts properly intervene; the people want to satisfy diverse interests, and hence it is another standing policy of the political organization as a whole to give interest groups a hearing.

To judge, therefore, whose authority should be recognized by the standard given presupposes *accepting* the authority of those who play the part of authorities in the process of popular choice. But then how can we intelligibly judge whether any of *these* authorities deserve to be recognized? If we could silence each of these authorities turn by turn and get a verdict on them, in each case invoking all the rest of the process, we might get answers that could be regarded as reasonable approximations to popular choice; but there is no practical hope of doing anything of the sort. Furthermore, if we silence any authority, we do abandon

²⁴ Cf. Hendel's discussion of John Adam's ideas about "the authority of the people," *Authority*, esp. p. 23. One need not talk about the people having authority, and perhaps would do better not to. The source of authority need not have authority itself; and in ordinary language, the question, "Does he have authority to do x ?" is a question about where he derived his authority and how it is limited. Would one ask such a question about an absolute monarch?

our ordinary concept of the people's choice in favor of an *ad hoc* innovation. The concept of popular choice is a striking illustration of the indissoluble association of concepts with particular social institutions.

It seems to follow also that if we are committed to the standard of popular choice, we cannot make any intelligible case for revising the present process and the role that present authorities play in it. There is no basis for holding either that the present process better expresses the authority of the people than any alternative process or that some alternative process expresses it better than the present one. It is circular to judge the present process by the present process, or the alternative process by the alternative process; it begs the very question that we want answered to judge the present process by the alternative process or the alternative process by the present one.

This looks like a truly philosophical quandary, and its pathos is congenial to Winch's theory. For it seems that though we can understand our present concept of popular choice, and elucidate it at length as an incident of interpreting our culture to ourselves, we cannot intelligently revise any of the roles and procedures connected with it, and hence have little need for a treatment of these phenomena by any causal-predictive social science. Attempts to perfect the process of popular choice must be blind attempts, since we cannot escape from our present concept of it, and that is tied to our present process. The fly cannot get out of the fly-bottle.

Are we, however, as trapped as it looks? Must we either make sense with the present process or plunge into blind change if we abandon it? It is no help to offer another standard for recognizing authority, if the standard that we want to follow is that of the people's choice.

I think that the main thing to say before proposing an escape route is that when the process is not working as coherently as we normally expect we cannot trust its results. The process is required to discover what the people want. We can nevertheless recognize situations—widespread and persistent popular discontent, for example, expressed in petitions, mass meetings, and riots—in which the process does not suffice. In such situations, we can get

no answer of the normal sort as to what the people want. The practical problem for democrats then becomes one of establishing a situation in which the institutions of government function without such anomalies; and there is no use denying that this may call for blind and desperate experiment.

If the anomalies are less spectacular, however, they can be dealt with within the process itself. In fact, this is constantly going on: the participants in the process are continually modifying each others' roles in the course of their contentions over policy. It is only if we assume that the criteria for discovering popular choice must be rigidly fixed once and for all that we are led to think that any modifications must take place, so to speak, outside their intelligible scope. But, at least outside mathematics and formalized theories in other sciences, no concept in ordinary use has wholly fixed criteria, as Wittgenstein (and Winch following him) have insisted. In the case of the concept of popular choice, the mutual adjustment and readjustment of authorities and other participants is already envisaged in the concept of the process.

Adopting the standard of popular choice does not, then, preclude the person who adopts it from invoking the same standard to justify revising the authorities who participate, though the sense in which he "invokes" it is perhaps a peculiar one. He is not deducing what he wishes from a formula, but seeking to work within a process for a certain result. The identity of the standard is the identity of a standard constantly changing in a certain way. The man who adopts it recognizes the participating authorities only within a process which is constantly checking them and revising their powers. He allies himself with the shifts presaged by the standard in the very course of adopting it. So long as no major anomalies appear, his position remains intelligible. When they do appear, one of the disasters that they entrain is that the social world is for a time less intelligible than it used to be.

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EXPLORATION

THE PHILOSOPHY OF DEWITT H. PARKER (1885-1949)

ANDREW J. RECK

I. INTRODUCTION

IN *The Self and Nature* DeWitt H. Parker described "the method of metaphysics" as "radical empiricism extended through the imagination."¹ A generation later, in his mature system, *Experience and Substance*, Parker cited approvingly his early description of the procedure of metaphysics.² Taking experience as given, and viewing it as a fragment of a wider reality, metaphysics is radically empirical. Yet its empiricism is oriented toward analysis. It probes into the omnipresent features of given experience to uncover what is universal and permanent in the particular and transient. Metaphysics therefore unfolds the categories of experience, and so it becomes speculative. It employs these categories, forms of the eternal embedded in experience, to envision the given experience in the wider context of the reality beyond and to interpret this reality in terms accessible to experience. Thus metaphysics flies from the given experience upon the wings of imagination to grasp the world picture speculatively.

Throughout his philosophical career DeWitt H. Parker was concerned both with the analysis of given experience to provide the metaphysical categories and with the formulation of a cosmological scheme based on these categories. He published two extensive works on metaphysics: *The Self and Nature* (1917) and *Experience and Substance* (1941). Yet he was preoccupied with no area of given experience more than with value experience, as is evident

¹ DeWitt H. Parker, *The Self and Nature* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917), p. vi. In subsequent citations this work will be denoted by the abbreviation SN.

² DeWitt H. Parker, *Experience and Substance, An Essay in Metaphysics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1941), p. 9. In subsequent citations this work will be denoted by the abbreviation ES.

from the titles of his books: *The Principles of Aesthetics* (1920),³ *The Analysis of Art* (1926),⁴ and *Human Values* (1931).⁵ In his intellectual autobiography Parker confessed that this interest in "the general nature, classification, and criticism of Values" came as "a result doubtless of ethical problems raised by the Great War."⁶ On two occasions at least Parker promised in print to write a volume on the metaphysics of value (*HV*, p. 12, n. 1; *ES*, p. vii).⁷ Unfortunately he never did so, although at the time of his death he was at work on such a volume. Professor William K. Frankena of the University of Michigan, omitting the introductory chapter and reducing other references to the metaphysics of value, has edited this manuscript and published it as *The Philosophy of Value* (1957), the title Parker himself had chosen.⁸

³ DeWitt H. Parker, *The Principles of Aesthetics* (Boston, New York, Chicago, San Francisco: Silver, Burdett and Company, 1920); 2nd ed. (New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1946). All references will be made to the second edition, denoted by the abbreviation *PA*.

⁴ DeWitt H. Parker, *The Analysis of Art* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926). In subsequent citations this work will be denoted by the abbreviation *AA*.

⁵ DeWitt H. Parker, *Human Values, An Interpretation of Ethics Based on A Study of Values* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931); reprinted (Ann Arbor: George Wahr, 1944). All references will be made to the Wahr papercover, lithoprinted edition (1947), denoted by the abbreviation *HV*.

⁶ DeWitt H. Parker, "Empirical Idealism," *Contemporary American Philosophy*, ed. by G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague (New York: Macmillan Co., 1930), Vol. II, 165.

⁷ Parker did write an article entitled "Metaphysics of Value," *International Journal of Ethics*, XLIV (1934), 293-312. The article appears to be the first of a series, but to my knowledge the sequel was never published, though the same ground is covered in *ES*, ch. xv, pp. 292-312.

⁸ DeWitt H. Parker, *The Philosophy of Value*, ed. with Preface by William K. Frankena (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957). Subsequent citations to this work will be denoted by the abbreviation *PV*. Professor Frankena states that since the final projected chapter of the book had not been written at the time of Parker's death, editorial considerations prompted the omission of the introductory chapter and the reduction of other references to metaphysics, although he points out that Parker, keenly disposed to metaphysics, would not have taken this elimination of metaphysics lightly. I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Frankena for making available to me a copy of Parker's unpublished first chapter, entitled "The Value Situation: Basic Categories and Basic Attitudes," 56 pages in double-spaced typescript, and his own unpublished

The primary purpose of this paper is to revivify the total structure of Parker's thought, to make the memory of his philosophy, which is receding so rapidly, green awhile. For Parker was a philosopher of exceptional talents. He possessed a literary style of unusual warmth and sensitivity, clarifying abstract questions with illustrations drawn from intimate contact with life. During a period in American philosophy when the dominant temper was naturalistic and anti-metaphysical, Parker elaborated and ably defended a metaphysics of voluntaristic idealism. The second purpose of this paper is to reconstruct Parker's metaphysics and to explore its bearing on and implication from his theory of values. Although Parker never fulfilled his intention to write a metaphysics of value, the outlines of such a theory may be gleaned from his published writings, and in this field his contribution is unique and comprehensive. Value experience involves categories which, being universal and eternal, are metaphysical; and to Parker belongs credit for elucidating these categories. To deny the relevance of metaphysics to values is to be blind to the way categories like substance, time, space, causality pervade value experiences. Moreover, value experiences occur in the wider context of experience and reality. And Parker's philosophy, instead of retreating from the demands of a speculative view, has aimed to formulate this wider context in which values are possible and come to exist.

II. THE GENERAL THEORY OF VALUES

Parker proposed to formulate a general theory of value, one which defines the "*generic concept*" of value (PV, 5). Expressing a universal which is embodied in all species of value, this theory is designed to grasp the nature of value, free from the bias that affects an axiology expounded from the standpoint of a specific type of value.*

essay, "Parker's Metaphysics of Value," 10 pages in double-spaced typescript. It is hoped that both of these important contributions to the development and understanding of Parker's philosophy will soon be published.

* At present, ethical value dominates discussions of value theory, evident in the recent symposium edited by Ray Lepley, *The Language of Value* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957). As one participant in the

Further, the examination of specific values from the perspective of the general theory illuminates the continuity of values and suggests how moral and aesthetic features, prominently displayed in particular values, nevertheless run together in all values. In *Human Values* Parker had declared ". . . that there is no separate moral interest or value, but that, on the contrary, morality is indissolubly connected with every branch of human activity" (HV, vii). Similarly, aesthetic features pervade all moral values. "The aesthetic experience realizes in little . . . the value of the mind as a whole harmony. Beauty is the type of the good" (HV, 322).

Besides elucidating the generic concept of value, Parker sought to determine the status of value in the world and to open the way for a juncture with independent metaphysical investigations to ascertain the nature of the world which allows value this sort of status. Finally, because Parker accorded values a status such that their existence is disclosed only in expressions, he inquired into the nature and role of value statements, determining whether or not they are cognitive, the extent to which they are cognitive if cognitive at all, and the function they perform if not cognitive.

1. *Generic Value*

Parker's analysis of value yielded as universal features six essential factors and six dimensions. The essential factors actually constitute the specific values encountered directly in concrete experience, while every value exemplifies the dimensions. Together the factors and the dimensions of value comprise its generic concept, providing the investigator with an instrument for the understanding of experienced values detected by empirical inquiries.

a) *Essential Factors of Value*

First of the essential factors is *desire*. It is ". . . a vectorial experience . . . asymmetrical and directed . . . like movement

symposium, H. N. Lee, firmly put it: "An axiology that takes its point of departure from moral value and treats aesthetic value casually or not at all is manifestly inadequate" (*Ibid.*, p. 187). But instead of exercising neutrality in his own theory, Lee asserted that ". . . aesthetic value is the value *par excellence*, and . . . aesthetics is the core of value theory" (*Ibid.*, p. 304).

and like time. . . . It is also a tense experience; we can . . . compare it to coiled spring. . . . Finally, it is an efficacious experience, an activity, one which changes or might change the course of events" (PV, 91). Value consists in precisely the satisfaction of desire, and when desire is frustrated, the result is evil.

Second, value experience involves *a goal or objective* as an essential factor. This is ". . . never an object but an activity or passivity, usually with reference to an object. It is not the bread that I want, but to eat the bread . . ." (PV, 92). Satisfaction consists in the realization of the objective.

Third, value experience requires *an object*. "The energy of desire flows through and around the object and is released by it" (PV, 95). This does not mean that the value is identical with the object. Rather the relation between object and satisfaction is causal. Thus the "complementary object" is distinguished from "means object," the former directly causing the satisfaction, the latter being necessary to produce the complementary object. Moreover, Parker held that in some instances value experiences are objectless. He seems to have meant (1) that some values are enjoyed gratuitously without prior consciousness of a desire for an objective—e.g., my pleasure in the scent of flowers drifting through the window of my study; and (2) that some satisfactions, especially aesthetic values, are uncaused by purely physical objects—e.g., my pleasure in hearing the symphony. In this context (2) is the more important contention. For Parker an aesthetic object is not a physical object. As he bluntly put it: "Aesthetic facts are mental facts" (PA, 7). The physical work of art is "an aesthetic instrument," but "the aesthetic object," i.e., the experience of value, belongs to the world of imagination (HV, 324). Parker's distinction between the values of real life and of imagination pivots on his conception of complementary objects as either physical or imaginative. Values of real life, health, comfort, ambition, love, ethical value, knowledge, and efficiency, draw ". . . their complementary objects from the environment, physical and social, and depend for realization upon adaptation to it" (HV, 48). In the case of values of imagination, dream, play, art and religion, Parker wrote: "I do not so much conform to a given environment as create one of my own, and instead of employing real things as complemen-

tary objects, I make use of . . . 'substitute objects'—objects of make-believe or of faith, rather than of belief, and belonging not so much to the real as to the imaginary or 'ideal' world" (HV, 48).

A fourth essential factor of value experience in the case of conscious intelligent experiences is *judgment* ". . . concerning the fitness of means objects or the complementary object for the realization of the goal" (PV, 99). Fifth is ". . . the *assuagement of desire through the realization (verification) of the objective*" (PV, 100).¹⁰ An active or passive experience, my own or another's, results in the realization of an objective, an activity or passivity, which satisfies the initial desire. Sixth, the value process is accompanied by ". . . *anticipatory and memorial satisfactions*" (PV, 102), the former adding incitement to the process of realizing the objective, the latter enriching it with echoes of past satisfactions.

b) *The Dimensions of Value*

Besides explicating the six essential factors constitutive of values, Parker analyzed the "multidimensionality" of value itself. Each of the six dimensions brings into focus ". . . a range of variations of a kind which may occur independently of another range and may or may not be susceptible of serial order" (PV, 104). First is *intensity*. As intensity characterizes separately the desire and the satisfaction, there is usually, though not strictly, a correlation between the intensity of the initial desire and the intensity of its satisfaction (PV, 105). *Duration* is second. To be enjoyed a value must last awhile, its echoes in subsequent experience evincing its persistence (PV, 105-107). *Volume* is the third dimension of value. Evident in the difference between the value in drinking water and that in drinking coffee, volume ". . . depends rather upon the complexity of the pattern of desire than upon the complexity of the pattern of the object, although the two are roughly correlative" (PV, 107). *Quality* is the fourth dimension pertinent to value. Values manifest qualitative variations not reducible to a single kind, say, sensual pleasure, because ". . . the satisfaction is colored by the activity, and itself becomes different according to the differences in the

¹⁰ The italics in quotations are in the published texts.

activities" (PV, 108). Fifth is *height*. Despite recurrent philosophical attempts to reduce the height of value to volume or quality or to some complexity of the other dimensions, Parker was convinced that, in view of the traditional acknowledgment of a hierarchical ranking of values, ". . . there is some unique dimension of values, referred to by the term 'height,' which is an intrinsic attribute and not a mere evaluation or rating . . ." (PV, 111). The sixth dimension is *harmony*. It consists in ". . . precisely the co-operation of diverse strains of desire toward a single goal or satisfaction" (PV, 115).

The presence of the dimensions in value experiences accounts for norms. Consequently, the identification of value with satisfaction is rendered consistent with normative ethics. "All values are 'moral' in the broadest sense, since they are normative or imperative" (HV, 199). Reflection on the dimensions of values in connection with both the desires they satisfy and the considered means for their satisfaction produces the principles of evaluation or criticism: principles of success, of interrelation with other interests, of adequacy (HV, 89; cf. PV, 157ff). These principles are in effect expressions of higher order desires. "A standard is an objective of desire, but of a desire of higher order, a desire regarding desires and satisfactions of a specific sort; and like all such objectives, more permanent than those of lower order" (PV, 150). Moreover, "there are no separate desires, since all are interwoven in the matrix self, the desire of highest order" (PV, 155). This self, the inherent life plan of an individual subject, is tantamount to the norm which, establishing the complex objective of the totality of one's desires, subordinates and integrates all component desires and satisfactions. By reference to this desire of highest order all desires may be criticized. Hence ". . . only desire can judge desire" (PV, 156).

However, recognition of norms springing from values identical with the satisfactions of selves does not suffice for morality as long as the satisfactions are egocentric, for ". . . in the case of morality, man is pursuing a goal that cannot be identified with his own satisfaction" (PV, 239). Why, then, be moral? Neither fear of consequences nor desire of approval, though constraining the disruptive desires of men to some extent, exhaust the meaning of

morality. Rather the moral interest is born of another source—the self-transcending efficacy of love. “Love may be defined,” Parker wrote, “as any activity which finds its end and value in the maintenance and increase of value to another mind” (*HV*, 177). Through love men are able to find vicarious satisfactions in the satisfactions of others. Hence “. . . morality depends, in the last analysis, upon love” (*PV*, 269).

2. *The Status of Value*

Parker not only described and defined value and its dimensions; he also sought to ascertain its status. Value theorists have, in the main, advanced three conceptions of the status of value: objectivism,¹¹ relationalism, and subjectivism. Parker's position is a species of subjectivism, stated and defended in the context of a criticism of the alternative theories.

Objectivism defines value as a transcendent “ought” whose being is its validity (W. M. Urban) or as a property resident in objects (G. E. Moore, C. I. Lewis). Whereas, from Parker's standpoint, a theory such as Urban's fails because, segregating value norms from actual processes of desire, it neglects the immanence of value in actual experiences of satisfaction, the equation of value with properties resident in objects is ruled out by the definition of value as the assuagement of desire (*ES*, 304f; *PV*, 51ff). G. E. Moore's conception of generic good as non-naturalistic and indefinable contains additional faults, since value is definable ostensibly, as *this* experience of enjoyment, and analytically, as the assuagement of desire (*PV*, 44ff). And C. I. Lewis's conception of value as a potentiality residing in objects to produce experiences of inherent value is rejected because a metaphysical penchant for the radically empirical rules out potentiality as a non-empirical mode of being, a recrudescence of barren Aristotelianism (*PV*, 38-39).

Although Parker's theory is sometimes misrepresented as

¹¹ For an excellent discussion of the different meanings of the thesis that values are objective, see Donald Walhout, “Objectivity and Value,” *The Journal of Philosophy*, L (1953), 285-300.

relationalism,¹² he dismissed relationalism, just as he repudiated objectivism. In the development of relationalism, R. B. Perry's renowned but ambiguous naturalistic definition of value as the object of any interest has figured prominently. Against this position Parker's objections are several (*PV*, 34ff). First, some value experiences are devoid of objects—for instance, music, so that occasionally the objective of desire involves no object but inheres directly in the subjective process of enjoyment. Second, the ambiguous formula of value as the object of interest, while seeming to bridge the span between the inner and the outer worlds, is actually a sham. Precisely interpreted, it is seen to fall on one side or the other, since the only sort of relation that holds between an object and a value satisfaction is a causal relation, in itself devoid of value. Thus the definition of value as any object of interest proves, upon analysis, to be an untenable halfway house between objectivism and subjectivism. If it means that the objects of interest have objectively the properties which satisfy the interest, it collapses into objectivism, and is open to the objections previously mentioned. If it means that the interest endows the object with value, then either the term "object" in the formula signifies a concept akin to Parker's concept of "objective" or the expression really means that value is the satisfaction of an interest with which the object is causally associated. Now if the first alternative, equating Perry's object with Parker's objective, is the acceptable specification of the formula, then paradoxically value would pre-exist the process of its realization; it would be enough to be interested in a value to enjoy it; and the role of the objective as a guide for action would be gratuitous. Hence the formula collapses into an absurd subjectivism, or the second alternative, identifying value with the satisfaction of interest or desire, is adopted.

This leads directly to Parker's type of subjectivism. "Values belong wholly to the inner world, to the world of mind" (*HV*, 20). But this does not impugn the operancy of norms partially immanent in all values, nor does it collapse values into fleeting episodes

¹² See Dorothy Walsh, "Fact and Values," *The Review of Metaphysics*, XI (1957), 262. This misconception of Parker's theory is due perhaps to the fact that his definition of value as the assuagement of desire is close to the interest theory.

of epiphenomenal consciousness. Even the inner world is distended between the initial impulse of desire, the apprehension of an objective through the realization of which the desire is assuaged, the reflective consideration of the complementary and extrinsic objects, if any, requisite for the realization of the objective, the active or passive process of realizing the objective, capped finally by the satisfaction which constitutes the value. More important, however, the characterization of values as having subjective status does not mean that they are psychical accidents in an indifferent, perhaps hostile world. Parker posited an intimate connection between value and existence. He distinguished two broad streams in the history of philosophy: one springing from the tradition established by Leucippus, Democritus, and Lucretius, the other stemming from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Whereas the former looked upon value as "an incidental, purely contingent aspect of reality" and regarded the world empty of value until life and consciousness began, the latter have asserted that "value is essential to reality, and (that) the very conception of existence apart from value is meaningless (*ES*, 292). Parker's theory belongs to the second stream. "The unity of value and existence," he held, "follows directly from the conception of existence as a system of experiences, together with the insight that volition is primary in experience" (*ES*, 292). Thus fact, the stuff of scientific objectivity and the exclusive principle of metaphysical naturalism and materialism, is an abstraction from value-drenched existence.

3. *Value Expressions and Knowledge*

Since in Parker's theory values are regarded as being subjective, it is no surprise that expressions of value, in which alone privately felt values can be publicly displayed, receive close attention. When this attention takes note of the philosophers' special interest in knowledge theory, it is natural that the question of the cognitive character of value expressions should come to the front.

If the cognitive is equated with the factual and its articulation is restricted to descriptive statements in which the terms designate empirical objects accessible to public verification, then the subjectivity of value precludes the possibility of value judgments being

cognitive, i.e. true or false, though of course statements about value expressions could be cognitive. Despite the similarity of grammatical form between factual statements and value expressions, the ascription of value to an object really signifies the existence of a subjective satisfaction (*HV*, 412-413; *PV*, 61ff). Further, to read value expressions as reports of private feeling is to mistake their role. As illustration Parker chose the statement: "I love you." Of course, this statement may be understood as the report of a psychological state of affairs, describing the feeling of love by the speaker for the hearer, so that it is true or false, false if the speaker is lying. However, occurring in the context of lover speaking to beloved, "The expression 'I love you' is part of a process that includes the love of the lover. Indeed, his love is part of the very content of the expression, literally part of its meaning" (*PV*, 75-76). Accordingly, "... value statements . . . are vectorial currents of feeling which overflow into expressive media and as such are neither true nor false" (*PV*, 68).

Parker divided value statements into two classes: lyrical and practical. Lyrical statements simply communicate feelings without intending to cause action. Interjections, declarative expressions of feeling, and aesthetic objects are all lyrical statements.¹³ Practical expressions, like the lyrical, communicate feelings, but in addition they are intended to induce or prevent action. Commands, entreaties, legal and ethical expressions are practical statements. The volitional character of ethical statements is manifest in instances of moral conflict. A hardened criminal may not feel at first that theft is wrong, and no description of facts may move him, unless he can be stirred by appropriate exhortations to feel sympathy for his victims or to apprehend that thievery does not promote his own interests. Recognizing the volitional basis of ethical and legal statements, Parker refrained from the naturalistic reduction of morals to social science. He attributed Dewey's faith in social science as the ultimate instrument for the eradication of

¹³ For Parker, works of art are linguistic expressions. Hence a monograph in aesthetics is a contribution to philology. See DeWitt Parker, "The True, the Good, and the Beautiful," *The University of Michigan Contributions in Modern Philology*, No. 11 (July, 1948).

moral conflict and evil to a rationalism outdated by contemporary realities (PV, 51). He insisted that morality is not a matter of knowledge alone. The public world is the product of the desires which clash despite the accumulation of knowledge and which can be reconciled, though never completely, by the efficacy of love (PV, 174ff).

Parker's theory of value expressions has, therefore, obvious affinities with current non-cognitivism or emotivism in values.¹⁴ Nevertheless, it is distinctive in three important respects.

In the first place, corresponding to every value expression are ". . . one or more conditional predictive, empirical propositions" (PV, 87), which state the physical properties of objects that causally produce satisfactions. The correlation between value statements and factual statements, giving rise to ". . . the persistent confusion between the two types . . .," simultaneously ". . . shows that values do not exist in some hypostatic realm of their own but have firm residence in the world of fact—in existing desires and in prevalent conditions for their realization" (PV, 87-88).

In the second place, Parker conceded a cognitive element in value expressions. "Expression may contain self-knowledge, but knowledge by acquaintance, not knowledge by description. And in knowledge by acquaintance what is known is what is present to the concepts that know it" (PV, 77). Art illustrates perfectly the combination of knowledge and feeling in expression. Art objects are substitute objects for the imaginative satisfaction of desires which exceed what can be gratified in real life. But unlike other modes for the imaginative satisfaction of desire, dream and play, art is expression which clarifies and socializes the private possession into ". . . the dream for all men and the surcease of superabundant desire" (AA, 30). Since no object in the world is more beautiful than the human body, which crystallizes the promised gratification of countless human desires (PA, 227), the artists'

¹⁴ See DeWitt Parker, "Discussion of John Dewey's 'Some Questions about Value,'" *Value, A Cooperative Inquiry* ed. Ray Lepley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), pp. 233-244, and "Rejoinder by Parker," pp. 451-454.

preoccupation with representing it is understandable. But if Renoir's bathers satisfy imaginatively insatiable desires for erotic play, what impulse is fed by Rodin's statue of the old courtesan? Parker's answer to this question not only broadens the conception of the imaginative satisfaction art provides; it also sheds light on the cognitive role of emotive expressions. The representation of ugliness, pain, or evil in art meets Dionysian, moral and cognitive needs in man (*AA*, 122ff). It fills Dionysian desires of lust, hate, cruelty within the imagination and without spilling over into the world of real life. By doing so, it meets the moral demand of purging men of these base impulses by subordinating them in release to the mastery of form art involves. And in satire it urges men to direct moral reform. But neither the harmless indulgence of base impulses nor the moral fervor for reform explains the expression of evil in art objects such as Rodin's statue or the great tragic dramas. Here the justification is the cognitive insight man gains through the art. "Man has the pressing need to come to some certain understanding with himself concerning life as a whole, and particularly concerning the most baffling element of all, evil. Man must face the facts, all the facts, and find a way of living at peace with them and himself" (*AA*, 122).

In the third place, the cognitive character of value expressions is linked with the entire theory of knowledge. For knowledge is itself a value satisfying desire; it illuminates action with a plan that anticipates the series of actions and events necessary to achieve a goal (*HV*, 245). Its success turns on its adjustment to the objective situation. Though ministering to the multifarious desires of men, knowledge can do its job only if it eschews wishful thinking for a realistic appraisal of the objective situation. There is, then, a desire for knowledge: "The tendency to believe in accordance with evidence—or the tendency to adjust action to its conditions, which is intelligence—is itself a desire on an equal footing with other desires" (*HV*, 254). In this sense, there can never be a conflict between desire and reason as something which is not desire, for reason is itself a desire (*HV*, 255). Just as facts may be looked upon as a kind of abstraction, so judgments of fact, knowledge in the narrow scientific sense, prove indispensable for

a lucid understanding of the skeletal network of causal connections immanent in a value-drenched existence.

III. THE METAPHYSICS OF EXPERIENCE

Parker's philosophy of values is intricately interwoven with metaphysical propositions. First, it is grounded in necessary presuppositions of a metaphysical character. In probing into the particular, concrete experiences, metaphysics unfolds the underlying, generic forms or universal categories—like substance, causality, relation, and time. The involvement of these categories in the philosophy of values has been evident throughout the previous discussion. Not only does the propriety of undertaking a theory of generic value hinge upon a metaphysical doctrine of the relation between universal and particular, such that universals, while detachable from particulars in meaningful concepts, exist solely in the concrete particulars; but also the description of the experiences of value, attending to the essential features and dimensions of value, makes use of the generic concepts which metaphysics examines and interprets. To be enjoyed, values must endure awhile, and to exhibit the dimension of harmony they must be amenable to interrelation. Hence an acceptable metaphysics posits a theory of time which allows a past moment to "echo" in its successors (*ES*, 131 ff) and a theory of relation which accords the equal reality of relations and terms related (*ES*, 205). Moreover, the fact that complementary objects cause satisfactions injects consideration of causality, a metaphysical category necessitating animistic interpretation (*ES*, 270ff) if the subjectivity of values is to be guaranteed, for it supposes that causality of external origin is prompted by the desires of beings similar to one's self and is directed toward satisfactions of value. Finally, the definition of value as the satisfaction of desire depends upon a metaphysics of the self.

Secondly, Parker's philosophy of values culminates in metaphysics as it suggests definite conclusions about the nature of the world. Although Parker's cosmological theses were allegedly reached independently of value considerations, the coherence of both aspects of his philosophy affords collaborative support. After

all, the fact of values, defined as the satisfactions of desires, evinces a kind of world in which selves with desires exist and in which the desires are not wholly futile, a kind of world, in short, which is amenable to a spiritualistic interpretation. "The unity of value and existence," to repeat a quotation, "follows directly from the conception of existence as a system of experiences, together with the insight that volition is primary in experience" (ES, 92).

1. *The Self*

Parker's metaphysics is a metaphysics of experience: to be is to experience or to be an element of experience (ES, 48). Hence experience cannot be an accident of some crude material, the secretion of the life process at an advanced stage of biological evolution. Nor is it a diaphanous stuff of fragile duration, a gratuitous flash of quality in a void. On the contrary, experience is substance. But before demonstrating the equation of experience with substance, Parker offered a preliminary description in which he brought to the forefront a novel and complicated theory of the self, a theory adumbrated in and presupposed by the philosophy of values.

According to Parker, ". . . the term 'experience' is a general term like 'water'; for even as, not water, but this pool or this cupful exists, so, not *experience*, but this or that center of experience exists" (ES, 27). The first noteworthy fact about experience, then, is its centricity. "Experience falls into distinct wholes . . ." (ES, 26), and ". . . there is no addition operation between wholes of experience . . ." (ES, 27). These centers of experience, also called "wholes" or "monads," are ". . . like circles that are never concentric or coincident, never lie wholly one within another, but may overlap or be tangential" (ES, 27). Thus ". . . the centricity of experience is the same as egocentricity" (ES, 47), and the key to a proper understanding of experience is the unique "self" or "ego" that constitutes the core of each center of experience.

Parker's concern over the nature of the self harks back to his early essay in metaphysics, *The Self and Nature*, and his adherence to old conclusions is evident in the treatment of the wholes of experience. These wholes are analytically divided into activities and sensa (ES, 28ff). The sensa are factors of experience which

overlap; and the contiguity of consciousness with its environment is the coincidence of *sensa* as events of consciousness with *sensa* as surfaces of objects, i.e. other wholes of experience (SN, 53ff). In the rhetoric of Parker: "Perception is a contact with an alien reality—a chance embrace of strangers, involving no fatal entanglements" (SN, 54). At the heart of each center of experience is the cluster of activities indicative of the self: ". . . apart from the activities there is no self" (ES, 29). One type of activity is expression, "the giving of meaning . . .," of which perception is an example, for ". . . perception is the activity of giving 'thing' meanings to *sensa*. . . . Perception is, as Berkeley called it, a natural language, with ordinary *sensa* taking the place of words" (ES, 30). Another type of activity is conception. "Its effect is to enlarge experience vicariously by presenting absent existences as if they were here and past ones as if they were present" (ES, 31). The third type of activity is volition, ". . . the guidance of experience from within . . ." with some objective intended (ES, 32). Of the three types of activities, volition is basic: ". . . all acts are acts of volition" (ES, 33). Thus Parker's description of experience discerns the existence of centers or wholes, then segregates *sensa* from activities within each whole, next construes *sensa* as factors in a whole under the control of external centers (countercontrol), then defines the self as the core of activities, and finally locates the basis of all activities in volition. Hence the metaphysics of experience is a metaphysical voluntarism.

But to regard being as willful subjects and their volitions, does not afford sufficient stability, unless the agents of desire intend more than the gratification of passing whims. Toward a stabilizing of the voluntarism Parker, in his mature system, distinguished between the focal and the matrix self (ES, 41ff). "The focal self is an event, coming and going, one of a series of events flashing into and out of existence" (ES, 43). It ". . . consists of that activity, or complex of compresent activities, now in operation . . ." (ES, 43). The focal selves, however, "do not rise from a vacuum, but appear against a background more stable than themselves, and whatever intelligible relations they possess among themselves they derive from the matrix from which they emerge" (ES, 43). Now Parker did not mean to shatter the self into one matrix and many

focal entities. "There is but one self: the focal self and the matrix self are only two aspects of a single fact. The matrix self is a layer of deeper significance that continues and endures from one ongoing activity to another, but it cannot exist unless there is a focal activity that carries it on" (*ES*, 45). The matrix self, the essential self which preserves the unity of meaning that overarches all the focal selves flowing by, imparts stability and continuity. The matrix self is, indeed, "the life plan" (*PV*, 126), upon which the organization and criticism of values fundamentally depend.

2. *Experience as Substance*

Parker defended his metaphysics of experience as substance by demonstrating that experience meets the four criteria of substantiality developed in the history of philosophy: "to be substance means to be subject but never predicate, to be independent, to be causally efficient, and to be conserved through change" (*ES*, 49).

The proof that experience is subject assumes that to be is to be subject or predicate. The distinction between subject and predicate marks off the unique, unrepeatable factors from the generic, recurrent factors of existence. Therefore, to ". . . assert that substance is absolute subject . . . (is to) mean that there are factors of existence that are unique; hence, while substances may be designated by proper names and partly described, they cannot be adequately described" (*ES*, 51). Now it is evident, according to Parker, that the individual monad I am as well as the particular events that I experience are unique. For while you and I may hear the same song, the concrete events of hearing a song occurring in you and me are absolutely unique, so that they are subjects, not predicates. Similarly, the monadic centers of experience are unique and therefore subjects, for ". . . while there might possibly be another person just like myself—although this is doubtful—there could not be another me" (*ES*, 55).

Second, experience is independent. By "independence" Parker meant with Aristotle ". . . self-existence, that is to say, existence that is not intrinsically—as distinguished from causally—founded on the existence of other things in the way that the existence of

relations and universals is founded on the existence of individuals," although he recognized that "independence now means . . . , in addition, absence of causal determination from outside" (*ES*, 51).

If we view experience strictly from the inside, ignoring what we may know about it through its discoverable relations to other things, it does not reveal itself as being intrinsically based on anything other than itself, either as a whole monad or in its elements . . . Experience comes to us not like a relation, like an adjective that needs its perch on a substantive, but as a self-subsistent kind of entity, standing on its own feet. The only intrinsic dependence that a monad reveals is dependence on other monads—social dependence—the *I* on the *you*; the *you* on the *me*, but the entire circle of monads is not revealed as depending on anything known to be different in kind from experience (*ES*, 56).

Experience meets the third qualification of substance—namely, causal efficacy. Causal efficacy supplements independence, for while internal determination suffices for the latter, external determination of events outside the monad is requisite for the former (*ES*, 52). Parker located causal efficacy within experience ". . . in two broad classes of events: events inside a monad determined by something in that same monad, and events in one monad determined by something in another monad" (*ES*, 57). Within consciousness one is aware of the coming to be and the passing away of a series of events, displayed against the background of a relatively constant item of experience, ". . . in such a way as to fulfil its objective or intent" (*ES*, 57). "In every phase of experience we find a relatively constant factor generating events within experience which fulfil its intent" (*ES*, 58). As for external determination, some events in a single consciousness can be explained only by reference to the intentions of other consciousness. "When I listen to the impassioned orator or the inspired creative musician I experience sounds that no intention of mine could possibly produce. And all communication, if on a lower plane, is of the same nature: a creative process starting in one mind yet having effects in another mind, through which it is understood" (*ES*, 58).

Finally, experience possesses the fourth characteristic of substance: conservation through time. This criterion does not require that substance be eternal: ". . . all that we can rightfully demand is that it should persist through a succession of events, in relation

to which it may be said to endure" (ES, 53). Experience meets this qualification. First, experience contains universals which recur at different times and places; these universals are conservative features of experience. Second, ". . . experience is conserved through the matrix self" (ES, 60). This self ". . . has no existence independent of a stream of experience, and could not possibly be embodied in any other center; it is, therefore, not a universal, but a deeper stratum of individual existence within the ongoing pulse of experience, a true *res cogitans* which abides as the more superficial layers overlying it are sloughed off" (ES, 68).

Hence Parker concluded that experience, conceived not as a succession of discrete entities but as ". . . a process of accretion and attrition around a central core that remains relatively but literally invariant" (ES, 69), is substance. And because of his manner of describing experience, his metaphysics, though based on experience, is neither a phenomenism nor a scepticism; rather it is a spiritualistic monadism oriented toward the realization of values, and so, though a monadism, this idealism supposes that the monads are not simply located in absolute isolation but that they partially overlap to form neighborhoods of satisfying cooperation or battlegrounds of frustrating conflict. "All reality is a dynamic process produced cooperatively by the desires of monads. Being is secondary to doing, and doing is the creature of desire" (ES, 350).

3. *The Omega System*

Within the individual consciousness philosophical investigation has discerned a layer of selfhood below the focal selves that pass by. Within the system of interrelated monads science discovers the existence of different levels of experience—the sociological dependent on the psychological, the psychological on the biological, the biological on the physical, the macroscopic physical on the microscopic physical. In its form as well as its existence each level is determined by the level below, except the "final lowest level" which is undetermined by anything below and which, for want of more precise information, Parker called the "Omega system" (ES, 320).

In two respects the Omega system is eternal. By contrast

with the transiency of all things, lives and systems of ideas, ". . . only the Omega system of the physical world is a type of being that is not known to be transitory" (*ES*, 321). First, dialectical considerations confirm that the Omega system is everlasting. It could not have had a beginning, since that whence it came would then be tantamount to the Omega system. Nor can it end, since that whither it passes would, in turn, be tantamount to the Omega system. Nor can it change, since change presupposes the persistence of something that does not change, in this case ". . . the Omega system, an eternal present, existing at all moments of time" (*ES*, 323). Secondly, the eternal character of the Omega system is also revealed in connection with historical propositions (*ES*, 323).¹⁴ The truth of all propositions consists in correspondence with a reality external to them. However, as the events represented by historical propositions, being past, no longer exist, these propositions must refer to the echoes of the past events, and these echoes must exist in the Omega system. "It must bear on its face the scars and wrinkles of every event" (*ES*, 324).

Since metaphysics is based on experience, and since the description of experience detects the fact of centricity, the Omega system can be speculatively portrayed only in the terms of concrete experience (*ES*, 327). Paradoxically, the dependence of human consciousness on lower levels of existence is rendered compatible with a spiritualistic interpretation of the universe because the ultimate level, the Omega system, is grasped in spiritual terms. With religious sentiment Parker agreed, ". . . the control of the Omega system is exerted by a single Will . . ." (*ES*, 341). Just as all the activities within a single monad spring from its volitions, its desires for satisfaction, so all the changes that occur in the natural world, even those determined from below, are due to the satisfactions in the Omega system sought by ". . . a will at least as complex as that of man" (*ES*, 344). Underlying and controlling all the levels of desiring is the Omega system, whose long-range plans, its volitional preconditions of all events to come, are approxi-

¹⁴ See Parker, *The Metaphysics of Historical Knowledge*, in University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1913).

mated by the laws of physics. This system is the cosmological equivalent of God, but an immanent God ". . . with the same ideals that we have" (*ES*, 350).

From the standpoint of the Omega system, the fact of death, so troubling to a philosophy which defines value as satisfaction, yet refuses to succumb to pessimism, may be justified. As new monads need fresh opportunities, and forces in the physical world desire satisfaction, other monads perish (*ES*, 356; *SN*, 314). However, Parker was never persuaded that all the evil in the world could be so easily explained away. "We can find the root of evil," he confessed, "but not the justification of it" (*SN*, 312).

Religion is born of man's awareness of evil and is rooted in his interest in survival: "the background of every religion is a great pessimism" (*HV*, 360). Religion imaginatively compensates for defeat and disillusion, though it demands, in addition to imagination, a faith which approximates the kind of belief appropriate to things of the real world. The uniqueness of religion is that it ". . . represents an effort to bring the two worlds, of fact and of imagination, together" (*HV*, 49). Acknowledging evil, religion nonetheless effectively strengthens ". . . man's motives for living against despair" (*HV*, 360). "It has given him something of more value in the struggle for existence than any single victories—the conviction, tonic for all his endeavors, that in the long run he cannot fail" (*HV*, 361). Thus religion is a kind of belief determined by value. "So long as an imaginative interpretation of reality in terms of desire is required to provide men the confidence necessary to carry on with serenity, religion will exist" (*HV*, 369). Moreover, theology, defined as ". . . an interpretation of the universe favorable to man's wishes, but not capable of any direct verification or refutation" (*HV*, 362-362), comprised for Parker the primary task for religion in the future. "Faith will proclaim, as against every form of naturalism, the existence of a supreme and enduring value, to which all who labor in love may contribute. The tragic harmony which a man may realize in his own life through faith, he will ascribe to the universe" (*HV*, 373).

Parker's account of the Omega system in *Experience and Substance* is his sketch of the theology justifiable by "a radical empiricism extended through the imagination." Parker did not

deny the existence of evil. Rather he located the root of evil in the heart of the Omega system, for just as the desires of the system are dissociated to crystallize into the finite monads that throng the world, so in the beginning these desires are incompatible. God, therefore, is responsible for evil. "The primary material of the world was once a part of God, and in it lay hidden the competition and disharmony that are the root of evil" (*ES*, 357). Still Parker recommended not despair but arduous moral struggle. "In the creative process, in which we are co-workers with God, we are given the opportunity for victory and love, for beauty and for virtue. . . . To ask for more is to ask for what God himself cannot give" (*ES*, 358).

IV. CONCLUSION

Parker developed his philosophy of values in full awareness of its metaphysical underpinning. His philosophy is a profound and original humanism which embraces a "naturalist" value theory founded on a metaphysics of explicit monadic idealism. Like the naturalists, Parker identified values with the satisfactions of desire, tracing the origin of values from basic organic needs, and presenting a theory of the continuity of biological, moral, aesthetic, cognitive and religious values, which made possible the formulation of a general theory of value with specifications in all these areas. Like the emotivists, who followed upon the naturalistic dismissal of values, Parker held that value expressions are primarily non-cognitive, expressing private feelings and intending to excite corresponding feelings in others. Thus he doubted the efficacy of rational, scientific methods in the field of values. He did not, of course, disregard the normative component of value. On the contrary, he maintained that every satisfaction involves a normative dimension, determined by its position in and coherence with the basic system of desires defining the self. Accordingly, rational methods do not get to the heart of the matter of moral conflict and evil. Parker conceived the world as a system of monadic selves each willing its own satisfactions, such that the satisfactions of some are the frustrations of others. Good and evil are interlocked. Love may assuage the hurt by enabling the individual self to find value in the satisfactions of others. Love is man's main

practical stay against the despair of the evil that undermines and overwhelms him. Philosophy is also an aid. Theoretical knowledge of the Omega system, interpreted as Divine Will underlying the physical universe, may guarantee the preponderance of good over evil. But Parker, despite this idealism, never wavered in his conviction that the world contains ineradicable evil. Art in its highest moments makes it possible for man to face evil, and religion imbues men with faith in a victorious good despite the appearance of things. But in the final analysis the highest end of human life is a harmony which Parker described as tragic.

The supreme end for man, Parker saw, is a kind of harmony. But neither the harmony of sublimation of desires nor the harmony of their integration encompasses the supreme harmony, though both are subsumed as subordinate methods of limited effectiveness. Sublimation alone fails because it cannot eviscerate the lower desires without shattering the whole fabric of human existence. And despite the recognition that the good life is the happy integrated life (*PV*, 133ff), integration does not suffice, since it does not reckon with the human condition in a world where good and evil are entwined. The good life prevails through conflict, suffering and waste. "None of life's values would have the poignancy which they possess were they not set off against contrasting values," Parker wrote (*HV*, 401). And he surmised: "In the end, it may be true that life is better because of death" (*HV*, 402). The highest good for man, he therefore contended, is "tragic harmony," a harmony ". . . not merely founded upon . . . but inclusive of evil" (*HV*, 404). Tragic harmony dwells in the concrete wholes of experience manifest as moods of resignation, defiance, good humor, and faith.

There are, it is true, some lives that have the radiant and symmetric harmony of a star. But for most men the ultimate value is some tragic or comic victory which finds expression in a mood of resignation, defiance, faith, or humor, akin to a melody of Mozart or Beethoven. This victory each man builds in his own way out of the smooth joys or sharp stones of his adversity. For all men the ultimate value, and hence the categorical imperative, is in its complete essence so personal that it is mystical (*HV*, 408).

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DISCUSSIONS

MIND, MATTER, AND FACT¹

FRANCIS H. PARKER

GROWTH in philosophy involves an imaginative creation of original theories, an honest dealing with the difficulties contained therein, and a conscientious and diligent working out of details. Professor Donald Williams' fine paper on "Mind as a Matter of Fact" exemplifies all three of these requisites, as well as being entertaining; and I find in it much that is true and even more that is fruitful. But I also find serious defects in Professor Williams' three main theses, theses concerning *mind*, *matter*, and *fact*. The first of these is the epistemological theory called Direct Realism or Objectivism. The second is a psychophysical thesis, that of Materialism. And the third is the ontological thesis Professor Williams calls Actualism or Factualism. I shall first consider Mr. Williams' Direct Realism and then comment on his Actualism and Materialism, both in themselves and in relation to Direct Realism.

I

Direct Realism or Objectivism, the epistemological theory that we directly know real, independent things themselves rather than subjective copies of them, is a thesis which I wholeheartedly accept. And Mr. Williams' appeal to naive realism, to our unsophisticated reports of our own awareness, is, I believe, the strongest *prima facie* evidence for the truth of Direct Realism. Of course such an appeal is not a logical argument, and I believe that a logical argument can be given. But since Mr. Williams purposely excludes

¹ An earlier and slightly different version of this commentary on Professor Donald Williams' "Mind as a Matter of Fact" was read, after Mr. Williams' paper, at the meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America at Brooklyn College, March 21, 1959. Mr. Williams' paper appears in this *Review*, XIII (December, 1959), 203-225.

from the purview of his paper the question of proof (p. 203), we must, regretfully, accept this omission. He must, however, be criticized for presenting an argument which tends to verify a theory opposed to the Direct Realism which he himself espouses.

Mr. Williams argues that subjectivism or epistemological dualism is just as compatible with knowledge of objective things themselves as his own Objectivism is, that it is *false* that "if we experienced only . . . 'subjective' impressions and ideas, we should never know anything of the rest of the world, not even that it exists" (p. 217). He maintains this on the ground that "subjective or objective . . . the datum is an *existent* and can't help being evidence about existents" (p. 217). It is indeed true (given the requisite relations) that the datum, being an existent, can't help being evidence for other existents *if* we know that there *are* other existents. But this is just what we could not know if subjectivism or epistemological dualism were true, if we knew *only subjective* existents. For while such subjective existents might be evidence of objective existents if there were any, we could not know that there were any and hence could not know that our subjective existents were evidence of *them*.

Mr. Williams maintains, to present the same point in a different way, that "the datum's having a subjective . . . locus does not disqualify it for the service of truth" (p. 217), that is as evidence of objective existents, on the ground that "on . . . the subjectivistic [theory], the content provides a fair basis for an estimate of the rest of the world" (p. 217). This, again, is true *if* we know that there *is* any "world" distinct from the datum, but this is just what we cannot know if we can know *only* subjective data. Of course one might argue that the subjective datum is given *as* an effect of an objective thing (though Mr. Williams tells me that he does not hold this position) and that it is therefore, *qua* effect, evidence of that objective thing. This would indeed permit inference from the subjective datum to the objective thing, but at the cost of making the datum no longer purely subjective, at the cost of abandoning subjectivism.

Thus if subjectivism or epistemological dualism says that we know only ideas, it cannot also say that we know that objective things are causes or prototypes of these ideas. And if subjectivism

says that we know *idea-effects*, it is no longer subjectivism in any distinctive sense because the effectness tacitly contains the objective cause. Hence Mr. Williams' claim that subjectivism, distinctly understood, permits knowledge of objective things seems to me false. And what is more serious and curious, if it is not false but true, then it argues against the very Direct Realism which he himself espouses, for it removes at least a major reason for believing in Direct Realism. If one believes that one's awareness can be confined to subjective states and still extend to objective things, why should one choose to be a Direct Realist? There may be other reasons for so choosing, but a major reason has been removed.

Mr. Williams argues that his "zeal for direct realism reaches no such proselytizing or claustrophobic pitch" as my above argument, and that he does not think that "any such stupendous issue [as solipsism] hangs on the theory" (p. 217). To my mind, however, it is neither proselytizing nor claustrophobic, but merely logical, to hold that it is self-contradictory to maintain both that one is only aware of subjective data and also that one knows things, or that there are things which are not subjective data. And to my mind the issues between contradiction and consistency and between solipsism and knowledge of extra-mental reality are, for philosophy, stupendous issues. If one does not believe that subjectivism rules out knowledge of objective reality, then I do not see, at least in Mr. Williams' article, any good reason for rejecting it and accepting Direct Realism.

Why then should Mr. Williams be so interested in offering this evidence tending to favor subjectivism or epistemological dualism, if he rejects it in favor of Direct Realism? What I strongly suspect to be the reason is manifest in his attachment to Cartesian dualism—an attachment which seems strange in a Direct Realist or epistemological monist. Since the *epistemological* dualism of Cartesianism is patently opposed to Direct Realism, it must be the *psycho-physical* dualism which interests Mr. Williams. But why should this be so, especially in one who professes materialism? Can it be because he feels that his materialistic psychophysics is inadequate? I shall return to this question at the end of my remarks.

There is but one other point I wish to consider in connection with the thesis of Direct Realism. This concerns Mr. Williams'

treatment (pp. 210-18) of the anti-sense datum theories which he picturesquely calls "primitivism" or "blear phenomenology." If his main contention here is that the "primitivist's" "things" are only verbally different from his own "sense data," since both are equally objective and directly known, then I agree entirely. But he takes such a long time to say this that one suspects that he does not see that this disagreement is merely verbal, and one therefore also suspects that Mr. Williams believes he is constructing in favor of sense data an argument which is more than verbal. There is present here, to be sure, another issue which is real and more than verbal, but on this issue Mr. Williams must take the same stand as his "primitivist." The "primitivist" does maintain with "some plausibility," Mr. Williams informs us (p. 216), "the view that . . . 'sense data' . . . stipulated by every theory except direct realism—states of the brain or of an immaterial spirit, for example—are bound to be delusory," in the sense that they would make impossible the achievement of any knowledge of extra-mental reality. Now Mr. Williams does, as we have just seen, claim disagreement with his "primitivist" on this real issue; but, as I have also just argued, his Direct Realism does not entitle him to do so. For the Williams' Direct Realism *does*, and the Williams-Parker Direct Realism *must*, deny that sense data or objects of knowledge are merely states of the brain or spirit; and this denial is also maintained by the "primitivist." In short, Mr. Williams should forget about the controversy over the language of "sense data" and "things" and welcome his "primitivists" as friends and allies insofar as they are Direct Realists—though he may castigate them on other grounds.

II

Let us now, before turning to "matter," to Materialism, consider Mr. Williams' ontological thesis, Actualism or Factualism. This is the claim that everything is a fully actual, fully determinate, particular fact (pp. 203-04). No slurry surds, no potencies, forces, or other metaphysical muck, and no unexampled essences or disembodied possibilities are admitted to this neat and sterile ontological laboratory. This Actualism is neutral even on so large an

issue as idealism versus realism, and also among different forms of realism; it neither entails nor is entailed by Direct Realism since Actualism is as indifferent to the objectivity or subjectivity of the inhabitants as Direct Realism is to the neatness or sloppiness of its objects. Mr. Williams disavows any such entailment, but one still gets the feeling that one is being offered a package deal whose come-on is, for me, Direct Realism, and whose catch is Actualism. For Direct Realism, Mr. Williams advertises, is "a culmination of actualism" since it equates "the real facts' with the objective ones" (p. 209). But one can of course claim, without self-contradiction, that what is objective is a non-factualistic *materia prima*, or, on the other hand, that every neat fact is under the hat. At this point I only want to make sure that it is understood that Direct Realism does not commit us to Actualism, nor *vice versa*.

As a matter of fact there are some indications that Mr. Williams is a little worried that his Actualism may even conflict with his Direct Realism—or at least with his own Direct Realist theory of secondary qualities and the conscious field. "To say that a crimson quale, for instance, both is and is not the correlative vibration pattern," he tells us (p. 224), is to "infringe a little on our principle of the 'shining presence' of the object," the principle, that is, of the full actuality of the datum,² since for a datum both to be and not to be something is definitely not for it to be a fully definite, factual thing. While I am here strongly tempted to shout "Damn the Actualism; full speed ahead with the Direct Realism," I must rather confess that I frankly do not here see any infringement of Actualism³ since a thing may, in full, determinate actuality, both be something in one context and not be it in another. Of course Mr. Williams just-quoted position may indeed, as he feels, suffer from "a *soupc on* of . . . self-contradiction" (p. 224), but then I do not see that Actualism as such forbids contradictions as inhabitants of its universe. And if Actualism does conflict with Direct Realism, what is the point of being an Actualist? The only reason I can find is in order "to avoid the . . . stupendous disparity

² Mr. Williams used this latter characterization in the paper he delivered to the Metaphysical Society of America.

³ Mr. Williams no longer says that there is any such infringement, but to me he still seems a little worried that there may be.

between actuality and potentiality" (p. 204). What this disparity is we are not told, nor how it is a greater disparity than what may subsist between the extremes (perhaps contradictories?) inhabiting an Actualistic universe. Of course, as we have seen, Mr. Williams is not concerned, in this article, with giving reasons for his beliefs; yet isn't his worry that Direct Realism infringes Actualism a reason, sufficient or not, for disbelieving one of these theories, and ought not a reason for disbelieving, to the extent that it is a reason, be a cause of disbelieving?

Be that as it may, Actualism does conflict with Direct Realism in another way—or at least it conflicts with some of the *data* which Direct Realism, as a theory of knowledge, is obliged to accept. These rebellious data are those conceptual objects signified by words ending in "able" and "ible" (e.g. "combustible") and also those sensory objects, such as this seen change now, which can be understood only by apprehending such "ible" conceptual objects in their backgrounds. For such "ible" objects are, I'm afraid, examples of the potencies, unexampled essences, or disembodied possibilities which Actualism rules out. While I am only pretty sure that *no* epistemology can rule these out, I am very sure that Direct Realism cannot do so, for the simple reason, if for no other, that I am now directly apprehending, in World War III, an unexampled essence. It is conceivable but incredible that a Direct Realist should retort that all such apprehensions of unexampled essences are either translatable into determinate actualities or else downright illusory, and thus that the world really remains Actualistic—incredible because these apprehended unexampled essences must still be *somewhere* in the universe which the Actualistic ontologist purports to map, whether or not they are declared either translatable or illusory.⁴ The short of the matter is that change, it seems quite certain to me, involves unactualized possibilities; and change is surely a datum which Direct Realism cannot deny. If such passage is only a myth, it still is just that and I apprehend it. Of course Mr. Williams does not deny change,⁵ but it seems clear to

⁴ I would like to see Mr. William's ontology of error (he does discuss time lag on pp. 209-10), but of course one can't do everything in one article.

⁵ In the paper delivered to the Metaphysical Society of America Mr. Williams said that "time, change, and causation are derivative from

me that his Actualism implies such a denial. Here Spinoza's is a more consistent Actualism: since everything which infinite intellect conceives actually (and necessarily) exists, the idea of anything as changing is an inadequate idea.

III

Let us finally get to the substance of the matter, to the third thesis, Materialism. This thesis puzzles me, for I do not clearly know what Mr. Williams means by his Materialism nor what connection he sees it to have with his Direct Realism and Actualism.

Materialism is certainly not entailed by Actualism, for Mr. Williams notes that "facts can be of any sorts" (p. 204); "a Cartesian mind is as much *fact* as the materialist's is" (p. 209). Yet Actualism is, in Mr. Williams' mind, "most crisply and massively manifest in physical monism or materialism" (p. 204). This statement shows plainly that it isn't just *any* old materialism that Mr. Williams has in mind, for some historical materialisms are indeterminate and murky and some historical immaterialisms are crisply Actualistic. In fact a crisp immaterialism and a murky materialism can even combine in a single philosophical system; note for example the crisp Actualism of Santayana's non-material realm of essence and the murky indeterminacy of his realm of matter. No, it is only *Actualistic* materialism which most crisply manifests Actualism, if any does; and this is no more a materialism than is the physicalism of the positivists. Indeed, physicalism, I am convinced, is a more accurate name for Mr. Williams' Materialism, for matter is "not . . . the blank *hyle* of hylomorphism," he tells us, but rather the "structure . . . which is the object of the most successful sciences" (p. 205), that is, the physical sciences. Such

partition, position, and comparison" which are categories of Actualism. This statement I find intriguing, and I regret that he did not develop this and discuss the nature of this derivation in his published paper. I myself must doubt that such derivation of *real* change, in contrast to Santayana's *essence-change*, is possible unless the categories from which it is derived tacitly contain unactualized possibilities. Indeed, even if they did not, I would be tempted to point out that the *derivation*—need I say derivability?—from them does involve such possibilities.

physicalism, the reduction of all phenomena to physical ones, should, I think, be carefully distinguished from metaphysical materialism. The positivists, as Mr. Williams indicates (p. 204), have been just as good physicalists as the metaphysical materialists have, and usually better. And if such physicalism "promises the acme of intelligibility and credibility" (p. 205), I suspect, lacking evidence, that it is because it is a *physicalistic* intelligibility that it promises.

Nor of course is Materialism or physicalism entailed by Direct Realism. Just as Direct Realism does not imply that all things are fully actual, so also it does not imply that all things are material or physical. Furthermore, it seems to me that Mr. Williams' Direct Realism is actually incompatible with Materialism and physicalism, and in two ways.

In the first place, Mr. Williams' physicalistic theory of cognition seems incompatible with Direct Realism. I can only applaud his rejection of the "under-the-hat" theory which has been drawn as a consequence of a physical-causal theory of cognition. But his alternative to intra-cranialism seems to land him in a difficulty which is at its core the same as that of intra-cranialism—and this because both theories are based on a purely physicalistic account of the causes of cognition.

Mr. Williams' escape from intra-cranialism is achieved, it seems to me,^{*} by adding onto the incoming causal chain an out-

^{*} Mr. Williams objects to this statement that his theory involves an outgoing causal chain or projection of the datum out from the perceiving organism: "I cannot too much emphasize that the percipient does not 'project' anything back on the entity perceived, or if he does, this is a gratuity irrelevant to the perceiving" (p. 208). "Projection" may be a poor word, but how else is the perceived datum to become extra-organic if, as Mr. Williams claims, perceiving is entirely a physical process which involves the intermediation of the physical, perceiving organism? Moreover, Mr. Williams' language invites the use of the word "projection." Note for example the following: "that transaction which sprawls from the objects of perception through the percipient organism and out again," and "Of the philosophers who appreciate this problem, a few [it seems clearly suggested that Mr. Williams is one of these] have placed the conscious datum on the *efferent* side, in the *reaction*" (p. 206, italics mine). My criticism depends only on the physicalism of the process, however; it is independent of whether or not there is any such outward projection.

going causal chain, Hobbes' "outward endeavor," Pitkin's "projection," or Santayana's "positing," which locates the datum in the near vicinity of the original cause. "If the organic and educated receptivity of the brain would be enough to involve the retinal image in consciousness," says Mr. Williams, "why need it stop within my skin at all? . . . The datum . . . is at the moon's end, the cause end" (p. 207). I myself do not object, as some do, that the temporal difference between the spatially remote cause and the cognitive *act* or *knower* prevents that remote cause from being that knower's object, for I agree with Mr. Williams (pp. 209-10) that the object of knowledge may bear a different date from that of the knower—else how are memory and anticipation possible? My objection is rather that Mr. Williams' exclusively physicalistic account of the process of cognition implies that the causal object bears a date different from that of the *datum*. For this means that the datum and the object are not numerically identical, and this violates the definition of Direct Realism. If there is change wherever there is time, moreover, this temporal difference would mean also a qualitative difference. But I will not press this. It is enough to see that, whether or not there is an outgoing causal chain in addition to the incoming one—no matter, that is, how accurate a moon-shot the perceiver might make, no matter how cozily the datum-project may snuggle with the thing that was its cause—the datum is still not the same thing as its cause, for it bears a different date. One might here protest, of course, that the datum-effect doesn't need to bear the same date as the object-cause. Nor does it if viewed from outside the cognitive situation or from the stand-point of epistemological dualism. But for a Direct Realist looking at things from the inside, it does. As Mr. Williams says, for Objectivism "the object is both the percept and the cause of its being perceived" (pp. 212-13)—(if it is caused at all); "the theory declares that the conscious datum is where and when the stimulus event is" (p. 209). But this is just what cannot be the case if the causation is exclusively physical—here Mr. Williams' "Anglo-American primitivists" are right (p. 212)—since strictly physical causation always creates a date difference between the cause and the effect. And if this be denied, the meaning of physical causation must become so attenuated as to

make it not different from non-physical causation. Direct Realism requires that the moon that I seem to see be the moon *itself*, whereas a physicalistic account of cognition must make the moon that I seem to see something temporally different from the moon itself.

In sum, since Direct Realism is the view that the object and the percept are the very same thing, completely or numerically identical, Direct Realism cannot allow a time difference between the object and the percept. But to make the object the cause, in a physical sense, of the percept, is exactly to create such a time difference. Hence Direct Realism must maintain either that the percept is not caused at all or that it is caused in some non-physical way. The ephemerality of human perception plus the law of sufficient reason forces the latter alternative, which is, I think, what Aristotelean realism has meant by the object's being the formal cause of the percept. And, curiously enough, Mr. Williams' just-quoted statement that "the object is both the percept and the cause of its being perceived" appears to be—heaven forbid!—identical with the Aristotelean dictum, except that the cause in Mr. Williams' statement is supposed to be physical. But this, I have tried to show, is impossible for Direct Realism. It should be emphasized, however, that saying that the causation is non-physical or immaterial or formal does not, of course, say what it is; and Mr. Williams' claim that "the scholastic's notion of 'form and matter' has . . . encouraged him to claim the merits and disclaim the demerits of every regular epistemology without the trouble of explaining how he manages it, so that in practice he too depends on . . . blear descriptions" (p. 212), is one which I find largely justified.

In the second place, and finally, Mr. Williams' theory of the unity of consciousness, when explicated, is, I believe, incompatible with physicalism—or else with Direct Realism, depending on the choice made between two alternative ways of completing the theory. This theory, which also explains secondary qualities, says that "the conscious structure," that is, the demarcated field of awareness, is both, as a whole of parts, the structured field and also, as a simple unity, the quality of consciousness. I greatly admire this theory, and as an account of secondary qualities (a secondary quality is a "fusion" of the structure which is the cor-

responding primary quality, and a primary quality is a "fission" of the unity which is the secondary quality (p. 224) I am pretty well convinced that it is true. Moreover, I believe it would also be true as an account of the unity of consciousness *if* the consciousness didn't *belong* to anyone. For the objective boundaries of a conscious field are indeed determinable solely in terms of items in that field. The trouble is that every conscious field is *someone's* conscious field, and the someone seems to have been pretty well slighted in Mr. Williams' theory. He does say at one point (p. 208) that for his relational theory of consciousness he has specified "relations directly with the percipient" as well as "relations directly among the members of the [conscious] field," and at another point (p. 223) that the conscious field "remains conditioned by relations to the percipient too." But what these relations to the percipient are, or any further mention of their existence, I have been unable to discover; and, as a matter of fact, he even says elsewhere (p. 224) that the conscious field's "relativity to a percipient" is something "which I do not intend."

The unity of consciousness is thus defined entirely *objectively*, apparently, that is, in terms of objects. But then in what sense is this unified consciousness *my* consciousness or *your's* or *anyone's*? How on this strictly objectivistic definition of the unity of consciousness could there even *be* more than one conscious field? For different conscious fields would require references to different knowers or conscient subjects. But such references seem to be omitted from Mr. Williams' account. Why is this? Because his Materialism would require that any such relation to the conscient subject be physical, and because its being physical would be, as I have argued, incompatible with his Direct Realism? Perhaps so, since he says that objective relativism "turned into an intricate variety of the under-the-hat theory" (p. 212). At any rate I hope that this is the reason for his omission of a consciousness relation to the knowing subject: his recognition that such a relation would necessarily violate either his Direct Realism if the consciousness relation were physical (for then, as I have been arguing, one could not know the object *itself*, identically) or else his Materialism if the consciousness relation were non-physical.

In sum, Mr. Williams explains the unity of the conscious field

very nicely—*except* that it is no one's or everyone's conscious field, not the conscious field of any individual knower. And to account for the conscious field as *directly, realistically* known by an individual knower he would need, I believe, to include a non-physical relation of the conscious-whole-quality to the individual knower. Is this why Mr. Williams seems so entranced with Cartesian dualism, as we saw earlier that he seems to be—because, even though epistemologically it is incompatible with Direct Realism, Cartesian dualism as a psychophysics includes such a non-physical consciousness relation? What such a relation is I cannot here attempt to say, but *some* relation to myself is required to make the consciousness *my* consciousness, and a *physical* relation would, I am convinced, prevent my consciousness from being a Direct Realist one.

IV

In conclusion: Mr. Williams' Direct Realism does not entail his Actualism or his Materialism, so we may accept the former without either of the latter (or *vice versa* if you will). His Actualism, in fact, seems incompatible with the facts of change, and his Materialism incompatible with Direct Realism. Direct Realism is, I think, true, both because of what Mr. Williams has said and because of other arguments. If this is so, Materialism and Actualism must be rejected.

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CONCERNING NON-EXISTENCE

MELVIN M. SCHUSTER

IN HIS TALK about non-existents¹ Clive Ingram-Pearson claims that there is an "existential state of *real absence*"² to which "positive reference"³ is made whenever the existence of something is meaningfully denied. It is this contention that the present paper will subject to examination and criticism.

First it will be necessary to examine the argument, and the meaning of the argument, by which Mr. Ingram-Pearson is led to uphold such an unusual position. Using the statement, "fairies do not exist," as his example, he observes: "In order to achieve its obvious status *as a denial* this statement must have some object of reference for its subject term; for denials which are denials of nothing are not denials in any sense at all."⁴ What, then, is the designate (or object of reference) of the term "fairies"? It is, we are told, "*an existent* [*italics mine*] which at least one person believes to be present in the world and which another person at the same time and in the same context believes is not there."⁵ To say that "fairies do not exist" is therefore to say that "certain entities, designated by the term 'fairies,' are not present in the world," or "specific entities, designated by the term 'fairies,' are really absent from the world." The latter statement is positive, and Mr. Ingram-Pearson tells us explicitly that positive statements cannot "succeed in making intelligible"⁶ something made intelligible by negative statements about non-existents; but he has in mind such "ordinary"⁷ positive statements as "fairies are imagined beings." In other words, it is not that negative statements about

¹ "On Talking about Non-Existents," *The Review of Metaphysics*, XII, 352-60:

² *Ibid.*, p. 355.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 353.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 355.

⁷ *Ibid.*

non-existents cannot find their equivalent in positive statements as such, but that they cannot find their equivalent in some positive statements, namely, those that do in fact say something else. Thus it would appear to be perfectly legitimate to state, "fairies are specific entities that are really absent from the world," or to state (since real absence is regarded as an existential state), "fairies are specific entities that are in the existential state of real absence"; and these statements would be the exact equivalent of "fairies do not exist."

The positive expression of the non-existence of fairies leads us to enquire further into the entities that are the designates of the term "fairies." Let us say that the term "fairies" designates "winged-type creatures," so that the person, A, affirming the existence of fairies, is saying, "winged-type creatures exist." If it is also assumed that A has an idea of fairies then this idea would similarly be of winged-type creatures, i.e. it would refer to the same entities as does the term "fairies." The term "fairies" does not designate the *idea* of fairies since, as Mr. Ingram-Pearson demonstrates, the statement "fairies do not exist" would mean "ideas of fairies do not exist," which happens not to be the case and which happens not to be at all what is meant by saying "fairies do not exist." Hence there are entities, other than the term and the idea, that are the objects of reference in the discussion. We ask: what is the existential state of these entities as conceived by the person asserting their existence? The person, A, obviously does not believe that they are in the existential state of real absence; we shall say, therefore, that A views his winged-type creatures as in the existential state of *real presence*. In short, when A says, "fairies exist," he means, "there are winged-type creatures in the existential state of real presence."

Having ascertained the position of A, can we now determine with greater precision what the person, B, means when he denies the existence of fairies? When B says, "fairies are in the existential state of real absence," does the term "fairies" designate the "really present fairies" of A? Does B mean that "really present fairies, as such, are really absent"? This is no more possible than is the position that a white thing, *qua* white, is black. It would appear that, for B, the term "fairies" designates winged-type creatures in

such a way that all reference to real presence or real absence is excluded. And if B's position is to be a genuine denial of A's, then A must also be using the term "fairies" in the same sense: if A and B were using the term "fairies" in such a way as to refer, respectively, to "really present fairies" and "really absent fairies," then A would be uttering the tautology, "really present fairies are really present," and B would be uttering the tautology, "really absent fairies are really absent." No denial would be involved. Hence the center of the discussion must be winged-type creatures considered without reference to the existential states of real presence and real absence; and we must now ask about the existential state of these creatures. It is difficult to determine what answer Mr. Ingram-Pearson would make to this query. When he speaks of "existence" as "already a meaning or interpretation" * he seems to believe that the entities under discussion are not only capable of being considered without reference to any kind of existence, but actually and originally are considered in this fashion. Thus he says that prior to considering their real absence there "is no sense at all in which existence is attributed to entities. . . ." * Perhaps it is this neutral condition that he intends by his use of the word "factuality." **

We must postpone a direct consideration of this issue concerning the existential state of the entities that are neutral with respect to real presence and real absence until two additional points are treated. The first point concerns the priority of real absence. It is hard to see why "existence" (real presence) must be a consideration subsequent to that of real absence. Is there any reason which precludes enquiring into the nature of cows until one has been confronted by the consideration of the not-cow? Plato's procedure would seem to indicate that the mere fact of having two of a kind is enough to prompt a study of what we mean by "two of a kind." And if this is true respecting the nature of cows, why could it not be true respecting the existence of fairies or anything else? Given two things, there is a sufficient condition for enquiring

* *Ibid.*, p. 358.

* *Ibid.*, p. 359.

** *Ibid.*, p. 357.

into the meaning of "being" or "existence." Moreover, if one considers that there are commonly held to be different kinds of entities, such as mental and non-mental entities, there is even greater reason for enquiring into the aspect common to both and by virtue of which both are said to exist. Second: granting that real presence and real absence are alike existential states, why would real presence be an "interpretation" and real absence not? No reason presents itself as a basis for making such a distinction. And if it is argued that things "come to be" really absent, so that real absence is, in a sense, "imposed" upon us; why, then, it can be argued that things are given to us in experience as really present. Real presence and real absence seem in every way to be on a par.

We return now to the question concerning the existential state of those entities that are neutral with respect to real presence and real absence. These entities, we saw, are the designates of the term "fairies" in both the statement affirming their real presence and the statement asserting their real absence. Mr. Ingram-Pearson apparently denies the possibility of our enquiry on the grounds that it would lead us directly to either the real presence or real absence of fairies, for these are the only existential states that come into consideration. He might have in mind something of this sort: when two people argue about the color of some x —that it is black and that it is white—it is ridiculous to ask what the color is of which it is said on the one hand that it is black, and on the other hand that it is white. This is quite true, but in every controversy of the form " x is a versus x is b " there is always some common agreement that there *exists* an x about which the controversy centers. Indeed, without this agreement (actual or assumed) there would be no controversy but only two people talking about two different things. Moreover, given the x in common, it can always be asked—*independently of the particular issue being argued*—in what sense that x is said to be. And if there is no sense in which x is said to be *independently of the issue under discussion*, then there is no sense in which there can be said to be an x about which the discussion centers. Mr. Ingram-Pearson has interpreted the problem of existence and non-existence so as to make it a specific instance of the general issue just mentioned. The entities, "fairies," are the x while real presence and real absence are the a

and the *b*. If there is no sense in which "fairies" exist independently of the controversy about real presence and real absence, then it must be that A and B are arguing about two different things in saying that "fairies exist" and that "fairies do not exist." A must be talking about "really present fairies" and B must be talking about "really absent fairies," or something of the sort. There is consequently no denial involved, as was shown earlier. The situation is hardly improved even if it is granted that the entities, "fairies," are in an existential state which can be termed *neutral presence*. This move, unfortunately, takes us back to the aforementioned difficulty of claiming that a white thing, *qua* white, is black. Of course *ad hoc* characteristics can be attached to neutral presence so that an entity in this state can also be said to be really present or really absent, but such a procedure is an affront to reason and imagination: it is inconceivable that something in one existential state can, as such, be in another existential state.

If the foregoing analysis is correct then Mr. Ingram-Pearson's argument is invalid, for it results that statements which purport to deny existence simply fail to do so, or in striving to do so, involve themselves in contradiction. The immediate cause of this difficulty is the erroneous view that non-existence is *non-existence*, i.e. a special kind of existential state. As such it becomes real absence, which in turn leads to the introduction of real presence, neutral presence, and the various problems accompanying these multiple states of existence. It must be noted, however, that the erroneous view just mentioned is itself the consequence of a more fundamental error, namely, that the subject terms in statements denying existence must have objects of reference. Mr. Ingram-Pearson adopts the latter position by reasoning as follows: if there are not objects of reference then the denials are about nothing, and "denials which are denials of nothing are not denials in any sense at all."¹¹ Thus, he concludes, there must be something designated by the subject term, so that in speaking of the non-existence of that designate one cannot reasonably mean that it is nothing. What must be meant is that a certain existent (the designate) does not exist in one sense (that of real presence) but in another sense (that

¹¹ See above, p. 521.

of real absence). Statements denying existence are therefore not what they appear to be—denials that there is something—but are, instead, merely denials that some existent is in some particular existential state. In other words, according to Mr Ingram-Pearson's argument it is impossible to ever unqualifiedly deny existence because every such denial presupposes existence. In the same way it becomes impossible to ever unqualifiedly affirm existence, and this is made quite evident by recognizing that a denial such as "fairies do not exist" is a denial of the affirmation "fairies exist." Now since "fairies do not exist" is not a denial that there are fairies, "fairies exist" cannot be an affirmation that there are fairies. And since the denial presupposes fairies and only denies that they are in the existential state of real presence, the affirmation must similarly presuppose that there are fairies and only affirm that fairies are in the existential state of real presence. The affirmation therefore assumes, rather than affirms, existence; and every statement which appears to make an unqualified claim that something exists is actually claiming that some existent, which it takes for granted, is in the existential state of real presence.

In order to avoid Mr. Ingram-Pearson's unorthodox and unfortunate interpretation we must reject his assumption that the subject term in statements denying existence must have objects of reference. Mr. Ingram-Pearson himself remarks early in his paper that "the person propounding the statement 'fairies do not exist' clearly does not believe that his subject term designates anything whatever; indeed it is precisely the intention to deny that there is any designate or any existent to talk about in this case."¹² This is the obvious interpretation and the one that is perhaps universally intended. When a person denies the existence of fairies he is not saying that certain existents do not exist or that certain existents are really absent from the world; he is, instead, merely denying that the term "fairies" has designates, i.e. that there are existents which conform to the definition of the subject term. And the person who affirms the existence of fairies claims not that certain existents exist or that they are really present, but simply that there are existents satisfying the definition of "fairies." An existent

¹² Ingram-Pearson, p. 353.

would be presupposed if, in affirming existence, we were attributing something to something. This, we have seen, cannot be the case. It is one and the same to say "there is something" or "something exists."

Concerning "non-existents," perhaps the most significant comment that can be made here is that it is a term well calculated to encourage that type of discussion responsible for the ill-repute of metaphysics. We have seen that apart from certain ideas, and words expressing these ideas, there is nothing. There are no "beings of the mind" or "imagined beings" distinct from ideas, and no existents independent of the mind that either do not exist or are really absent from the world. When used in one of the latter senses, the term "non-existent" designates nothing at all; when used in the former sense it designates a term or idea which itself does not have a designate.

Mr. Ingram-Pearson would object that, according to our interpretation, the statement "fairies do not exist" is a denial of nothing and therefore not a denial at all. We reply: it is "a denial of nothing" only in the sense that there is no existent, satisfying the definition of the subject term, the existence of which is denied. But it is hard to understand why the statement should thereby fail to achieve its status as a denial. If there are terms with definitions, and if it is meaningful to affirm that there is something satisfying the definition of a particular term, then there appears to be no reason why it should not also be meaningful to state that nothing satisfies the definition of a term.

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PROBLEMS AND PERPLEXITIES

With this issue, the *Review of Metaphysics* inaugurates a new section, devoted to the examination of some challenging questions. It offers the following \$25 prizes:

1. For the most satisfactory account of the scholastic, if any, who first discussed or raised the question: "how many angels can dance on the end of a pin." Or, for the best account showing the time, place, occasion and inventor, if any, of this supposed question.
2. For the best explication of the Kantian remark: "A hundred real dollars do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible dollars."
3. For the best account of the meaning of "exists" in the *Principia Mathematica*.
4. For the best demonstration that one does or does not see stars that were in existence a long time ago.
5. For the best paper showing that motion is or is not possible in Whitehead's later philosophy.
6. For the best statement of the meaning of the expression "value of a variable."

Papers should not be more than 1000 words long, and should be in the hands of the editor of this *Review* no later than May 15, 1961. Submitted manuscripts will either be published in the *Review* or returned to the authors.

Readers are invited to submit questions. Ten dollars will be paid for each question that is used.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS *

JOYCE E. MITCHELL AND STAFF

BERTHOLD, F., Jr. *The Fear of God: The Role of Anxiety in Contemporary Thought*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959. 158 pp. \$3.00—A study of Teresa of Avila, Luther, Freud, Heidegger and Barth provides Berthold with a basis for a phenomenological analysis of anxiety. Anxiety is polar in nature, implying both longing and fear, and a desire and threat to its fulfillment. Berthold believes his analysis provides a mediating position between the Thomistic and Calvinistic anthropologies. — F. E. B.

BOAS, G. *The Inquiring Mind*. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1959. 428 pp. \$4.50—Epistemology is here approached from a systematic rather than an historical point of view. Boas recognizes that our experience is mediated by selective concerns and principles of interpretation, and emphasizes the role of consistency in organizing our knowledge. The writing is unpretentious and often witty. His is the cautious wisdom of a man who has struggled with questions a long time, rather than a brilliantly conceived and tightly reasoned argument of one who would offer us a strikingly novel solution. — L. S. F.

CLEOBURY, F. H. *Christian Rationalism and Philosophical Analysis*. London: James Clarke and Co. Ltd., 1959. 162 pp. 15s—An intellectual defense of Christianity which argues that contemporary apologetics are much too defensive intellectually. Cleobury contends that the insights of the Christian faith are most compatible with an idealistic world view. This he presents and defends with subtlety. — F. E. B.

DENT, W. R. *Reason for Living*. New York: Vantage Press, 1959. 115 pp. \$3.25—The author divides present ideological tendencies into three groups: Christian, Communist, and agnostic. Subsequent chapters attempt to outline a "small-l liberal" theology designed to provide a "reason for living" through "the present chaos." — K. R. D.

FARBER, M. *Naturalism and Subjectivism*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1959. xvi, 389 pp. \$9.50—The issues between naturalism and subjectivism are brought into sharp focus, mainly through a critical

* Books received will be acknowledged in this section by a brief résumé, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgment does not preclude more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. The Summaries and Comments will be written by the Managing Editor and her staff of assistants, with the occasional help of others. Reports have been contributed to this issue by Robert S. Brumbaugh and Gloria Buonocore.

examination of Husserl's phenomenology, with the author defending not only naturalism, but the view that only by a pluralism of methods can an adequate philosophy of experience be attained. Farber criticizes Husserl for failing to recognize that his method, rather than experience itself, generates some of the problems he attempted to solve. The movement from subjectivism to "irrationalism," (Farber's term for existentialism), is briefly accounted for by considering Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel and Sartre. An important book, occasionally sardonic and humorous. — J. E. M.

FERM, V., Ed. *Classics of Protestantism*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 587 pp. \$10.00—Abridged selections, with brief one page introductions, from sixteen authors influential in the development of Protestantism. In addition to such recognized theologians as Luther, Calvin, Schleiermacher, and Ritschl, the editor has included a liberal sprinkling of American writers (Edwards, Channing, et. al.). Contemporary thought is represented by Barth. — L. S. F.

GURR, J. E., S. J. *The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems 1750-1900*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1959. 196 pp. \$6.00—In an effort to document the infiltration of rationalistic and essentialistic patterns of thought in nineteenth century scholasticism, Father Gurr has been patient and thorough enough to search through most of the Catholic manuals in use from 1750 to 1900, focusing on the single problem of the principle of sufficient reason. Whatever the ultimate origins of this principle, it received its classic formulation with Leibniz and Wolff. It is from these thinkers that the manual writers borrowed the concept, disengaging it from its rationalistic implications with only varying degrees of success. — L. S. F.

HAINES, C. G. *The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy*. New York: Russell and Russell, 1959. xviii, 705 pp. \$10.00—Haines' work first appeared in 1914; this volume is a reprint of the enlarged second edition, which was judged at that time (1932) to be "clearly the most comprehensive survey of the origin and early growth of judicial review." In the second part, covering the period since the Civil War, Haines attempts an adequate rather than a complete quantitative study, including not only the relevant court decisions but also a survey of informed critical opinion concerning the powers of the Court to rule on the constitutionality of legislation. In the final chapter he argues against the traditional doctrine that the courts do not control the legislature, but simply interpret the law. The study includes three lengthy, but not up-to-date, appendices. — L. S. F.

HOCKING, W. E., *Strength of Men and Nations: A Message to the USA vis-à-vis the USSR*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. vii, 248 pp. \$3.50.—At the age of eighty-six, Professor Hocking has contributed a treatise on our times which shares the rarely combined merits of youthful adventure and mature insight. The central theme

of "strength" is pitted at once against the theories of ideological intransigence (i.e. "Capitalism vs. Communism") and appeasement (or "peace at any price"). The main body of this work is devoted to an investigation of the present contrasts, the common values, and the possible paths toward a creative reconciliation of the guiding educational, economic, legal, moral, political, and esthetic ideas of US and Soviet society. — K. R. D.

HUSSERL, E. *Erste Philosophie (1923/24), Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion. Husserliana, Vol. VIII.* Herausgegeben von Rudolf Boehm. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. xliii, 592 pp. 32 gld.—The second half of Husserl's university lectures of 1923-24 are given, along with supplementary materials from Husserl's *Nachlaß* which the editor adds in an attempt to clarify the obscurities and bewildering jumps of the lectures. To this are appended variant readings from 3 mss, all presented with the painstaking care usually reserved for biblical scholarship. Departing from his earlier contention that the Cartesian is a unique way to Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl explores other means for eliminating contingency, and thereby achieving an apodictic starting point for philosophy as a strict science: 1) the development of a phenomenological psychology, 2) a criticism of the positive sciences, and 3) the demonstration that positive ontologies require an absolute and universal ontology. But in granting that there might be other ways to Transcendental Phenomenology Husserl implicitly suggests the impossibility of an apodictic starting point. — D. D. O.

KALLEN, H. M. *A Study of Liberty.* Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1959. xv, 151 pp. \$3.00—This rather discursive study draws upon many sources in maintaining that freedom is the touchstone for an understanding of the human condition, both of man's possibility and his development in a world of chance and change. Kallen argues that mankind can best achieve liberty by adopting a pragmatic view of ideas which neither neglects the actual nor distorts the ideal. — F. E. B.

KAVARNOS, C. *To Sympan kai ho Anthropolos sten Amerikanike Philosophia (The Universe and Man in American Philosophy).* Athens: Aster, 1959.

A series of four lectures given in Athens during the author's tenure of a Fulbright Fellowship. The intention is to introduce Athenian public to three classical American philosophers (Emerson, James, Whitehead), as well as to contemporary trends. The author sees interesting parallels between Emerson and the Byzantine Mystics and predicts that the interest of Americans in Ancient Greek philosophy will lead to closer studies of Byzantine philosophy. The chief defect of the book is its willingness to sacrifice content for coverage. Presentation is cursory and often by terms which are misleading in themselves and particularly unfortunate when rendered into modern Greek. — A. P. D. M.

- KREYCHE, R. J. *First Philosophy*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1959. xviii, 328 pp. \$6.00—Subtitled *An Introductory Text in Metaphysics* this work provides a basic indoctrination in Thomism, giving credit to the theses borrowed from Aristotle. Non-Thomistic answers to the mysteries of being are, for the most part, dismissed as irrelevant. — J. E. M.
- LARSON, M. A. *The Religion of the Occident*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. xx, 711 pp. \$6.00—A study of the religion of Jesus in terms of its pagan and Jewish sources, its inner meaning and finally its redevelopment in the pagan world. Larson argues that the religion of the Essene Jesus was a grand "synthesis of human experience drawn from many cultures" and that this religion has been greatly distorted by the ritual of the Church. — F. E. B.
- LAZOWICK, F. E. *The Science of Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 379 pp. \$6.00—In an attempt to render the philosophical enterprise scientific by making it fully systematic, Lazowick elaborates seven exhaustive dimensions or categories (faith, justice, love, freedom, beauty, might, and wisdom) which are applicable in every instance to each of the three dominant wholes: the personal self, cultural institutions, and God. The attempt is not enhanced by Lazowick's singularly barbarous style. — L. S. F.
- MARTIN, C. B. *Religious Belief*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959. 168 pp. \$3.00—Martin believes that "mathematic statements, scientific statements, and moral statements are not (typically at least) themselves in conceptual disorder, though philosophical accounts of them regularly are." In this book he sets out to show that most religious statements (e.g. "God is necessarily good") share this defect. Martin uses linguistic analysis, but his aim is primarily to criticize the content of religious statements, not to discover the logic of religious discourse. Much of his argument depends upon the contention that many assertions are meaningful only if their negation is logically possible and that such assertions cannot be meaningfully transferred from the contingent realm to apply necessarily to God. Martin writes well, and uses dialogue to illustrate his point effectively and entertainingly. — L. S. F.
- MASSOLO, A. *Prime Ricerche di Hegel*. Urbino: Pubblicazioni dell'Università di Urbino, 1959. Serie di Lettere e Filosofia, Vol. X. 107 pp. L. 1000—Expository and interpretive studies of the fragments, essays and notes which constitute Hegel's writings while at Tübingen, Berne and Frankfurt. The author concentrates on the consonance, rather than antithesis of the writings with some of Hegel's later works. His correspondence with Schelling is considered closely, and these too are integrated with Hegel's later philosophy by means of a carefully executed, well-documented treatment. — G. B.
- MELDEN, A. I. *Rights and Right Conduct*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1959. 87 pp. 12s. 6d.—Melden approaches some important ethical prob-

lems by a careful analysis of moral rights in the moral community. A right for him is a moral role or status in the moral community; that community is served and preserved by right action. The discussion, although extremely succinct at times, ranges over a number of important points. — F. E. B.

MURRAY, B. D. *Commonwealth of Americans*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 219 pp. \$3.75—Drawing from the American literary heritage, Murray attempts to show a basic religious and moral unity and continuity in the American ethos. — F. E. B.

PLATO. *Lysis, Phaedrus, Symposium*, translated into Japanese by Mitsui Kō and Kenryo Kanamatsu. Tokyo: Takagawa University Press, Machidashi, 1959. 400 yen—An elegant book, with careful scholarly annotation, by two scholars who believe that Plato has a contribution to offer to the thought of modern Japan. It will be interesting to see what scholars in the field say as to how far, if at all, Plato's thought must be deflected toward or from Zen Buddhism by the overtones of the language in any Japanese translation. But the choice of these three dialogues for translation evidently reflects a central interest in Plato's analyses of love and desire as an attempt at building a coherent, if somewhat discursive, bridge in a Western style between finite beings in time and their background in eternity. And the Western Platonist should feel that there could perhaps be no more propitious prologue to the *Symposium* than the Japanese philosophic tradition expressed in Bashō's poems, such as "The Milky Way" (*Ama-no-Gawa*, tr. R. S. B.): A stormy sea—To Sado Isle reaches The River of Heaven. — R. S. B.

POLANYI, M. *The Study of Man*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. 102 pp. \$1.75—The first two chapters of this book (The Lindsay Memorial Lectures, 1958) reiterate the results established by Polanyi in his more comprehensive work, *Personal Knowledge*, and, according to the author, might serve as an introduction to that work. In the third and final chapter Polanyi illustrates his thesis that the study of man is continuous with the study of nature, by interpreting history according to his theory of personal knowledge, thus repudiating Collingwood and other "secessionist" theorists of history. A common ground of natural sciences and humanities is postulated in the appetitive, (including intellectual passions), perceptive center of man. — J. E. M.

SALVUCCI, P. *Grandi Interpreti di Kant: Fichte e Schelling*. Urbino: Pubblicazioni dell'Università di Urbino, 1959. Serie di Lettere e Filosofia, Vol. IX. 147 pp. L.900—A good analysis of the part Kant played in Fichte's *The Second Introduction to the Doctrine of Science* and in Schelling's *On Construction in Philosophy*. The study on Fichte considers a) his view of the genesis of Kant's intellectual intuition as the intuition of a historical reality, and b) his view of the genesis of Kant's recognition of a thing-in-itself as the recognition of a common consciousness. The study on Schelling discusses the way in which

he extended the concept of constructibility—limited by Kant to spatial constructibility in mathematics—to the eternal constructibility of the Absolute in philosophy. — G. B.

RUNES, D. *Pictorial History of Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. x, 406 pp. \$15.00—A parade of personalities, broken occasionally by general statements indicating that the personalities in question were to some extent concerned with philosophical problems. It is hard to know to what audience this book is directed, although Runes in his preface expresses the hope that the readers will be stimulated to delve into the writings of these thinkers. He asserts that "Philosophy is ethics, or it is nothing at all." He singles out three men who have fulfilled his ideal of philosophers: Solomon, Socrates and Spinoza. But this distinction wins for the latter two only a half page of text and three pages of pictures, and for the wise King Solomon, even less attention. Some of the reproductions are quite good. — J. E. M.

SAMBURSKY, S. *Physics of the Stoics*. New York: Macmillan, 1959. 153 pp. \$3.50—From the meagre fragments available (mostly from ancient writers unsympathetic to Stoic thought), Sambursky has carefully reconstructed the basic physical concepts of the Stoa, emphasizing the continuum theory developed by Chrysippos and Poseidonios. Stoic physics, in contrast with Democritean atomism, has been largely neglected, in spite of its relevance to contemporary theories of continuity. Sambursky's contribution should overcome this omission to a great extent, and, together with Mates' and Lukasiewicz's work in Stoic logic, enable us to comprehend the non-ethical features of Stoic thought. Included is a 30 page appendix giving English translations of the relevant classical fragments. — L. S. F.

STIERNOTTE, A. P. *Mysticism and the Modern Mind*. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. 206 pp. \$4.50—Eleven essays devoted to contemporary perspectives on mysticism, mostly written in the tradition of religious liberalism. Several contributors (e.g., H. N. Wieman, N. P. Stallknecht) stress the existentialist contribution to our understanding of mysticism, while N. A. Nikam examines "Some Aspects of Ontological and Ethical Mysticism in Indian Thought." Emerson is considered, along with two less conventional candidates, Whitehead and Wittgenstein, for their relevance to mystical thought. These studies are suggestive rather than definitive. — L. S. F.

TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, P. *The Phenomenon of Man*. Translated by Bernard Wall with an introduction by Julian Huxley. New York: Harper and Bros., 1959. 318 pp. \$5.00—A very felicitous translation of a work of major importance for science and philosophy. The book attempts to provide a coherent vision of the process of evolution starting from the formation of our planet through the emergence of life, and later, thought, to an imagined end state or Omega Point. The book is rich in imaginative theories about the various transitions of evolution but its greatest merit is in providing an overall pattern of high plausibility

rendering the past more intelligible and the future, in some measure, predictable. The central concept of the book seems to be that the energy present in each element of the universe (at whatever stage of complexity) is divided into two distinct components: a 'tangential' energy which links the element with all others of the same order of complexity and a 'radial' energy which draws the element towards ever greater complexity and centrality. The elaboration of the concept of 'radial' energy gives this book its great originality. — D. D. O.

WHITEHEAD, A. *Whitehead's American Essays in Social Philosophy*. Ed. and with an Introduction by A. H. Johnson. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. xii, 206 pp. \$4.00—In addition to presenting ten reprinted essays belonging to Whitehead's American period together for the first time, this volume contains a moderately lengthy "interpretative exposition" of Whitehead's social philosophy by Professor Johnson. He futilely defends Whitehead's non-technical rambles in sociology. — J. E. M.

WILD, J. *Human Freedom and Social Order, An Essay in Christian Philosophy*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1959. xi, 250 pp. \$5.00—Christian philosophy has remained an unrealized possibility, according to Wild, because Christian Faith has hitherto, for the most part, been combined only with Greek Rationalism and the long Western tradition of abstract and objectivist thought. A New Christian Philosophy, using the method of phenomenological analysis of the *Lebenswelt* is developed in the areas of ethics and social philosophy. An ethics of self-realization is rejected in favor of self-transcendence. The book is carefully argued and Wild attempts to answer the objections which will surely be raised: that this philosophy is irrational, subjective, and a surrender of the autonomy of reason. The book deserves a careful study by anyone interested in a new approach to the old problem of relating reason and faith. — D. D. O.

WILSON, N. L. *The Concept of Language*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959. 153 pp. \$4.95—In answering the question "what is a language?", the author goes beyond Tarski, Carnap and Quine—to whom he is at the same time greatly indebted—and suggests that there cannot be a logic without ontology, that language is conditioned by the world, and that full explication of the concept of language must include pragmatics, not merely syntactics and semantics. This important and fair-minded book presupposes a grasp of symbolic logic. — E. S.

WINCH, P. *The Idea of a Social Science*. New York: The Humanities Press, 1959. 143 pp. \$2.50—Winch identifies the central problem of sociology, "that of giving an account of the nature of social phenomena," with philosophy, particularly epistemology. In his attempt to undermine the "underlabourer" conception of philosophy, he draws support from Wittgenstein by reinterpreting the latter's assertion that "What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms of life." The social character of language and meaningful behavior is

treated as the starting point for a new conception of philosophy, as well as of sociology. — J. E. M.

- WOOLF, H. *The Transits of Venus; a Study of Eighteenth-Century Science*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. 258 pp. \$6.00—In this careful study, Woolf traces the international effort to make accurate observations of the transits of Venus across the face of the sun in 1761 and 1769. Precise measurement of these infrequent transits (they have been observed only three other times: 1639, 1874, and 1882) permitted the calculation of the distance from the earth to the sun, and enabled the eighteenth century to give fixed scalar dimensions to the Newtonian account of the solar system. — L. S. F.

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- COHEN, F. S. *Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959. xi, 303 pp. \$1.95.

HAINES, C. G. *The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy*, see p. 530.

- LENZEN, V. F., PEPPER, S. C., et. al. *Civilization*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959. ix, 176 pp. \$1.50.

POULET, G. *Studies in Human Time*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959. ix, 363 pp. \$1.75.

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A symposium on "Phenomenology, Existentialism, and Psychiatry" to be held in Chapel Hill is being planned for April or May of 1960. For further details write to Professor Maurice Natanson, Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.

The Yale University Library is currently completing a collection of microfilm of the extant Greek manuscripts of Plato's works, in whole or part. A description of the content and purposes of the collection will be published shortly (Robert S. Brumbaugh and Rulon Wells, "The Plato Microfilm Project," *Yale Library Gazette*, XXXIV, No. 4, April 1960). Anyone interested in receiving a reprint of this note, or having questions or suggestions, is invited to write to Mr. Wells or Mr. Brumbaugh, Department of Philosophy, Yale University.



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